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Summary 
This thesis consists of essays investigating job mobility and measurement error. Job 
mobility, captured here as a change of employer, is a striking feature of the labour 
market. In empirical work on job mobility, researchers often depend on self-reported 
tenure data to identify job changes. There may be measurement error in these 
responses and consequently observations may be misclassified as job changes when 
truly no change has taken place and vice versa. These observations serve as a starting 
point for this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the level and determinants of job mobility in Ireland, using the 
Living in Ireland Survey, the Irish component of the European Community Household 
Panel. One of the findings is that the rate of voluntary (i.e. employee initiated) job 
mobility in Ireland trebled over the period 1995 to 2000. A decomposition technique 
indicates that composition changes only explain around one-fifth of the increase, 
while the remainder reflects changes in operation of the labour market.  
 
Chapter 4 uses Monte Carlo simulation techniques to investigate the performance of a 
modified probit estimator developed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) 
that controls for misclassification in a dependent variable. An analysis of the data 
indicates that there is the possibility of substantial measurement error which may 
make it difficult to capture job changes. The Hausman et al. (1998) estimator is used 
to formally control for measurement error in models of job change for Ireland 
(Chapter 5) and other European countries (Chapter 6). The main findings are that the 
true rates of job change are being severely undercounted in several countries and also 
that similar factors are important in determining job changes across countries. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 contributes to the existing literature that examines the impact of job 
mobility on wage growth.  It finds that by controlling for measurement error in job 
changes, the effect of job mobility on wage growth is larger than prevailing estimates 
suggest. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis consists of six chapters (in addition to this introduction) investigating job-
to-job mobility and measurement error in capturing job changes. Job mobility is an 
important phenomenon to understand because the movement of workers from one job 
to another allows for flexibility in the labour market by providing workers and firms 
with a mechanism to adapt to changing economic and personal circumstances. This 
churning can be seen as the efficient working of the labour market; workers can seek 
out new employment matches that they are more productive in and for which they will 
be better rewarded. 
 
Survey data are very often used in applied work on job mobility. Typically, surveys 
do not contain a direct question asking respondents if they have changed jobs; instead 
job changes are inferred from responses to a question about tenure. It is documented 
in the literature that there is substantial measurement error in the responses to 
questions that are used to determine job changes (Brown and Light (1992)). However, 
most research ignores this measurement error and so there is a risk of misclassifying 
cases as job changes when truly no change has taken place and vice versa.
1
 This is 
one of the central concerns of this thesis. In empirical research, job changes are 
captured in a binary variable (an observation is coded as a job change or a job stay). 
Measurement error in this case is non-classical in nature, as it is negatively correlated 
with the true variable. 
 
The decision to change jobs can be analysed in a binary choice model, such as a 
probit model. Measurement error in the dependent variable in a nonlinear model leads 
to estimates that are biased and inconsistent (Hausman (2001)). Hausman, Abrevaya 
and Scott-Morton (1998) develop an estimator that controls for misclassification in 
the dependent variable in discrete choice models. The estimator explicitly 
incorporates the misclassification probabilities as additional parameters to be 
estimated. Hausman et al. (1998) show that even when only a small amount of data is 
misclassified that ordinary probit estimates are severely biased. 
                                                          
1
 See Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) for a survey of measurement error in survey data. 
 xiii 
There are also serious inference problems when a binary job change variable is used 
as an explanatory variable in a regression model, e.g. in estimating the wage effects 
associated with job mobility. Aigner (1973) demonstrates how, in the presence of a 
misclassified binary regressor, OLS coefficient estimates are biased towards zero.  
 
Therefore, in cases where misclassification is likely, it is essential to control for it, 
both when the potentially misclassified variable is the dependent variable in an 
analysis and when it is an independent variable.  
 
The determinants of job mobility and also the wage impacts of changing jobs have 
long been studied in labour economics. One of the contributions of this thesis is to 
examine how the results from these types of analyses are altered by measurement 
error in calculating job changes. In particular, it examines the extent to which job 
changes may be under- or over-counted in Ireland, and also in a range of other 
European countries. It also seeks to assess the impact that ignoring misclassification 
has on covariate effects in models of job change. In addition, it investigates the 
relationship between job mobility and wage growth for Ireland and the degree to 
which the estimated impact of job mobility on wage growth is affected by 
measurement error. 
 
In what follows, I summarise each chapter and the main conclusions.  
 
Chapter 2 contains a literature review on job mobility that is common to several of 
the subsequent chapters. It covers the theoretical approaches to job mobility and the 
associated wage effects, the patterns we should observe in the data and empirical 
evidence.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the factors that determine job-to-job mobility in Ireland over 
the period 1995 to 2001, using the Living in Ireland Survey, the Irish component of 
the European Community Household Panel. Changing jobs appears to be an important 
part of worker‟s experience in the labour market yet little is known, in an Irish 
context, about how prevalent job changing is, as well as what types of worker are 
most likely to switch jobs and this chapter seeks to bridge that gap. It finds that each 
year approximately 10 per cent of workers change jobs.  
 xiv 
 
The chapter distinguishes between voluntary (employee initiated) and involuntary 
(employer initiated) mobility. It finds that labour market experience, working in the 
public sector, whether a person is overskilled, the sector they work in and their 
occupation are important determinants of voluntary job change. The dataset used 
covers most of the Celtic Tiger period, a time where growth in the Irish economy was 
exceptional. The chapter finds the rate of voluntary job mobility in Ireland trebled 
over the period 1995 to 2000. The sample is divided into two time periods and a 
decomposition technique is applied to ascertain how much of the increase in mobility 
is attributable to compositional changes and how much is due to other factors. 
Compositional changes explain around one-fifth of the increase, while the changes in 
the labour market conditions facing workers are also an important factor driving the 
increase. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses in detail the estimator developed by Hausman et al. (1998) to 
control for misclassification in binary choice models. The chapter uses Monte Carlo 
simulations to compare the estimates from the Hausman et al. model with those from 
an ordinary probit model for different model specifications with varying levels of 
misclassification. There are many sources of misclassification in models that employ 
binary dependent variables, such as coding error, self-reporting, recall error and where 
a dummy variable is used to serve as a proxy for some true underlying variable. The 
aim of the chapter is to provide insights into when it is reasonable to use the Hausman 
et al. estimator to control for misclassification. In general, the Hausman et al. 
estimator outperforms an ordinary probit model but in some cases, especially when 
the range of 'ix  is limited or when both the sample size is small and the level of 
misclassification is low, a probit model is superior. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the extent of measurement error evident in responses to the 
question used to capture job changes for Ireland using the Living in Ireland Survey. It 
finds that the extent of measurement error in the data is considerable but it is similar 
to what Brown and Light (1992) find for the US using the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. The chapter uses the Hausman et al. (1998) estimator to formally control 
for misclassification in job changes. It finds that, by ignoring misclassification, the 
 xv 
true number of job changes is underestimated by around 60 per cent.  To put this 
figure in context, the average mobility rate in the dataset is calculated at around 9.7 
per cent and this estimate implies that the true mobility rate is around 15.6 per cent. In 
addition, the chapter finds that ignoring misclassification leads to diminished 
covariate effects.  The chapter also explores the possibility of covariate dependent 
misclassification but no support is found for this hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 6 extends the analysis in Chapter 5 to other European countries in the 
European Community Household Panel dataset. The chapter finds that the true rates 
of job mobility are undercounted in several countries, typically in the peripheral 
countries of the EU. In addition, it finds that similar factors are important in 
determining job mobility across countries. Apart from age, personal and household 
characteristics are generally not important in explaining job changes, while firm and 
job characteristics have an important role in explaining job changes. For the countries, 
where the model incorporating misclassification is accepted, the impact of the 
covariates is much stronger indicating that ordinary probit estimates are biased 
downwards. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the wage effects associated with changing jobs. Previous 
research has examined the role that job mobility makes to life cycle wage growth (e.g. 
(Topel and Ward (1992)) or how gender differences in the returns to job mobility may 
help explain the gender pay gap (e.g. Loprest (1992)). Estimates of the returns to job 
mobility are crucial to such studies. The chapter finds OLS estimates (that ignore 
misclassification) of the effect of job mobility on wage growth of around 8 per cent. 
This effect persists even after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
This estimate is very similar to what has been found in other studies (e.g. OECD 
(2010)). However these estimates ignore measurement error in job changes. The 
chapter adopts a two-step approach to controlling for misclassification in a binary 
explanatory variable.  It finds that controlling for misclassification has a substantial 
effect on the estimated impact changing jobs has on wage growth. The effect of job 
mobility on wage growth is estimated to be closer to 14 per cent when measurement 
error is controlled for.  
 1 
 
2. Literature Review on Job Mobility 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical background for some of the 
subsequent chapters.
2
 Section 2.2 reviews theories of job mobility and the associated 
implications for wages. Section 2.3 explores the types of patterns we should observe 
in the data and the related empirical evidence. Finally, Section 2.4 focuses on the 
empirical research on the wage effects of job mobility.  
 
2.2 Why do Workers Change Jobs and how does Job Mobility 
affect Wages? Theoretical Considerations 
It is widely accepted that human capital accumulation, both general and specific to the 
job, is a major driving force of wage growth over the life-cycle. In equilibrium, in a 
competitive labour market with perfect information, workers are paid their marginal 
product which depends on human capital investment. However, if the labour market is 
characterised by heterogeneity in workers and firms and by incomplete information, it 
is only after a series of job matches, separations and new job matches that this 
equilibrium is achieved. For example, imperfect information may mean that firms are 
uncertain about the productivity of workers at the beginning of employment 
relationships. As a result, workers may not be initially employed in the jobs in which 
they are the most productive. Job mobility provides a mechanism for the labour 
market to move towards a more efficient allocation of resources whereby workers sort 
themselves into jobs that maximise their productivity. Therefore job mobility may 
make an important contribution to life-cycle wage growth.  
 
In the empirical literature, it is quite difficult, and not always possible, to distinguish 
between different models of job mobility and often they are seen as complementary in 
the sense that each contributes to our understanding of a worker‟s decision to change 
                                                          
2
 Sections 2.2 and 2.3 essentially provide the theoretical background and empirical evidence on job 
mobility relevant for Chapters 3, 5 and 6. In addition to Sections 2.2 and 2.3, Section 2.4 is important 
for Chapter 7. 
 2 
jobs and the effect this can have on wages (Veum (1997)).
3
 A few papers attempt to 
disentangle the wage effects from different models of job mobility (e.g. Light and 
McGarry (1998), Campbell (2001) and Munasinghe and Sigman (2004)). Underlying 
the various models are different causal mechanisms through which job mobility 
affects wages. Also, some of the theoretical models make different predictions about 
the impact of changing jobs on wages. As a result, it is useful to understand and to 
identify these different mechanisms and the associated predicted wage effects.
4
 Four 
main theoretical approaches can be distinguished in the literature, namely the mover-
stayer model, job search models, job matching models and human capital models. 
Mover-Stayer Model 
The mover-stayer model of Blumen et al. (1955) comes from the sociology literature 
and is one of the earliest models of job mobility. In this model some individuals are 
instinctively more likely to change jobs than others. This inherent “itch” or “hobo 
syndrome” arises from some underlying unobservable personal characteristic(s). This 
characteristic results in people being consistently high or low mobility individuals 
over time. It is assumed that this instability makes movers less productive than 
stayers. The implication for wages is that movers earn lower wages because they are 
less productive workers. In this model, mobility is negatively correlated with wages 
because it is correlated with the unobservable characteristic that determines 
productivity. Therefore, in empirical work controlling for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity should mean that the wages of movers and stayers do not differ. 
Empirical evidence tends to refute the predictions of this model (e.g. Light and 
McGarry (1998) and Munasinghe and Sigman (2004)). 
Job Search Models 
In job search models (e.g. Burdett (1978)) there is heterogeneity in worker 
productivity across jobs and so a worker‟s productivity depends on the firm they are 
employed in. The quality (i.e. productivity) of an employment match is known in 
advance. Workers search for better matches and so they move from lower to higher 
paying jobs as the opportunity arises. 
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 In fact, many models of job mobility combine some of the approaches outlined here. For example, the 
job separation model in Jovanovic (1979a) merges the specific capital approach with job search theory. 
4
 In the models examined in this section, job mobility refers to voluntary (employee initiated) job 
changes.  
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In Burdett (1978) when the worker enters the labour market, if they accept the first 
job offer they obtain, their wage can be seen as a random draw from a distribution of 
wage offers reflecting their differing productivities in each of the jobs available. Once 
employed, the worker can engage in search activity. Any job offer they receive from a 
firm will reflect their productivity in that firm. The more intensely a worker searches, 
the faster is the arrival rate of alternative offers. Workers will have an incentive to 
switch jobs if the present value of the wage in the alternative job exceeds that of the 
existing job, net of any mobility costs. Therefore, the model predicts that job mobility 
has a positive effect on wages. 
 
In this type of search model, the wage gain arising from mobility comprises a discrete 
jump in the wage level at the point of job change. Wages are not affected by mobility 
as such, but rather by an improvement in match quality which is constant (within the 
job). Therefore, mobility should have no effect on wages once time constant job-
specific effects are controlled for. The wage effects predicted by this model have 
received mixed empirical support. Light and McGarry (1998) find that job mobility 
has an effect on wages, even after controlling for observed and unobserved personal 
and job characteristics. However, Campbell (2001) estimates how much of the wage 
effect associated with mobility is attributable to a change in the wage level when the 
job change occurs and how much is due to a change in wage growth. He finds that 
around 40 per cent of the gain associated with job mobility is attributable to an 
increase in the wage level at the time of changing jobs and the remainder is due to 
higher on-the-job wage growth in the new job so this type of search model only 
provides a partial explanation of the wage effect associated with changing jobs. 
 
More recent models extend the approach in Burdett (1978). For example, Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) incorporate the reactions of firms. Naticchiono and Panigo (2004) 
classify this type of search model as “static” in the sense that is does not allow for any 
within-job wage dynamics. Other search models allow for on-the-job wage growth. 
For example, in Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004), employers post wage-
tenure contracts (instead of just wages) that allow wages to increase with tenure, to 
reduce the quit probability of their employees. In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) 
wages increase on-the-job because of outside offers. In these more recent search 
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models, the gain from changing jobs will not necessarily comprise a discrete jump in 
the wage level at the time of job change but rather depend on the wage growth in the 
new job. 
Job Matching Models 
The key feature of the job matching approach is that match quality is not known ex 
ante. In matching models (e.g. Johnson (1978), Jovanovic (1979b) and Viscusi 
(1979)), jobs are considered as „experience goods‟ and it is only over time that 
information about the quality of the match is revealed. Similar to the job search 
approach, matching models tend to assume there is heterogeneity in worker 
productivity across jobs.  
 
In Jovanovic (1979b), workers face a distribution of wages reflecting firm‟s estimates 
of their productivity, rather than their actual productivity, in different jobs. As tenure 
on the job increases firms accumulate additional information about a worker‟s true 
productivity. This can lead to an upward or downwards adjustment to wages.
5
 
Workers who experience wage cuts or have low on-the-job wage growth are likely to 
separate from their employer. Specifically, job changes occur if the expected value of 
an offer at another firm exceeds the expected value of the wage in the existing job. 
This model predicts a positive relationship between job mobility and wage growth, 
although it is not a direct relationship but rather wage growth is affected by superior 
perceptions of match quality. One of the implications of the model is that a worker 
may be willing to accept a wage cut at the time of changing jobs (i.e. in the short-run) 
if they receive higher on-the-job wage growth in the new job. Naticchiono and Panigo 
(2004) classify this type of model as “dynamic” as it incorporates within-job wage 
dynamics. However, on-the-job wage growth is not attributable to changes in 
productivity but rather from changes in the firm‟s assessment of the worker‟s 
productivity.  
 
In matching models, mobility is driven by changes in observations of match quality. 
Although true match quality is constant within the job, views about match quality can 
change over time. Therefore, there will be a relationship between job mobility and 
                                                          
5
 Other models (e.g. Greenwald (1986) and Gibbons and Katz (1991)) explore the possibility of 
informational asymmetries where employers have private information about the ability of their 
employees and how this affects employees‟ wages and mobility. 
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wages even after individual and job specific observable and unobservable effects are 
controlled for. Although we expect the relationship between job mobility and wages 
to be positive, it can be negative in the short-term. Light and McGarry (1998) find 
that mobility has an effect on wages after controlling for individual and job specific 
unobservable effects and argue this finding is consistent with the job matching model. 
Specific Human Capital Approach 
The specific human capital approach (e.g. Becker (1962), Jovanovic (1979a), 
Mortensen (1978) and Parsons (1972)) highlights a negative relationship between 
investment in specific human capital and the likelihood of job change. Workers 
acquire specific human capital as tenure in a job increases. As these skills are not 
transferable to a new job, workers and firms share the costs and benefits of this 
investment. The acquisition of this specific human capital raises productivity and 
consequently wages in the current job so the likelihood of a job separation decreases 
with tenure. In the short-term, we expect changing jobs to result in wage losses 
because of the non transferability of specific capital to another job. 
 
However, as the rate of specific human capital accumulation declines with job tenure, 
wage growth will also decline as tenure on the job increases. Although existing 
specific capital is lost when changing jobs which can lead to a lower starting wage in 
an alternative job, there may be more opportunities for investment in specific human 
capital in an alternative job which means that the worker could have faster on-the-job 
wage growth than in the current job (Mortensen (1988)). 
Other Approaches 
Many modern theoretical models build on the models described above. However, 
there are alternative approaches. For example, in Lazear‟s (1986) raiding model, firms 
compete for high quality workers and they use workers‟ previous wages as an 
indicator of their quality. Consequently, high productivity workers experience more 
mobility than low productivity workers because the high paying firms will poach 
workers from other firms. This is contrary to the prediction of the mover-stayer 
model; in this raiding model mobility acts as a positive signal of productivity and 
leads to wage gains.  
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2.3 Patterns we should observe in the Data 
Labour Market Conditions  
Turnover rates should vary over the course of the business cycle. Shimer (2003) 
highlights the fact that vacancies are procyclical. Therefore, during an upturn there is 
an increase in vacancies and so there are more potential employment opportunities 
available to workers. In job search models, this would lead to an increase in the job 
offer arrival rate. In job matching models there is an increase in the number of 
alternative jobs a worker can switch to. In general, we would expect workers to have a 
higher probability of quitting when they have a good chance of obtaining a better job 
quickly. Therefore, when labour market conditions are tight we would expect to see 
more quits than when they are loose (e.g. Cornelissen, Hubler and Schneck (2007)). 
Conversely, layoff rates tend to be anti-cyclical; when demand falls employers will 
layoff workers. 
 
Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) say that the relationship between job turnover and 
the business cycle is more complex. They argue and find empirical support for their 
hypothesis that in an upturn, where there is a surge in hiring by firms, there is also an 
increase in the number of workers whose productivity is unknown and this may lead 
to higher subsequent job separations. Similarly, downturns in activity provide 
employers with an opportunity to shed their least productive workers, thus reducing 
the need for subsequent adjustments in their workforce.   
 
Other studies focus on the effect of labour market conditions at the time of labour 
market entry for workers; the impact this has on wages and how it affects job mobility 
(e.g. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz and (2008) and Bachmann, Bauer and 
David (2010)).  
Cross Country Differences 
Borghans and Golsteyn (2011) document differences in mobility patterns across 
countries for college graduates. They find that graduates in the US are more mobile 
than European graduates and that there are large differences in job mobility within 
Europe; graduates in Norway and the Netherlands are more mobile than those in 
France, Sweden and Germany. They also find that mobility rates in Japan are close to 
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the European average mobility rate. We would expect to see higher mobility rates in 
countries with more flexible labour markets. Several studies highlight differences in 
labour market institutions and regulations across countries which may help explain 
differences in mobility rates and wage changes (e.g. Davia (2005), Dustmann and 
Pereira (2008), Ibsen, Trevisan and Westergaard-Nielsen (2008) and Pavlopoulos, 
Fouarge, Muffels and Vermunt (2007)). 
Tenure, Age and Experience 
Age is an important factor determining job mobility and turnover declines with age.  
In Stigler (1962) younger workers are more likely to try a variety of jobs in order to 
acquire knowledge of the labour market and their own preferences and ability for 
different jobs (a process known as “job shopping”), so we expect to see higher 
mobility rates for younger workers. In job search models, as workers gain labour 
market experience, they have more opportunities to search for, assess and accept 
superior job offers. Consequently, as experience increases so does the worker‟s 
reservation wage for changing jobs so the probability of job mobility declines with 
experience. This is supported empirically by numerous studies. For example, Topel 
and Ward (1992) find that for young men, two thirds of their total lifetime job 
mobility occurs within the first ten years of their career. They see job mobility for 
young workers as a crucial phase in workers‟ movement to more long-term stable 
employment relationships. Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (1999) use 
retrospective work-history data from the British Household Panel Survey to study 
mobility over the period 1915 to 1990 and they find that on average workers hold five 
jobs over the course of their working lives and that half of all lifetime job changes 
occur within the first ten years of labour market entry. 
 
The probability of job mobility also declines with tenure. In job matching models, 
when the quality of the match is revealed, workers in a successful match may be 
rewarded with higher wages or match specific rents. If tenure indicates the existence 
of a successful match then these rents may reduce job mobility for workers with 
longer tenures.
6
 In human capital models, the relative value of an existing job, in 
terms of productivity and wages, increases with tenure because of specific human 
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 This negative relationship between job mobility and job tenure is usually evident using annual data. 
However, using more frequent data can show there is an increase in the hazard of a job ending in the 
first few months of an employment relationship (e.g. Farber (1994)).  
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capital accumulation. Therefore, as workers acquire specific human capital the 
probability of turnover is reduced. 
 
In addition, Groot and Verberne (1997) argue that mobility is likely to be higher for 
younger people or for those with less labour market experience or less tenure due to 
the presence of mobility costs. There are both financial and psychological costs to 
changing jobs. Older people are more likely to have made investments in housing and 
be more settled or attached to their environment. Therefore, the costs of changing jobs 
are likely to be higher for older people, especially if changing jobs involves moving 
house. Workers with longer tenure are also likely to have higher psychological costs 
in changing jobs. To the extent that longer tenure reflects high quality matches, these 
workers may feel a stronger attachment to their organisation and colleagues. In 
addition, even if the costs associated with changing jobs are the same for younger and 
older people, younger people have more time before retirement to make up these 
costs. Workers change jobs if the expected utility from doing so exceeds the costs. If 
the gains involved in changing jobs put a worker on a higher wage path, younger 
workers will benefit for longer from these gains. Finally, older workers may have 
higher time preferences and therefore apply a higher discount rate on future earnings 
so job mobility declines with age.
7
 
Gender 
Central to why we might expect differential mobility rates by gender is that women 
have a lower attachment to the labour force. Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1993) 
develop a job-matching model where workers differ in their attachment to the labour 
force. The model predicts that those with a weaker attachment to the labour force are 
sorted into jobs that offer less training and that use less capital and as a result have 
less to lose by changing jobs in terms of specific capital. On the other hand, women‟s 
mobility decisions may be more constrained by nonmarket variables such as their 
partner‟s location or the rearing of children. In addition, women spend more time on 
household tasks than men (Hersch and Stratton (1997)). Therefore the opportunity 
cost of job search may be higher for women. Empirically, several studies have found 
that by controlling for characteristics, such as labour market experience, gender 
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 While there are theoretical arguments supporting the importance of variables such as age, experience 
and tenure, empirically, they tend to be correlated with each other, which may make the identification 
of separate effects difficult. 
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differences in turnover rates diminish or disappear (e.g. Blau and Kahn (1981) for 
worker-initiated separations in the US and Booth and Francesconi (2000) for worker-
initiated separations in the UK).   
 
However, there are instances where we expect to see differences in job change rates. 
For example, within voluntary mobility, women may be more likely to make changes 
for non-job related reasons, for example they may be more motivated to change jobs 
to help them combine their professional and family life (e.g. Keith and McWilliams 
(1999)). 
Education 
There are several reasons to expect a relationship between education and job mobility 
but there is no consensus in the literature as to whether it is positive or negative. 
Barron et al. (1993) argue that education may qualify workers for high training jobs 
or capital-intensive jobs and so incentives are offered to decrease the expected 
number of quits for better-educated workers. Connolly and Gottschalk (2006) observe 
that less educated workers may invest less in human capital and consequently have 
less to lose by changing jobs. They will therefore have a lower reservation value when 
approached with an alternative job offer. Weiss (1984) suggests that there is an 
unobservable characteristic, which he calls “stick-to-itiveness”, that affects both the 
value of education and the value of staying in an existing job.  
 
Neal (1999) proposes a model of job search that involves both employment matches 
and career matches. He argues that less educated workers are likely to experience 
more job turnover because they experience mobility that involves career change and 
then they search for a good employment match. Therefore, it is possible that the 
process of finding a good career match may add considerably to the wage growth of 
younger workers, especially the less educated. To the extent that better educated 
workers (especially those with college degrees) use time spent in education as a form 
of pre-market search, they are less likely to experience mobility that involves career 
changes. 
 
However, it is also possible that there could be a positive relationship between 
education and mobility. Weiss (1984) argues that education increases workers‟ 
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alternative opportunities and so may increase job mobility. Johnson (1979) argues that 
higher wage variance may increase the option value of job mobility, so highly 
educated workers may experience more job turnover as they face more variable but 
potentially more rewarding alternative job offers. In addition, Greenwood (1975) 
contends that highly educated individuals may be more efficient job searchers and so 
have lower transactions costs and therefore may change jobs more easily. It is 
possible that better educated workers are more likely to have „faster‟ careers and will 
change jobs more frequently as a means of advancing up the career ladder (Borsch-
Supan (1987)). Finally, Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) put forward the idea that highly 
educated workers have a comparative advantage in learning and implementing new 
technologies and so firms may provide incentives to reduce job quits. 
 
2.4 Empirical Findings on Wage Impacts  
Many empirical studies of the wage changes associated with job mobility find a 
positive effect on wage growth of around 10 per cent. This result is reasonably robust 
across countries. Campbell (2001) finds that the wage gain associated with changing 
job over a three-year period is around 10 per cent in the UK. Abbott and Beach (1994) 
find that the average wage gain for Canadian women who change jobs is around 8-9 
per cent. Topel and Ward (1992) report a 10 per cent return to mobility for young men 
in the US. OECD (2010) find an average of a 3 to 4 percentage point wage premium 
associated with changing jobs for a range of European countries. Their estimate for 
the Irish wage premium is higher at around 9 per cent.   
 
Several studies (e.g. Light and McGarry (1998), Topel and Ward (1992)) do not 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary mobility. There are several reasons 
why it may not be entirely useful to differentiate between them. In some instances, the 
distinction between the two may be somewhat arbitrary. For example, an employee in 
a firm that is in difficulty may be concerned about being laid off and so may search 
for and obtain alternative employment. This would count as a voluntary quit even 
though it is motivated by the risk of being laid off. In addition, if we count all 
employee initiated separations as voluntary, then voluntary quits include those caused 
by illness and family reasons, in addition to those due to finding a better job. Finally, 
very often a significant proportion of respondents in surveys either do not give a 
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reason for why they left their previous job or they do so for a reason not included in 
the questionnaire. These people either have to be arbitrarily assigned as voluntary or 
involuntary movers or excluded from the analysis (Light and McGarry (1998)).  
 
However, other studies have found the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
mobility to be important when estimating wage impacts. A common result in the 
literature is that voluntary mobility leads to higher wage growth than not changing 
jobs or for involuntary moves. (e.g. Mincer (1986)). In addition, in many instances 
involuntary moves are associated with wage losses, especially when there is an 
intervening spell of unemployment between jobs (e.g. Garcia Perez and Rebollo Sanz 
(2005)). Different types of separations (within voluntary and involuntary changes) 
have been found to have differential wage impacts. For example, Bartel and Borjas 
(1981) and Keith and McWilliams (1999) find higher wage growth for voluntary 
separations that are job-related and not due to personal reasons. Keith and 
McWilliams (1997) find that being laid off has a smaller wage penalty associated with 
it than being fired. Keith and McWilliams (1999) also find that those who engaged in 
employed job search prior to separating from their employer receive higher returns to 
mobility. 
 
There is consistent evidence in the literature that mobility related wage gains decrease 
with age as well as tenure (e.g. Bartel and Borjas (1981)). In fact most of the 
empirical literature focuses on younger workers because job mobility is more 
common in the earlier stages of individuals working lives. For example, Topel and 
Ward (1992) find that job mobility accounts for one third of total wage growth for 
men in their first ten years in the labour market. 
 
Other studies argue that the effect of changing jobs on wage growth depends on the 
position in the wage distribution. For example, Pavlopoulos et al. (2007) find that job 
mobility leads to a wage increase for low-paid workers but not for high-paid workers. 
 
Other studies focus on gender differences in the returns to mobility and the extent to 
which this could account for the gender wage gap (e.g. Caparros Ruiz, Navarro 
Gomez and Rueda Narvaez (2004)). Gender differences in the impact of mobility may 
arise as women are more likely than men to separate from their jobs for family-related 
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reasons (e.g. Keith and McWilliams (1997)). In addition, the opportunity cost of job 
search may be higher for women, especially married women, and so they may search 
less intensively than men for a better job match. Kahn and Griesinger (1989) argue 
that female job quits may be less responsive to wages than male ones because women 
place a higher value on non-monetary aspects of a job than men.  Loprest (1992) finds 
that women only experience half the wage growth of men when changing jobs. 
However, Keith and McWilliams (1997) do not find gender differences in the returns 
to mobility once the reason for job separation is controlled for. 
 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of prior mobility on current 
wages. Keith (1993) argues that highly mobile workers generate greater turnover costs 
for employers so they view people with a high probability of turnover as undesirable 
and so there may be “reputation effects” associated with a high mobility past. Mincer 
and Jovanovic (1981) aggregate voluntary and involuntary changes and they find that 
prior mobility does not affect current wages. However Keith (1993) finds that each 
voluntary separation increases wages by 2 per cent while each involuntary quit 
reduces wages by a similar magnitude so that aggregating the two types of mobility 
disguises the offsetting impact of each. Light and McGarry (1998) also find that 
persistent mobility leads to a lower wage. 
 13 
 
3. Job Mobility in Ireland 
3.1 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is to investigate the various factors that determine job-to-job 
mobility in Ireland. The dataset used covers most of the Celtic Tiger period, a time 
where growth in the Irish economy was exceptional, and the chapter addresses the 
effect the changing labour market had on job mobility. Job mobility is an important 
phenomenon to understand because the movement of workers from one job to another 
allows for flexibility in the labour market by providing workers and firms with a 
mechanism to adapt to changing economic and personal circumstances. This churning 
can be seen as the efficient working of the labour market; as workers can seek out 
new employment matches that they are more productive in and for which they will be 
better rewarded. 
 
Over the course of the 1990s the Irish economy experienced spectacular growth rates 
with GNP growth averaging 7.9 per cent per annum over the period 1995 to 2001. 
The success of the Irish economy over this period was built on factors that affected 
labour supply, such as the favourable demographic structure of the labour force, a 
dramatic rise in female participation rates and net immigration, particularly towards 
the end of the period, and accompanied by factors that affected the demand for labour 
such as foreign direct investment and competitiveness. Over this period, labour supply 
growth averaged 3.4 per cent per annum and employment increased by an average of 
67,000 per annum (on a PES basis), implying that the number of jobs created over the 
period far exceeded the number of jobs that were destroyed.  Existing research tells us 
that some of these jobs were filled by those returning to the labour market, 
particularly women (see Doris (2001)), and immigrants or returning nationals (see 
Barrett, Fitz Gerald and Nolan (2002)). Changing jobs appears to be an important part 
of worker‟s experience in the labour market yet little is known, in an Irish context, 
about how prevalent job changing is, as well as what types of worker are most likely 
to switch jobs and this chapter seeks to bridge that gap. 
 
 14 
The chapter finds that labour market experience, working in the public sector, whether 
a person is overskilled, the sector they work in and their occupation are important 
determinants of voluntary job change. The chapter also finds the rate of voluntary job 
mobility in Ireland trebled over the period 1995 to 2000. It investigates the potential 
causes of this increase - is it simply driven by changes in the composition of workers 
or do other factors such as changes in the labour market conditions facing workers 
play a role? To do this, the sample is divided into two time periods and a 
decomposition technique is applied to ascertain how much of the increase in mobility 
is attributable to compositional changes and how much is due to other factors. 
Compositional changes explain around one-fifth of the increase, while the remainder 
seems to reflect fundamental changes in the operation of the labour market. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the dataset, the construction 
of key variables and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 presents the 
results of some multinomial probit models of job change and also discusses how we 
take account of changes in the labour market environment over the period. Section 3.4 
outlines a decomposition technique that is used to ascertain the extent to which the 
increase in mobility is driven by changes in the composition of the sample. Section 
3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Dataset, Defining Job Mobility and Descriptive Statistics  
3.2.1 Dataset and Sample Construction 
The Living in Ireland Survey (LIS) is used to investigate the determinants of job 
change. The LIS constitutes the Irish component of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) which began in 1994 and ended in 2001.
8
 It involved an 
annual survey of a representative sample of private households and individuals aged 
16 years and over in each EU member state, based on a standardised questionnaire. 
The fact that the same households were interviewed each year means that it is possible 
to study changes in characteristics or circumstances of individuals or households over 
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 Additional details on the structure of the LIS Survey and the sample design are available at: 
http://issda.ucd.ie/documentation/esri/lii-overview.pdf 
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time.
9
 A wide range of information on variables such as labour force status, 
occupation, income and education level is collected. There is also data on job and firm 
characteristics. 
 
Job mobility refers to the ability of workers to change jobs; in practice realised job 
changes are used as a proxy for job mobility. The panel dimension of the LIS is 
exploited to identify job changes. A revolving balanced panel of people aged 20 to 60, 
roughly the prime working age, is selected from the LIS. This means that individuals 
are included in the sample in every year that they meet this age restriction.
10
 A 
revolving balanced panel is preferable to a pure balanced panel as a balanced panel 
prevents the entry of younger people into the sample and so, over time, as the fixed 
sample ages the proportion of younger people would decline.
11
 Essentially, a 
revolving balanced panel allows younger people to enter into the sample and older 
people to leave the sample in later years. In addition, respondents must have 
completed the interview in each year in question. Each individual‟s labour force status 
is then categorised on a PES basis. Individuals, who are categorised as employed, are 
those who work or usually work at least 15 hours per week. Finally, around 120 cases 
are deleted from the sample each year; these cases refer to where the respondent is 
working but the start date with their employer (which is needed to capture job changes 
as described in Section 3.2.2) is missing in any year. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the total sample size for each year and provides some basic 
characteristics of the sample. The average age of the sample declines over the period 
implying that the impact of the baby boom generation outweighs the effect of the 
ageing of the sample. The sample labour force participation rate appears high but it is 
measured as the number of people in the labour force aged 20 to 60 as a percentage of 
the total number of people age 20 to 60.
12
 The male participation rate is significantly 
                                                          
9
 There was some attrition in the sample in the earlier years, although the representativeness of the 
sample was improved in 2000 with the addition of new households. These new entrants to the LIS 
sample have been excluded from the analysis. 
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 This approach to selecting a sample is similar to that of Baker and Solon (1999). 
11
 For example, someone who is 20 in 1995 will be 26 in 2001 and if we only considered the same 
group of people over time (a balanced panel), there would be no one below the age of 26 in the panel 
by 2001.  
12
 Using Central Statistics Office (CSO) data, the participation rate for those aged 15 to 64 rose from 60 
to 66 per cent over the period.  This is below the participation rate of the sample given in Table 3.1, but 
it considers more younger and older people who are less likely to be in the labour force and so it is at 
least consistent with the rate given in Table 3.1.  
 16 
above the female participation rate; however there is a dramatic rise in the female rate 
over the period. The table also shows that participation rates decline with age, as we 
would expect, and that the participation rates for those over the age of 30 increased 
between 1995 and 2001.
13
  
 
Table 3.1: Revolving Balanced Panel of Individuals aged 20 to 60 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sample Size 2,417 2,367 2,338 2,299 2,294 2,314 2,357 
less cases where starting date 
with employer is missing for 
workers 
125 120 121 120 115 119 118 
Revolving Balanced Panel 2,292 2,247 2,217 2,179 2,179 2,195 2,239 
Average Age 42.2 42.0 41.7 41.4 41.0 40.5 40.1 
        
 % % % % % % % 
Participation Rate 64 65 67 69 71 72 73 
Participation Rate: Male 90 89 90 90 91 90 90 
Participation Rate: Female 40 42 46 50 53 55 57 
Participation Rate: 20-29 79 81 81 81 84 78 81 
Participation Rate: 30-39 71 72 73 77 76 78 77 
Participation Rate: 40-49 65 67 71 72 76 77 75 
Participation Rate: 50-60 48 48 50 53 55 58 60 
 
3.2.2 Calculation of Job Mobility 
To capture job changes we need to be able to identify those who have separated from 
their employer between waves. The LIS does not contain an explicit question about 
changing jobs. Instead job changes are captured using the information about when a 
worker reports that they started working with their current employer. In this chapter, 
job mobility is defined in terms of employment-to-employment transitions, so to 
capture this, workers need to be employed in two consecutive waves. Workers are 
asked to report the month and year that they started working with their current 
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 There is a 6-percentage point drop in the participation rate for people aged 20 to 29 between 1999 
and 2000. This is explained by an increase in the proportion of younger people staying on in education, 
in particular those aged 20.  
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employer. The specific question asked in the survey is: „When did you begin work 
with your present employer (or in your present business)? Please specify the month 
and the year‟. If the reported date is after their interview in one year but before their 
interview in the following year, this indicates that the person has changed jobs 
between the two waves. Other types of labour market transitions such as moving from 
being unemployed or not participating in the labour market to being employed are 
excluded from the analysis. For example, someone who is employed in one year and 
then unemployed for two years and then employed again is not included in the 
analysis. Even though this person has moved to a new job over the four-year period, 
they have moved from being employed to being unemployed for two years to being 
employed again. These types of transitions are excluded because the decision to 
change jobs is different to the decision to move from, say nonparticipation or 
unemployment to employment. This definition of job mobility only allows people to 
be unemployed or to not participate in the labour market for a relatively short amount 
of time between jobs, essentially less than a year (or more precisely less than the 
amount of time between interviews).  
 
This measure of job mobility refers to a change of employers and so may be 
considered as a measure of external job mobility, there are other types of mobility that 
can take place within a firm, such as promotion etc but we cannot capture this type of 
internal mobility in the data.
14
 In addition, this measure of job mobility may 
underestimate total mobility if more than one job change takes place between 
interviews. It is well known that that there is a high hazard of jobs ending within the 
first year of an employment relationship (e.g. Farber (1999)).  
 
Individuals who are employed in successive two-year periods are selected from the 
revolving balanced panel. The resulting sample is one with workers who have a high 
attachment to the labour force. There are 1,817 people in the analysis and 8,976 
person-year observations. Table 3.2 shows the number of workers employed in 
consecutive two-year periods and the rate of job change.  Each year approximately 10 
per cent of workers change jobs. However, this figure masks an important trend 
                                                          
14
 Several studies (e.g. Booth and Francesconi (2000)) have found this distinction to be important. 
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evident in the data. In 1995, 6.5 per cent of workers changed jobs and this rate 
increased over the period so that by 2000 the mobility rate was 13.4 per cent. 
 
Table 3.2: Job Mobility Rate 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of workers 1,163 1,175 1,211 1,276 1,341 1,376 1,434 
No. Job Changes  76 85 102 139 146 184 156 
Job Mobility Rate 6.5% 7.2% 8.4% 10.9% 10.9% 13.4% 10.9% 
 
A total of 888 job changes are identified, however, some people changed jobs more 
than once so Table 3.3 shows the number of jobs held by the 1,817 workers between 
the beginning and end of the 7-year period. 
 
Table 3.3: Number of Job Changes per Worker 
0 1,254 
1 359 
2 121 
3 54 
4 20 
5 9 
 
To put Ireland in an international context, Table 3.4 shows average rates of job 
mobility for young workers over the period 1995 to 2001 across a range of European 
countries from Davia (2005). From the table we can see that young workers in Ireland 
have a relatively high rate of job mobility. The mobility rates reported in Table 3.4 
refer to workers who were under the age of 30 in 1994 as the sample considered by 
Davia (2005) is restricted to younger people. This chapter focuses on workers aged 20 
to 60. The mobility rate reported by Davia (2005) for Ireland is consistent with the 
mobility rate this chapter finds for younger people. 
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Table 3.4: Job Mobility Rates, Average between 1995-2001 for Workers under 30 in 1994 
Germany 6% 
Netherlands 8% 
Austria 8% 
Portugal 9% 
Belgium 10% 
France 10% 
Italy 10% 
Greece 13% 
Ireland 16% 
UK 19% 
Finland 22% 
Spain 23% 
Source: Davia (2005), estimates derived from the European Community Household Panel Survey. 
 
The LIS also asks the main reason for the previous employment relationship ending. 
This allows us to identify worker initiated or voluntary quits such as obtaining a better 
job, family-related quits etc and employer related or involuntary quits such as 
redundancy, dismissal, business closure etc. It may be important to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary job turnover as the reason for job separation is 
likely to have different impacts on subsequent wage growth.
15
 Table 3.5 gives the 
main reason why job changers stopped working in their previous jobs. In each year 
the bulk of job changes were voluntary, with 49 per cent of job changes being 
voluntary in 1995 rising to 65 per cent in 2001.
16
 In 1995, 33 per cent of mobility was 
involuntary and this tended to fall over the period so that by 2001 around 21 per cent 
of all job changes were involuntary. Unfortunately, around 15 per cent of people who 
changed jobs each year did so for another reason that wasn‟t included in the 
questionnaire or they did not answer the question. These workers are excluded from 
the analysis that follows and Table 3.6 shows the number of workers employed in 
consecutive two-year periods and the rate of job change for the resulting sample. The 
                                                          
15
 Keith and McWilliams (1999) amongst others find differential rates of return to job mobility in the 
US depending on whether the reason for separation is voluntary or involuntary.  
16
 Included in the „Other Reasons Given‟ category in Table 3.5 are explanations such as childbirth or 
looking after children, looking after an old, sick or disabled person, that their partner‟s job required 
them to move to another place, study, or that the person became ill or disabled. 
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table shows that the voluntary job mobility rate trebled over the period 1995 to 2000, 
while the involuntary job mobility rate remained roughly constant over the time 
period. 
 
Table 3.5: Reason for Stopping Previous Job 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Voluntary Turnover:        
Got Better Job 46% 44% 43% 41% 47% 53% 56% 
Other Reasons Given 3% 7% 11% 14% 16% 14% 9% 
Involuntary Turnover:        
Obliged to Stop 11% 12% 12% 17% 8% 10% 10% 
End of Contract 22% 24% 15% 12% 16% 12% 12% 
        
Rest 18% 14% 20% 16% 14% 11% 13% 
 
Table 3.6: Job Mobility Rate 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of workers 1,149 1,163 1,191 1,254 1,321 1,355 1,413 
No. Job Changes  62 73 82 117 126 163 135 
Overall Job Mobility Rate 5.4% 6.3% 6.9% 9.3% 9.5% 12.0% 9.6% 
Voluntary Mobility Rate 3.2% 3.7% 4.6% 6.1% 7.0% 9.1% 7.2% 
Involuntary Mobility Rate 2.2% 2.6% 2.3% 3.2% 2.6% 3.0% 2.3% 
 
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This section examines some individual characteristics of workers and of those who 
change jobs. The aims are to identify differences in characteristics between those who 
change jobs and those who stay in their jobs and also to identify any compositional 
changes in the total number of workers that might help explain the rise in the rate of 
voluntary job change. 
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Age 
The age distribution of all workers in the sample (from Table 3.6) is given in Table 
3.7. The proportion of workers in the 20 to 29 age group increases over time, and the 
increase is more marked in 2000 and 2001, reflecting the fact that these younger 
people only have to be working for a relatively short period of time to be included in 
the sample. The proportion of workers in the 30-39 age group declines over the 
period, consistent with the ageing of the sample over time. The proportion of the 
workers in the 40 to 49 age group increases up to 2000, again indicating the ageing of 
the sample.
17
 The proportion of workers between 50 and 60 declines slightly over the 
period because the impact of people dropping out of the sample at 60 slightly 
dominates the effect of ageing. There is a slight decrease in the average age of 
workers over the period due to the impact of the „baby boom‟ generation. 
 
Table 3.7: Age Distribution of Workers & Job Change Rate by Age Group 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Age Distribution of Workers 
20-29 17% 17% 19% 20% 22% 24% 24% 
30-39 31% 30% 28% 27% 25% 23% 22% 
40-49 26% 28% 29% 29% 30% 30% 29% 
50-60 26% 25% 24% 23% 23% 23% 24% 
Average Age 41.0 40.8 40.3 40.1 40.0 39.8 39.8 
        
 Voluntary Job Change Rate by Age Group 
20-29 12% 11% 15% 15% 17% 21% 13% 
30-39 2% 4% 3% 6% 7% 8% 9% 
40-49 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 
50-60 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 4% 5% 
Average Age 28.8 32.1 30.0 32.7 30.9 31.8 34.1 
        
 Involuntary Job Change Rate by Age Group 
20-29 3% 5% 4% 5% 3% 4% 3% 
30-39 2% 2% 2% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
40-49 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2% 
50-60 2% 1% 3% 3% 2% 3% 1% 
Average Age 39.4 35.6 38.9 38.2 38.8 37.5 36.9 
                                                          
17
 The proportion declines slightly from 2000 to 2001. The numbers leaving to enter the older age 
group roughly cancels out the number of people entering this age group and because the number of 
people in the younger age group is increasing quite dramatically the share of the total accounted for by 
the 40 to 49 age group declines somewhat. 
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The table also shows the percentage of each age group who experience voluntary and 
involuntary mobility over time. From the table, we can see that the propensity to 
voluntarily change jobs declines with age and this finding is consistent with the 
empirical literature. The increasing proportion of young people aged 20 to 29 is, at 
least in part, driving the increase in the overall mobility rate. Interestingly, the 
mobility rates for workers over the age of 30, although somewhat volatile over the 
period, show quite large increases. For example, the rate of job change for those aged 
between 30 and 39 quadruples over the period, albeit from a much lower base than the 
comparable rate for workers aged between 20 and 29. Workers who change jobs are 
on average 8/9 years younger than the sample average. The table also shows that the 
rates of involuntary change are more evenly distributed across age groups, although 
those in the 20 to 29 age category experience the highest rate of involuntary job 
separations. 
Gender 
Table 3.8 shows the gender distribution of workers over time and the proportion of 
men and women who experience voluntary and involuntary mobility. Female workers 
account for a rising proportion of workers over time, capturing female workers who 
returned to the labour market over the period. In addition, female workers experience 
a higher rate of voluntary mobility than male workers. Both the male and female rates 
of voluntary job mobility increase over the period 1995 to 2000 with the female rate 
increasing at a faster pace. The female voluntary job separation rate is around 1 
percentage point above the male rate so the changing gender distribution of workers 
may be contributing somewhat to the rise in the voluntary job mobility rate over the 
period.  
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Table 3.8: Gender Distribution of Workers & Job Change Rate by Gender 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Gender Distribution of Workers 
Male 69% 67% 66% 63% 63% 63% 61% 
Female 31% 33% 34% 37% 37% 37% 39% 
        
 Voluntary Job Change Rate by Gender 
Male 4% 3% 4% 5% 6% 8% 7% 
Female 2% 4% 5% 9% 8% 10% 7% 
        
 Involuntary Job Change Rate by Gender 
Male 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
Female 3% 3% 1% 3% 1% 4% 2% 
 
Education 
The education distribution of all workers is shown in the top panel of Table 3.9. In the 
table low-skilled workers are those who have, at most, Junior Certificate education, 
medium-skilled are those who have, at most, a diploma and high-skilled are those 
with degrees.
18
 From the table, an improvement in the educational attainment of 
workers is apparent with low-skilled workers accounting for a declining proportion of 
the total over time. 
 
The table also shows the percentage of workers within various education groups who 
change jobs by type of change. Medium-skilled workers have a higher propensity to 
experience voluntary separations than low-skilled workers or high-skilled workers. 
The rise in the proportion of medium-skilled workers may be contributing to the rise 
in the voluntary mobility rate. Low-skilled workers have the highest rate of 
involuntary separations. On average 3 per cent of low-skilled workers experience 
involuntary mobility, while the comparable rates for medium-skilled and high-skilled 
workers are 2 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 There are between 1 and 7 cases each year where the answer to the educational attainment question is 
missing. For these people, their educational attainment is assigned on the basis of the age at which they 
left full time education. 
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Table 3.9: Education Distribution of Workers & Job Change Rate by Education Level 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Education Distribution of Workers 
Low-Skilled 49% 48% 48% 45% 44% 43% 41% 
Medium-Skilled 37% 38% 39% 41% 42% 43% 46% 
High-Skilled 14% 13% 13% 14% 15% 14% 14% 
        
 Voluntary Job Change Rate by Education 
Low-Skilled 2% 3% 5% 5% 5% 6% 7% 
Medium-Skilled 4% 6% 6% 8% 9% 11% 8% 
High-Skilled 5% 3% 1% 5% 7% 10% 4% 
        
 Involuntary Job Change Rate by Education 
Low-Skilled 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 
Medium-Skilled 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
High-Skilled 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 
 
Occupation 
The occupations workers have may also provide a measure of human capital or skills. 
The occupational distribution of workers and the propensity for workers in different 
occupations to change jobs is given in Table 3.10.
19
 As job changes may also involve 
a change in occupation the data in the table refer to the occupation held in the 
previous year or in the previous job. The table shows that over the period there is 
generally some decline in the proportion of workers who are managers, professionals 
and skilled workers, while the proportion of workers in elementary occupations and 
clerks increases over the period. There is much more variability in the rates of job 
mobility by occupation than by education level. Clerks and those in elementary 
occupations have roughly double the rate of job change of managers, professionals 
and skilled workers. The changing occupational structure could be contributing to the 
overall increase in mobility. Over half of the job changes identified involve a change 
in occupation. Clerks and those in elementary occupations also experience a higher 
rate of involuntary separations. 
                                                          
19
 In the LIS, occupations are classified according to the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations, version 1988 (COM) 1-digit codes. In the tables the „Manager‟ category comprises 
managers, senior officials and legislators; the „Professional‟ category includes those working in the 
armed forces, professionals, technicians and associated professionals; the „Clerks‟ category includes 
clerks, service, shop and sale workers; the „Skilled‟ category comprises skilled agricultural or fishery 
workers and skilled craft or trade workers and finally the „Elementary Occupations‟ category includes 
those in elementary occupations, plant or machine operators and assemblers. 
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Table 3.10: Occupational Distribution of Workers & Job Change Rate by Occupation 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Occupational Distribution of Workers 
Manager 12% 11% 10% 9% 8% 8% 10% 
Professional 26% 26% 26% 25% 26% 24% 24% 
Clerk 21% 21% 22% 23% 24% 26% 26% 
Skilled 23% 23% 22% 21% 21% 21% 22% 
Elementary 18% 19% 20% 22% 22% 21% 19% 
        
 Voluntary Job Change Rate by Occupation 
Manager 4% 3% 3% 2% 6% 5% 6% 
Professional 3% 4% 2% 4% 6% 7% 4% 
Clerk 5% 5% 6% 10% 8% 13% 11% 
Skilled 3% 2% 5% 2% 5% 6% 8% 
Elementary 2% 5% 6% 11% 10% 12% 7% 
        
 Involuntary Job Change Rate by Occupation 
Manager 1% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 
Professional 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 3% 2% 
Clerk 2% 3% 2% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
Skilled 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 3% 
Elementary 5% 5% 6% 7% 5% 5% 4% 
 
Sector 
The share of workers in each sector is given in Table 3.11. The average shares over 
the period are broadly comparable to the employment shares from the Labour Force 
Survey and Quarterly National Household Survey, with the exception of the share 
employed in agriculture which exceeds the CSO data by around 5 percentage points 
and the share in market services which is around 5 percentage points lower than the 
CSO data.
20
 The declining importance of agriculture in terms of its share in 
employment and the rising importance of market services are evident in the table. As 
with occupations, a job change may also involve changing sector, so the data in the 
table refers to the sectors workers were in the previous year or in their previous jobs. 
 
                                                          
20
 The market services sector comprises distribution, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and 
communications, financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities and other services; 
the non-market services sector includes public administration and defence, education, health and social 
work. 
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There is considerable variability in job mobility by sector. Workers in construction 
and market services display the highest rate of job turnover, while those in non-
market services and in the agricultural sector are least likely to change jobs. A similar 
pattern holds for involuntary mobility. 
 
Table 3.11: Sectoral Distribution of Workers & Job Change Rate by Sector 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 Sectoral Distribution of Workers 
Agriculture, Mining & Utilities 16% 16% 13% 13% 12% 11% 10% 
Manufacturing 18% 18% 19% 21% 19% 19% 19% 
Construction 7% 8% 7% 8% 8% 9% 9% 
Market Services 33% 32% 35% 33% 36% 36% 38% 
Non Market Services 26% 26% 26% 26% 25% 25% 24% 
        
 Voluntary Job Change Rate by Sector 
Agriculture, Mining & Utilities 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 3% 1% 
Manufacturing 2% 3% 6% 6% 6% 8% 8% 
Construction 6% 7% 11% 6% 13% 16% 12% 
Market Services 6% 6% 6% 9% 10% 12% 10% 
Non Market Services 1% 2% 2% 4% 4% 5% 3% 
        
 Involuntary Job Change Rate by Sector 
Agriculture, Mining & Utilities 1% 2% 1% 3% 2% 1% 2% 
Manufacturing 1% 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 1% 
Construction 12% 10% 5% 1% 2% 5% 6% 
Market Services 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
Non Market Services 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 
 
From the preceding analysis age, occupation and sector appear to be important in 
explaining job changes. The following section explores the factors that determine job 
change more formally. The increase in voluntary job mobility over the period may be 
driven by changes in the composition of the sample, or, it may be related to the rapid 
output and employment growth observed over the period and we try to capture this 
effect in the next section.   
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3.3 Determinants of Job Change 
Table 3.12 reports the marginal effects from a multinomial probit model examining 
the factors that determine voluntary quits and involuntary changes relative to the base 
of staying in the same job with the same employer. The coefficient estimates from a 
probit regression pooling both types of mobility are used as starting values for the 
multinomial probit model. The data for 1995 to 2001 have been pooled so there are 
8,615 observations from which 506 voluntary job changes and 224 involuntary job 
changes have been identified.
21
 The explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 
Table 3.1. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year so they refer to the 
workers‟ characteristics and situation in the previous year or in their previous jobs.  
                                                          
21
 The number of observations is lower than reported in Table 3.6 as some observations are excluded 
because data is missing or not available for at least one of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 3.12: Multinomial Probit Model of Job Mobility* 
Variable 
Marginal 
Impact 
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Impact 
P>|Z| 
 Voluntary Mobility Involuntary Mobility 
Experience -0.0059 0.00 -0.0020 0.00 
Experience squared 0.0001 0.00 0.0000 0.01 
Female -0.0026 0.86 0.0122 0.06 
Children 0.0028 0.62 0.0013 0.71 
Living in a Couple 0.0095 0.22 0.0025 0.60 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0181 0.02 -0.0145 0.01 
Education (Ref: low):     
Education- medium -0.0058 0.18 -0.0091 0.01 
Education- high -0.0060 0.33 -0.0137 0.02 
Working Part-Time -0.0057 0.99 0.0561 0.00 
Female*Working Part-Time 0.0232 0.17 -0.0159 0.00 
Recent Training 0.0285 0.00 0.0027 0.39 
Public Sector -0.0236 0.00 0.0008 0.86 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0141 0.00 -0.0053 0.07 
Overskilled 0.0166 0.00 0.0090 0.00 
Occupation of Origin:     
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0160 0.02 -0.0175 0.00 
    Professional -0.0147 0.02 -0.0157 0.00 
    Clerk -0.0114 0.04 -0.0148 0.00 
    Skilled -0.0167 0.00 -0.0151 0.00 
Sector of Origin:     
(Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture,  Mining & Utilities -0.0273 0.00 -0.0054 0.28 
    Manufacturing     -0.0086 0.28 -0.0080 0.20 
    Building 0.0254 0.02 0.0277 0.01 
    Market Services 0.0101 0.15 0.0050 0.36 
Year Dummies:     
(Ref: 1995)     
    1996 0.0060 0.48 0.0020 0.64 
    1997 0.0085 0.35 -0.0024 0.73 
    1998 0.0289 0.00 0.0058 0.16 
    1999 0.0332 0.00 0.0007 0.60 
    2000 0.0509 0.00 0.0050 0.12 
    2001 0.0353 0.00 0.0004 0.62 
     
N  8,615  
Wald chi2  611.10  
Prob > chi2  0.0000  
Log pseudolikelihood  -2543.4988  
     
*Notes: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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Beginning with the results for voluntary mobility, the signs and significance of the 
marginal effects are, in general, what would be expected. The marginal effect of 
experience is negative and highly significant implying that for a worker with mean 
characteristics, an additional year of experience is associated with a 0.6 percentage 
point decrease in the probability of changing jobs.
22
 Experience may have a non-
linear effect on the probability of changing jobs so, to capture the fact that job 
changes are more likely to occur early in one‟s career, a squared term is included in 
the specification. The positive effect on the experience-squared variable implies that 
as years of experience increase the predicted probability of changing jobs decreases at 
a diminishing rate.  
 
The model contains a range of individual controls that include household structure 
and personal characteristics. The marginal effect on gender is small and insignificant 
implying that there are no gender differences in the probability of experiencing 
voluntary mobility. Looking at household structure, workers who are married or 
living in a couple are more likely to change jobs but the effect is not significant. If 
people are constrained by their partner‟s job we might expect the effect to be bigger 
for women. The results show that women who are married or living in a couple are 
1.8 per cent less likely to experience voluntary mobility. The marginal effect on the 
children variable is small and insignificant implying that having children does not 
affect the probability of changing jobs.
23
 This is somewhat surprising but may partly 
be explained by the fact that the sample considers people who have a high attachment 
to the labour force. 
 
The education variables capture general human capital. The marginal effects of higher 
levels of education are small and insignificant implying that education does not affect 
the probability of voluntary mobility. Booth and Francesconi (2000) find a similar 
result for the UK. The occupation variables may also serve as a proxy for human 
capital and the negative effects on the occupations of origin variables imply that 
people in occupations that embody more human capital than the base category 
                                                          
22
 Age was also included in the specification but as age and experience are highly correlated the model 
did not support the inclusion of both. Experience is used in the final specification because the resulting 
model has a better fit.  
23
 Alternative formulations of this variable such as including the number of children and specific age 
groups of children were examined. A gender and children interaction term was included but was 
dropped because it was not significant. 
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(elementary occupations) are less likely to change jobs.  In addition, workers who 
have undergone recent training are more likely to change jobs. This may reflect the 
fact that, typically, training is undertaken at the beginning of a job and there is a high 
hazard of new jobs ending early. 
 
A range of variables to capture job and firm characteristics are also included in the 
model. We would expect a positive relationship between working part-time (less than 
30 hours per week) and job mobility as part-time workers are less attached to the 
labour force etc and we may expect there to be differences by gender. However, the 
results do not support either of these hypotheses. A variable to capture overskilling, 
meaning that workers report they have skills and qualifications necessary to do a more 
demanding job, is included in the analysis as overskilling may indicate a poor job 
match. Workers who report that they are overskilled, have a higher probability of 
changing jobs. In addition, a firm size effect is included to capture the fact that those 
working in large firms may be less likely to change jobs because they have more 
alternative opportunities within the firm. The results indicate that workers in firms 
with more than 50 employees are 1.4 per cent less likely to change jobs.  
 
Workers in the public sector have a lower probability of changing jobs. The results 
show that workers in the public sector are 2.4 per cent less likely to change jobs and 
the effect is highly significant. The model results also show that workers in the 
building and market services sector are 2.5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively more 
likely to change jobs relative to workers in the nonmarket services sector. Workers in 
the agricultural, utilities and manufacturing sectors are less likely to change jobs than 
those in the nonmarket services sector.  
 
The year dummies are used to control for factors that vary over time and that affect all 
workers. The coefficients on the year dummies are positive and significant (with the 
exception of the dummies for 1996 and 1997) implying that there is an increase in 
voluntary mobility in the later part of the period. It is likely that these year dummies 
are picking up the strong rise in economic and employment growth that took place 
towards the end of the 1990s. One would expect the mobility rate to be higher when 
the labour market is tight. Ideally, one would like to include a variable that captures 
the job offer arrival rate to workers over time. Vacancy rates may be a good proxy for 
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this variable. Unfortunately, vacancy rates are not available for this period. Table 3.13 
reports the results for a probit model of voluntary job changes (involuntary changes 
are dropped from the models reported in the table). The first model in Table 3.13 is a 
standard probit model of voluntary mobility and the second model includes the 
unemployment rate, instead of the year dummies, as an indicator of labour market 
tightness. This variable is included to try to capture the changes in labour market 
conditions over the period. Essentially, lower unemployment rates may signal to 
workers that jobs are more plentiful and that job search is likely to result in an 
alternative to their current job. The marginal effect on the unemployment rate is 
negative as expected and significant. The second model which includes the 
unemployment rate has a better fit so it is the preferred model.  
 
The results in Table 3.12 suggest that there are some notable differences in the effects 
of characteristics on the probability of job mobility when we distinguish between 
types of mobility. The marginal effect of experience on involuntary mobility is 
negative, but the effect is more muted than for voluntary mobility. To the extent that 
experience and tenure are correlated, the negative impact of experience may indicate 
that employers operate a „last in first out‟ policy towards layoffs. However the smaller 
effect of experience on involuntary mobility may mean that workers undergo 
involuntary mobility throughout their careers, not just in the earlier years.  Education 
has a significant impact on the probability of involuntary job mobility. Workers with 
higher levels of education are less likely to experience involuntary mobility. To the 
extent that education acts as a positive signal of productivity, employers that are 
shedding jobs may be less likely to layoff better educated workers, as they may be 
harder to replace if the business recovers. Campbell (1997) also finds a significant 
negative education gradient for involuntary mobility in the United States. The results 
for occupation are broadly similar for both types of mobility.  
 
The household/family variables have similar effects on involuntary mobility. 
Although the marginal effect on the gender dummy changes sign, it is only significant 
at the 10 per cent level. The results also show a strong positive relationship between 
involuntary mobility and working part-time. However, women who work part-time 
are less likely to experience involuntary mobility. The effects of firm size, being 
overskilled and recent training are all smaller for involuntary moves. The effect of 
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sector is smaller for involuntary changes with the exception of working in the 
construction sector where the effect is slightly larger than for voluntary mobility. We 
would expect that workers in the public sector would make fewer involuntary changes 
as the public sector is relatively sheltered, in the sense that it is less exposed to market 
forces. Somewhat surprisingly, working in the public sector does not affect the 
probability of an involuntary change.  Finally, the time dummies are smaller and 
insignificant for involuntary moves. We would expect the impacts to be negative as 
firms are less likely to layoff workers when demand is high. However, due to the 
tightness in the labour market at this time employers may have been more tolerant as 
workers were harder to replace. The marginal effects on the time dummies imply 
there was no significant change in forced moves over the period. 
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Table 3.13: Probit Models of Voluntary Job Mobility* 
Variable 
Marginal 
Impact 
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Impact 
P>|Z| 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Experience -0.0059 0.00 -0.0060 0.00 
Experience squared 0.0001 0.00 0.0001 0.00 
Female -0.0010 0.89 -0.0011 0.89 
Children 0.0027 0.65 0.0028 0.64 
Living in a Couple 0.0100 0.20 0.0103 0.19 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0194 0.02 -0.0198 0.02 
Education (Ref: low):     
Education- medium -0.0067 0.19 -0.0068 0.19 
Education- high -0.0065 0.41 -0.0064 0.42 
Working Part-Time -0.0059 0.59 -0.0062 0.58 
Female*Working Part-Time 0.0286 0.08 0.0293 0.08 
Recent Training 0.0285 0.00 0.0278 0.00 
Public Sector -0.0243 0.00 -0.0243 0.00 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0143 0.00 -0.0146 0.00 
Overskilled 0.0171 0.00 0.0172 0.00 
Occupation of Origin:     
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0161 0.03 -0.0167 0.02 
    Professional -0.0146 0.03 -0.0148 0.03 
    Clerk -0.0116 0.07 -0.0117 0.07 
    Skilled -0.0166 0.01 -0.0172 0.01 
Sector of Origin:     
(Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining & Utilities -0.0278 0.00 -0.0278 0.00 
    Manufacturing     -0.0100 0.26 -0.0101 0.25 
    Building 0.0247 0.06 0.0247 0.06 
    Market Services 0.0090 0.23 0.0087 0.25 
Year Dummies:     
(Ref: 1995)     
    1996 0.0064 0.48   
    1997 0.0077 0.38   
    1998 0.0280 0.00   
    1999 0.0319 0.00   
    2000 0.0506 0.00   
    2001 0.0346 0.00   
Unemployment Rate   -0.0036 0.00 
     
N 8,391 8,391 
Wald chi2 430.42 427.44 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1572 0.1557 
Log pseudolikelihood -1611.0752 -1613.7926 
*Notes: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are computed at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
 34 
3.4 Decomposing the Increase in the Rate of Voluntary Job Change 
The voluntary job mobility rate trebled over the period 1995 to 2000. It is useful to 
ascertain whether this increase is simply driven by changes in the composition of the 
sample or whether it is due to other factors. One approach to doing this is to group 
some of the earlier years and some of the later years of the sample together and to 
decompose the difference in mobility rates between the two groups into the difference 
attributable to differences in the observable characteristics and the difference due to 
differences in the effects of characteristics by applying a non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca 
type decomposition to the estimates. This decomposition is important as it may help 
our understanding of the extent to which the nature of the Irish labour market itself 
changed over the period. 
3.4.1 Non-Linear Decomposition Technique 
I have grouped together the observations for 1995 to 1997 and for 1998 to 2001 as the 
marginal effects of the time dummies for voluntary mobility from the multinomial 
probit model are only significant from 1998 on.
24
 There are 3,321 observations in the 
1995-97 group and the average mobility rate is 3.9 per cent while there are 5,070 
observations in the 1998-01 group and the average mobility rate is 7.4 per cent. There 
is a 3.5 percentage point difference in average mobility rates between the two groups. 
To decompose the gap between the two mobility rates, a technique developed by 
Fairlie (2005) is applied. The approach follows that of the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition technique for linear models.  
 
Consider the general case where the expected value of the dependent variable is a 
function of a linear combination of independent variables where the function F may or 
may not be linear: 
 
    XFYE                  (3.1) 
 
where Y is an N   1 vector, X is an N   K matrix of independent variables,   is a 
K1 vector of coefficients and N is the sample size. 
 
                                                          
24
 Involuntary job changes are excluded from this part of the analysis as the rate of involuntary mobility 
is roughly constant over the period. 
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From (3.1) the general expression for the mean difference in the expected value of Y 
between two groups, say A and B, can be written as: 
 
BA
YY 

































 BBABABAA XFXFXFXF  ˆˆˆˆ            (3.2) 
 
The first term in the brackets in (3.2) represents the part of the difference in the 
expected value of Y for the two groups that is due to differences in the distribution of 
the independent variables between the two groups; this is referred to as the 
“explained” component. The second term in the brackets represents differences in the 
processes that determine Y for the two groups. 
 
In a linear regression model      XXFYE  , the effect of X is constant, so  
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where i=1….N is the number of cases. 
 
Using the expression for the general decomposition given in (3.2) yields the standard 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition: 
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In a non-linear regression model, such as a probit model, the effect of X is not 
constant i.e. 
    K
K
Xf
dX
YdE
 , the marginal effect of k varies with the level of X and 
the other variables in the model so 







  ˆˆ XFXFY . In this case:  
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Therefore we can write: 
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Fairlie suggests a decomposition for a non-linear regression equation, which can be 
written as: 
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Again, the first term in the brackets provides an estimate of the overall contribution of 
the independent variables to the gap in mobility rates and the second term represents 
the unexplained component. As with the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition one 
can use the coefficients from Group A as weights for the first term in the 
decomposition or the coefficients from a pooled sample of the two groups or one can 
re-write the decomposition to use the coefficient estimates from Group B. 
 
Fairlie focuses on the first part of the decomposition, which estimates the overall 
contribution of the independent variables to the difference in the average value of the 
dependent variable. The change in the average value of Y is calculated by replacing 
the distribution of all independent variables from Group A with the distributions of all 
the independent variables from Group B. 
 
The contribution of each independent variable to the overall change in the average 
value of the dependent variable is calculated by separately replacing the distribution 
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of each independent variable from Group A with its distribution from Group B while 
holding the distribution of the other variables constant. Suppose, first of all, that the 
sample size of both groups is the same. Then the contribution of variable 
1X  to the 
change in the average value of Y is given by: 
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To calculate the contributions of individual independent variables there needs to be a 
one-to-one matching of observations from both groups. To generate this matching, 
each person in Group A is ranked according to their predicted probability and 
similarly for each person in Group B. Then the person with the highest predicted 
probability in Group A is matched with the person with the highest predicted 
probability in Group B and the person with the second highest predicted probability in 
Group A is matched with the person with the second highest predicted probability in 
Group B and so on.
25
  
 
In practice, the sample sizes of both groups will seldom be the same so to calculate 
the contribution of individual independent variables to the gap Fairlie suggests taking 
a random sample of the larger group that is equal in size to the other group.  Each 
observation in the subsample of the larger group and the full sample of the smaller 
group is separately ranked by their predictive probabilities and matched by their 
respective rankings as before. The decomposition estimates will depend on the 
randomly chosen subsample. Ideally, the results should approximate those from 
matching all of Group A to Group B. To achieve this, lots of random subsamples from 
the larger group should be chosen and each of these should be matched to the smaller 
sample. Then separate decompositions for each subsample should be computed and 
the average value of the separate decompositions can be used to approximate the 
results for the whole of the larger group. 
 
                                                          
25
 As the predicted probabilities are non-linear functions of the parameter estimates standard errors for 
the estimates are calculated using the delta method. 
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Table 3.14 presents the results of the non-linear decomposition of the difference in job 
mobility rates between the two periods.
26
 The coefficient estimates from the pooled 
sample are used to calculate the decomposition.
27
 The results are based on mean 
values of decompositions with 1,000 different subsamples. The table also shows the 
average values of the independent variables over the two time periods. 
 
The difference in the average value of the independent variables accounts for around 
21 per cent of the difference in job mobility rates over the two time periods. This 
means that the difference in mobility rates between the two time periods would be 
around 21 per cent lower if the people in the 1995-97 group had the same distribution 
of characteristics as the people in the 1998-01 group. In terms of individual 
characteristics, experience, occupation and working in the public sector are important 
contributors to explaining the difference in mobility rates between the two time 
periods. The standard errors on practically all of the individual contributions are high 
so we cannot say with a lot of confidence how important individual variables are. 
However, the standard error on the overall contribution of the independent variables is 
low. The results suggest that the changing composition of the sample is only driving 
around a fifth of the increase in job mobility over the period.
28
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 The software to implement the decomposition is from Jann, B. (2006), “Fairlie: Stata module to 
generate nonlinear decomposition of binary outcome differentials”, available at      
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456727.html. 
27
 Using the coefficient estimates from 1995-97 or 1998-01 in the decomposition produces similar 
results. 
28
 Including year dummies in both sub-periods in the decomposition leads to the overall contribution of 
the independent variables rising to 31 per cent; however the standard error is high indicating that the 
overall contribution of the independent variables is insignificant. 
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Table 3.14: Non-Linear Decomposition of the Difference in Job Mobility Rates between 1995-97 
and 1998-01 using the Fairlie Method 
Sample used to estimate coefficients Pooled Coefficients  
Average Mobility Rate 1995-97 0.0388  
Average Mobility Rate 1998-01 0.0744  
Difference 0.0355  
All Variables (Amount of Gap Explained) 0.0075  
Standard Error 0.0010  
% of Overall Gap Explained 21.2%  
     
9597X  
 
9801X   Contribution P>|Z| 
Experience 0.0103 0.29 20.42 19.16 
Experience squared -0.0059 0.50 553.12 493.74 
Female 0.0000 0.96 0.33 0.37 
Children -0.0002 0.74 0.59 0.55 
Living in a Couple -0.0016 0.30 0.73 0.67 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.0005 0.73 0.22 0.23 
Education (Ref: low):     
Education- medium -0.0004 0.52 0.38 0.43 
Education- high 0.0001 0.80 0.14 0.14 
Working Part-Time -0.0001 0.88 0.13 0.16 
Female*Working Part-Time 0.0004 0.72 0.10 0.12 
Recent Training 0.0000 0.97 0.08 0.07 
Public Sector 0.0024 0.06 0.31 0.27 
Number of Employees > 50 0.0002 0.76 0.36 0.34 
Overskilled -0.0013 0.01 0.48 0.47 
Occupation of Origin:     
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager 0.0009 0.11 0.11 0.09 
    Professional 0.0008 0.33 0.26 0.25 
    Clerk -0.0006 0.32 0.21 0.25 
    Skilled -0.0004 0.56 0.23 0.21 
Sector of Origin:     
(Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agric. & Mining & Utilities 0.0010 0.23 0.15 0.12 
    Manufacturing     0.0000 0.99 0.19 0.20 
    Building 0.0011 0.26 0.07 0.08 
    Market Services 0.0002 0.80 0.33 0.36 
 
In Section 3.2.3, the rising proportion of young people in the sample was put forward 
as a possible explanation for the rise in mobility. Including age and its square in the 
decomposition instead of the experience variables produces broadly similar results; 
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the overall contribution of the independent variables increases to 27 per cent (see 
Appendix Table 3.2). Finally, including the unemployment rate in the model increases 
the proportion of the gap explained to 70 per cent (see Appendix Table 3.3). 
However, the fall in the unemployment rate captures the changing labour market 
conditions facing workers and is not related to the changing composition of the 
sample. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed job mobility in Ireland over the period 1995 to 2001 using 
data from the Living in Ireland Survey. It finds that there are several factors that 
determine mobility. Consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature in this 
area, years of labour market experience is a key determinant of voluntary job change. 
Workers in the public sector are less likely to change jobs and workers who are 
overskilled are more likely to change jobs. It finds that gender does not affect the 
probability of job mobility. Although human capital captured by education does not 
affect the probability of voluntary mobility, occupational level exerts a negative 
influence on job mobility. However, human capital captured by both education level 
and occupation significantly reduces the probability of experiencing involuntary 
mobility. In addition, somewhat surprisingly, working in the public sector does not 
reduce the probability of involuntary mobility.  
 
The chapter also finds the rate of voluntary job mobility in Ireland trebled over the 
period. Estimation results show that workers were more likely to change jobs in the 
later part of the period. A decomposition analysis shows that around a fifth of this 
increase is driven by changes in the composition of the sample. The changing labour 
market conditions facing workers appear to be an important factor driving the 
increase. Even accounting for compositional changes and changes in the labour 
market, a substantial part of the increase in job mobility over the period remains 
unexplained. It may be that there has been an increase in job instability over the 
period, although this is not necessarily worrying as the increase in mobility was 
voluntary in nature. At the same time, worker preferences may also have changed 
over the period, with a decline in the importance of the idea of a “job for life”.  
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Appendix Table 3.1: Explanatory Variables: Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Experience Number of years in employment 19.5 11.5 
Experience Squared Number of years in employment squared 513.2 508.6 
Female Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if female 
and zero if male 
0.36 0.48 
Child Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person has children and zero otherwise 
0.56 0.50 
Couple Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person is married or living in a couple and zero 
otherwise 
0.69 0.46 
Female*Couple Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person is female and married or living in a couple 
and zero otherwise 
0.22 0.42 
Education- low 
(Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest 
educational qualification is Junior Certificate and 
zero otherwise 
0.46 0.50 
Education- medium Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest 
educational attainment is above Junior Certificate 
but below degree level and zero otherwise 
0.41 0.49 
Education- high Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest 
educational qualification is a degree or above and 
zero otherwise 
0.13 0.34 
Part-Time Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person works less than 30 hours per week and 
zero otherwise 
0.15 0.36 
Female*Part-Time Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person is female and works less than 30 hours per 
week and zero otherwise 
0.11 0.31 
Recent Training Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person has been in education or training in the 
past year and zero otherwise 
0.08 0.27 
Public  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person was working in the public sector in the 
previous year and zero otherwise 
0.28 0.45 
Number of Employees Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
number of employees in the firm in the previous 
year is more than 50 and zero otherwise. 
0.35 0.48 
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Overskilled Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
worker reported that they felt they had skills and 
qualifications to do a more demanding job and 
zero otherwise. 
0.48 0.50 
Occupation of Origin:    
    Manager Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is manager, senior official or 
legislator and zero otherwise 
0.10 0.29 
    Professional Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is professional, technician or 
associated professionals and zero otherwise 
0.25 0.43 
    Clerk Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is clerk, service, shop or sale 
worker and zero otherwise. 
0.23 0.42 
    Skilled Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is skilled agricultural or 
fishery worker or a skilled craft or trades worker 
and zero otherwise. 
0.22 0.41 
    Elementary 
    (Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation in the previous year is plant or 
machine operator or assembler, or elementary 
occupation and zero otherwise. 
0.20 0.40 
Sector of Origin:    
    Agriculture, Mining & 
    Utilities 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is agriculture, fishing, mining or quarrying, 
or utilities and zero otherwise.  
0.13 0.34 
    Manufacturing     Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is manufacturing and zero otherwise. 
0.19 0.39 
    Building Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is building and zero otherwise. 
0.08 0.27 
    Market Services Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is distribution, hotels and restaurants, 
transport, storage and communications, financial 
intermediation, or real estate, renting and business 
activities and zero otherwise. 
0.35 0.48 
    Non-Market Services 
    (Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is education, public administration and 
defence or health and social work and zero 
otherwise. 
0.25 0.43 
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Year Dummies:    
    1995 
    (Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1995 and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    1996 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1996 and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    1997 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1997 and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    1998 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1998 and zero otherwise. 
0.14 0.35 
    1999 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1999 and zero otherwise. 
0.15 0.36 
    2000 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 2000 and zero otherwise. 
0.15 0.36 
    2001 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 2001 and zero otherwise. 
0.16 0.37 
Unemployment Rate ILO annual unemployment rate from the CSO 7.72 3.30 
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Appendix Table 3.2: Non-Linear Decomposition of the Difference in Job Mobility Rates between 
1995-97 and 1998-01 using the Fairlie Method, including Age instead of Experience 
Sample used to estimate coefficients Pooled Coefficients 
Average Mobility Rate 1995-97 0.0388 
Average Mobility Rate 1998-01 0.0744 
Difference 0.0355 
All Variables (Amount of Gap Explained) 0.0095 
Standard Error 0.0010 
% of Overall Gap Explained 26.9% 
   
 Contribution P>|Z| 
Experience 0.0102 0.60 
Experience squared -0.0052 0.77 
Female 0.0000 0.94 
Children -0.0001 0.91 
Living in a Couple -0.0006 0.69 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.0003 0.69 
Education (Ref: low):   
Education- medium -0.0003 0.61 
Education- high 0.0000 0.98 
Working Part-Time -0.0001 0.93 
Female*Working Part-Time 0.0008 0.64 
Recent Training 0.0000 0.89 
Public Sector 0.0025 0.07 
Number of Employees > 50 0.0002 0.81 
Overskilled -0.0011 0.04 
Occupation of Origin:   
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)   
    Manager 0.0011 0.07 
    Professional 0.0008 0.32 
    Clerk -0.0006 0.30 
    Skilled -0.0003 0.69 
Sector of Origin:   
(Ref: Non Market Services)   
    Agric. & Mining & Utilities 0.0010 0.36 
    Manufacturing     0.0000 0.97 
    Building 0.0010 0.29 
    Market Services 0.0002 0.87 
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Appendix Table 3.3: Non-Linear Decomposition of the Difference in Job Mobility Rates between 
1995-97 and 1998-01 using the Fairlie Method, including the Unemployment Rate 
Sample used to estimate coefficients Pooled Coefficients 
Average Mobility Rate 1995-97 0.0388 
Average Mobility Rate 1998-01 0.0744 
Difference 0.0355 
All Variables (Amount of Gap Explained) 0.0249 
Standard Error 0.0095 
% of Overall Gap Explained 70.1% 
   
 Contribution P>|Z| 
Experience 0.0087 0.37 
Experience squared -0.0061 0.48 
Female 0.0000 0.96 
Children -0.0002 0.72 
Living in a Couple -0.0016 0.29 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.0004 0.78 
Education (Ref: low):   
Education- medium -0.0005 0.50 
Education- high 0.0001 0.84 
Working Part-Time -0.0001 0.89 
Female*Working Part-Time 0.0004 0.72 
Recent Training 0.0000 0.91 
Public Sector 0.0021 0.10 
Number of Employees > 50 0.0002 0.77 
Overskilled -0.0012 0.02 
Occupation of Origin:   
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)   
    Manager 0.0008 0.13 
    Professional 0.0008 0.37 
    Clerk -0.0007 0.29 
    Skilled -0.0003 0.58 
Sector of Origin:   
(Ref: Non Market Services)   
    Agric. & Mining & Utilities 0.0008 0.28 
    Manufacturing     0.0000 0.98 
    Building 0.0010 0.30 
    Market Services 0.0002 0.79 
Unemployment Rate 0.0203 0.07 
 
 
 46 
 
4. The Performance of the Hausman et al. Estimator in 
Correcting for Misclassification in the Dependent 
Variable in Binary Choice Models 
4.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Discrete choice models, such as a probit model, are used when the dependent variable 
is a binary outcome or choice. Measurement error in a binary variable results in 
misclassification i.e. an observation is classified as a zero when the variable is truly a 
one, and vice versa. In a linear regression model classical measurement error in the 
dependent variable only affects the precision of coefficient estimates; however the 
same problem leads to estimates that are biased and inconsistent in a nonlinear model. 
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) use Monte Carlo simulations to 
demonstrate that even small amounts of misclassification can lead to substantially 
biased parameter estimates in a probit model. They propose a modified estimator that 
can be used to correct for misclassification. The estimator provides consistent 
estimates of the coefficients as well as the extent of misclassification. 
 
This chapter explores the performance of the Hausman et al. (1988) estimator and 
tries to extend their results by examining a range of different models. It analyses 
instances where the estimator performs well and others where it performs poorly. To 
do this a range of Monte Carlo simulations are run on models with different 
specifications and with different levels of misclassification. The coefficient estimates 
are also compared with those from an ordinary probit model. The aim of the chapter is 
to provide insights into when it is reasonable to use their estimator to control for 
misclassification.   
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 begins by reviewing the effect of 
measurement error in a binary dependent variable.  It then describes the estimator 
developed by Hausman et al. (1998) to control for misclassification. It also outlines 
some of the empirical applications that the estimator has been used in. Section 4.3 
illustrates the identification of the model using the results from Monte Carlo 
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simulations. Section 4.4 considers a range of changes and extensions to the basic 
model presented in Section 4.3 to try to determine situations where the estimator is 
appropriate to use to control for misclassification. It examines how the estimator 
performs when the effect of the explanatory variable in the model becomes weaker, 
the sample size is increased and decreased, the proportion of “1s” in the dependent 
variable is changed, when misclassification is asymmetric and when the explanatory 
variable in the model is dichotomous. It also compares the coefficient estimates from 
the Hausman et al. model with those from an ordinary probit model. Section 4.5 
considers situations where the estimator performs poorly and explains how this can 
occur. Section 4.6 concludes and offers some practical suggestions for researchers 
using the estimator.   
 
4.2 Binary Choice Model with Misclassification 
4.2.1 Effect of Measurement Error in the Dependent Variable 
In the classical linear regression model classical measurement error in the dependent 
variable does not have very serious consequences - the standard errors on coefficients 
will tend to be larger than they would have been if there was no measurement error. 
Consider the following model:
29
 
 
 iii xy  
'~                   (4.1) 
 
where i=1,……n and n is sample size, i  is an independently and identically 
distributed error term and all variables are measured as deviations from sample 
means. 
 
Suppose that iy
~  is measured with error so what we actually observe is: 
 
iii vyy 
~                  (4.2) 
 
where iv  is assumed to be independent of the covariates and i  
                                                          
29
 Hausman (2001) discusses the effects of measurement error in dependent variables. 
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Inserting (4.2) into (4.1) yields: 
 
iii xy  
'            where 
iii v                                    (4.3) 
 
The effect of measurement error in iy  is an error term with increased variance since 
the new error term,
i , contains both the original error term, i , and the measurement 
error, iv . In this case, the OLS estimates of   will remain unbiased since i  is 
uncorrelated with ix  but will be measured with less precision.  
 
In a non-linear regression model, such as a probit model, the effects of measurement 
error are more severe. As before, we can write the observed value as the sum of the 
true value and the measurement error, as follows: 
 
 iii uzz 
~                   (4.4) 
 
where iz
~  denotes the correctly measured binary variable, iz  is the mismeasured proxy 
and iu  is the measurement error.   In this case, when 1
~ iz , the variable iz  can only 
take on two values. It will be equal to one when it is correctly specified so 0iu  (i.e. 
there is no measurement error) or 0iz  when it is incorrectly specified and so 
1iu . Therefore when 1
~ iz , the mismeasured variable iz  can never overestimate 
the true value. Similarly, when  0~ iz , the variable iz  can never underestimate the 
true value; the measurement error iu  is always either 0 or +1. As a result, the 
measurement error iu  is negatively correlated with the true variable iz
~ . This can lead 
to coefficient estimates that are biased and inconsistent. 
4.2.2 Standard Model of Misclassification 
To address the problem of misclassification in discrete dependent variables, Hausman 
et al. (1988) propose a modified maximum likelihood estimator that provides 
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consistent coefficient estimates as well as estimates of the extent of 
misclassification.
30
 Consider the latent variable *
iy : 
 
iii xy  
'*   where i=1, 2 …n      n = sample size            (4.5) 
and 
i  is an i.i.d. error term 
 
In later chapters, *
iy  will be a latent variable that represents the potential or tendency 
for a worker to change jobs. It is a continuous variable that is unobservable and is 
determined by a set of explanatory variables, ix , in such a way that the larger the 
value of *
iy , the greater the probability of some event occurring, such as changing 
jobs. 
 
The true response (or what we would observe in the data if there was no measurement 
error), iy
~ , is generated by the latent variable crossing the zero threshold i.e.  
 
  1~ iy     if 0
* iy                 (4.6) 
          =0     otherwise. 
 
Let F(.) denote the cdf of i . The probability that an observation is truly equal to one 
is given by: 
 
    )0Pr(1~Pr '  iiii xxy   
          )Pr( ' ii x        (if F(.) is a symmetric distribution) 
          )( 'ixF                            (4.7) 
 
while the probability that it is truly equal to zero is given by: 
 
   '10~Pr iii xFxy                 (4.8) 
 
                                                          
30
 The details of the model come from Hausman et al. (1998). 
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Now suppose the true response, 
iy
~ , is observed with error. Let 
iy  denote the actual 
response that is observed in the data. Let 
0  denote the probability that 1iy  when 
truly 0~ iy  and 1  denote the probability that 0iy  when truly 1
~ iy . The 
misclassification probabilities depend on the true value, 
iy
~ , so the extent of 
misclassification depends on how good a proxy 
iy  is of iy
~ . The misclassification 
probabilities are assumed to be independent of the covariates, 
ix , conditional on the 
true response, more formally:
31
 
 
   iiiii xyyyy ,0~1Pr0~1Pr0  ,                        (4.9)
    iiiii xyyyy ,1~0Pr1~0Pr1  .           (4.10) 
 
The assumption that the misclassification probabilities are independent of the 
covariates is important for identification and this will be discussed later on.  
 
The probability that an observation is classified as being equal to one   ii xy 1Pr   is 
given by the probability that it has been correctly classified as being equal to one 
 11   multiplied by the probability that it is truly equal to one   'ixF  plus the 
probability that it has been incorrectly classified as being equal to one  0  multiplied 
by the probability that it truly is not equal to one   '1 ixF  as follows:  
 
          '100'0'1 )1()(111Pr iiiii xFxFxFxy            (4.11) 
 
Likewise, the probability that an observation is classified as being equal to zero is 
given by: 
 
         iiiii xFxFxFxy '100'0'1 )1(1)(110Pr        (4.12) 
 
Therefore we can write the expected value of the observed dependent variable, iy , as: 
                                                          
31
 Hausman et al. (1998) show how the model can be extended to allow for covariate dependent 
misclassification and this is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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    iiiii xFxyxyE '100 )1()1Pr(              (4.13) 
 
When there is no misclassification  010  , this collapses to usual expression 
)( 'ixF . 
 
If we assume that 
i  are normally distributed then we can use equations (4.11) and 
(4.12) to derive the log-likelihood function for the probit model with 
misclassification: 
 
        


n
i
iiiiii xyyxyyL
1
0Prln11Prlnln  
            

 
n
i
iiii xyxyn
1
'
100
'
100
1 11ln11ln         (4.14) 
     where  .  denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution  
 
Maximising the log-likelihood function given in (4.14) with respect to 0 , 1  and   
yields consistent and efficient estimates of   as well as the probabilities of 
misclassification.  
Identification 
The conditions for identification of 0 , 1  and   are similar to those for the 
traditional binary choice model. One additional assumption is needed for 
identification, namely that the misclassification probabilities are not very large, 
specifically, 110  .
32
 The assumption is needed because the normal distribution 
is symmetric ( )( 'ix =1- )(
'ix ) and we can define 10 1  

, 01 1  

 and 
 

 so that: 
 
   
  )()1()(1)(1()1(
(1)1()1(1)1()()1(
'
100
'
101
'
011
'
100


ii
ii
xx
xx



             (4.15) 
                                                          
32
 Hausman et al. (1998) refer to this assumption as the „monotonicity condition‟. 
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When the assumption, 110  , is not imposed the maximum likelihood estimator 
cannot distinguish between the parameter values ),,( 10   and ),1,1( 10   . 
The assumption that 110   excludes this situation because 110   implies 
1)1()1( 01   . An implication of this assumption is that if 110   but we 
impose 110   the estimates of   will have the wrong sign. This assumption 
guarantees that   '100 )1( ix  is strictly increasing in 'ix  as  (.) is strictly 
increasing.   
 
The model parameters are identified from the nonlinearity of  . . To see this, 
consider the linear probability model where )()( ''  ii xxF  , then the expected value 
of iy  is given by:  
 
   
))1(()(
)1()1Pr(
110
'
00
'
100




i
iiiii
z
xxyxyE
           (4.16) 
 where '' ),1( ii zx   and 
'
1
'
0 ),(    (i.e. separating out the constant) 
 
In this case the parameters of the model cannot be separately identified. 
 
Estimating 0  and 1  is only possible because they enter (4.14) additively and are 
then multiplied by the expression with the normal cdf. To identify the 
misclassification probabilities, 0  and 1 , 
'
ix  has to get reasonably large in 
magnitude so as to push  ii xy 1~Pr   close to 0 and 1 for some i. The intuition behind 
this is that we have assumed that misclassification rates are constant and depend only 
on the true value, iy
~ , so 0 , the probability that we classify a case to be equal to one 
when truly it is equal to zero, is identified from the observations that have a near zero 
probability of  truly having 1~ iy . These are observations where 
'
ix  is highly 
negative and which are very unlikely to have 1~ iy . So, if we observe some 
proportion of them as having 1iy , then these cases are probably misclassified. We 
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can also see this by noting that in equation (4.13) as 'ix  becomes more negative 
 ii xyE  tends to 0 .  
 
In a similar fashion, 
1 , the probability of misclassifying a true one being equal to 
zero i.e. misclassifying 1~ iy  as 0iy , is estimated from the observations that have 
very large and positive 'ix  and so have a very high probability of truly having 1
~ iy . 
If we observe some proportion of these observations as having 0iy , then these 
cases are probably misclassified. Similar to before, we can see from equation (4.13) 
that as 'ix  becomes more positive  ii xyE  tends to 11  . The identification of the 
misclassification rates is discussed further in Section 4.3.2. 
Marginal Effects 
From equation (4.7) we know that the expected value on the true response, iy
~ , is 
given by: 
 
   ')1~Pr(~ iiiii xFxyxyE                 (4.17) 
 
In general, we are usually more interested in the marginal effect of a specific variable, 
k, which is given by: 
 
    ki
ik
ii
ik
ii xf
x
xy
x
xyE
'
)1~Pr(~






             (4.18) 
 
Equation (4.13) gives the expected value on the observed response, iy , and the 
marginal effect of the variable, k, is given by:  
 
 
    ki
ik
ii
ik
ii xf
x
xy
x
xyE
 '101
)1Pr(






            (4.19) 
 
Comparing equations (4.18) and (4.19) shows that when there is misclassification the 
marginal effect on the observed response (from equation (4.19)) will be biased 
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towards zero (as  101    < 1).  The marginal effect on the observed response will 
always be less than the marginal effect on the true response by a factor of 
 101   . This result only holds when misclassification is independent of the 
covariates.  
 
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the following simple job change 
example: suppose you have a sample of 20 people, 10 of whom have a high value of 
some characteristic that makes them more likely to change jobs and the remaining 10 
people have a low value of this characteristic that makes them less likely to change 
jobs. Further suppose that 8 people from the first group and 4 from the second group 
are identified as job changers. Then the true marginal effect on the characteristic is 0.4 
(0.8-0.4). Now further suppose that we introduce misclassification (that does not 
depend on the particular characteristic) such that 4 out of the 8 true non job changes 
are misclassified (i.e. 0 =.5) and 3 out of the 12 true job changes are misclassified 
(i.e. 
1 =.25). As the misclassification probabilities are assumed not to depend on the 
characteristic, this implies that 1 job stayer from the first group and 3 from the second 
group are misclassified as job changers and 2 job changers from the first group and 1 
from the second group are misclassified as job stayers.  Then the marginal effect on 
the characteristic is 0.1 (0.7-0.6) which is a quarter or  101    of the true marginal 
effect. 
4.2.3 Empirical Applications 
The Hausman et al. (1998) estimator has been used in a wide range of empirical 
applications. Some studies focus on situations where there is misreporting in data, 
possibly because respondents in a survey have a psychological or economic incentive 
to misreport. Alternatively they may misunderstand the question or they may have 
poor recall. In addition, their responses may be coded incorrectly. For example, Artís 
et al. (2002) estimate models of fraud detection in the insurance industry, where there 
is uncertainty about whether claims have been correctly classified as honest or 
fraudulent. Brachet (2008) and Kenkel et al. (2004) investigate the misreporting of 
smoking participation. Caudill and Mixon (2005) are interested in the reliability of the 
self-reported incidence of undergraduate student cheating. Flathmann and Sheffrin 
(2003) use a taxpayer compliance survey to assess the reliability of self-reported non-
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compliance in completing tax returns. Dustman and Van Soest (2004) examine 
measurement error in the english-speaking fluency of immigrants in the UK (which is 
measured using an ordinal scale) and they extend the Hausman et al. estimator to the 
ordered probit case. Finally, Dustman and Van Soest (2001) also examine self-
reported speaking fluency of migrants and they distinguish between time-varying and 
time-persistent misclassification errors.   
 
In other studies, a dummy variable is created to serve as a proxy for some true 
underlying variable. For example, Leece (2000) examines the household choice of 
fixed versus variable rate mortgages where an algorithm is used to identify fixed rate 
debt in the data and so the type of debt may be misclassified. Dye and McMillen 
(2007) investigate redevelopment, where existing housing in established locations are 
torn down and replaced by new housing, in the Chicago metropolitan area. The 
authors use demolition permits as a proxy for redevelopment. This is an imperfect 
measure as a demolition permit may be issued but the house may not be demolished 
or it could be demolished but the land could be converted to non-residential use. 
Jensen et al. (2008) examine misclassification in patent applications. Patents are 
awarded on the basis of the size of the inventive step of the innovation and so it is 
possible that an application with a very high inventive step is incorrectly classified by 
a patent office as a „refusal‟.  
 
4.3 Identification of the Model 
This section uses Monte Carlo simulation techniques to examine the identification of 
the Hausman et al. estimator. The aim of the section is to complement the discussion 
of the identification of the estimator in Section 4.2.2. 
4.3.1 Monte Carlo Simulations  
In the first set of Monte Carlo simulations, the latent variable, *iy , depends on a single 
continuous covariate, ix1 , as follows: 
 
Model 1:  iii xy  1
* 5.11   
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Where 
ix1  is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 
two and the error term, 
i , is drawn from a standard normal distribution. The true 
response, 
iy
~ , is given by: 
 
   1~ iy  if 0
* iy  
        = 0 otherwise.  
 
The observed dependent variable is generated using symmetric misclassification i.e. 
10    and four rates of misclassification, namely 1%, 5%, 10% and 20%, are 
considered.
33
 To generate misclassification the observed dependent variable, iy , is 
drawn from a uniform distribution and whenever the value exceeds the cut-off point 
the observations are recoded to be zeros if they were ones and ones if they were zeros 
and when the value is less than the cut-off point the observations are equal to the true 
response, iy
~ .   
 
The average estimates of the misclassification probabilities from a thousand Monte 
Carlo simulations are reported in Table 4.1. For each level of misclassification 
considered, the Hausman et al. estimates of the misclassification probabilities are very 
close to the true rates. For each set of simulations, the actual rates of misclassification 
that have been generated in the data are reported in Table 4.1. On average, the 
generated rates of misclassification are very close to the desired ones, although these 
rates will vary somewhat between simulations. The average standard errors increase 
as the level of misclassification increases although on average the estimates are highly 
significant. The average standard error of 
1  exceeds that of 0  and this will be 
discussed in Section 4.4.3. 
 
  
                                                          
33
 Section 4.4.4 considers examples where misclassification is asymmetric (i.e. where 10   ). 
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Table 4.1: Estimates of Misclassification Probabilities for Model 1* 
Level of 
Misclassification 
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
0ˆ  
Std 
Error 
0ˆ  
MSE
0ˆ  
Min 
0ˆ  
Max 
0ˆ  
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Std Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  
Min 
 
1ˆ  
Max 
1ˆ  
No. of 
Sims 
 
Model 1: iii xy  1
* 5.11  
1% 0.0100 0.0092 0.0018 0.0000 0.0043 0.0148 0.0100 0.0103 0.0029 0.0000 0.0025 0.0204 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0487 0.0038 0.0000 0.0367 0.0624 0.0501 0.0497 0.0058 0.0000 0.0327 0.0657 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0983 0.0052 0.0000 0.0832 0.1172 0.1000 0.0988 0.0077 0.0000 0.0760 0.1235 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1985 0.0068 0.0000 0.1780 0.2162 0.2001 0.1984 0.0102 0.0001 0.1686 0.2306 1,000 
              
*The sample size is 10,000. The results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations. Specifically, the results in columns 3-7 and 9-13 are based on the average values from 
the Monte Carlo simulations and columns 2 and 8 are based on the average generated rates of misclassification from the simulations. 
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4.3.2 Identification of the Model 
In a standard probit model without misclassification, we would expect there to be no 
significant difference between the observed proportion of 1iy  and the predicted 
 1Pr iy  at different values of the explanatory variables, if the model fits the data 
well. However, we would expect there to be a difference between the observed 
proportion of 1iy  and the predicted  1Pr iy  when some of the observations are 
misclassified because these misclassified observations cannot be explained by the 
covariates in the model.  
 
To illustrate this point, Table 4.2 compares the average predicted  1Pr iy  with the 
average observed 1iy  from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of Model 1 from a 
probit model where 10 per cent of the data is misclassified (i.e. %100   and 
%101  ) and another probit model when none of the data is misclassified. In each 
simulation, the data are sorted from the observation with the largest negative value of 
'1ix  to the observation with the largest positive value of 
'
1ix . The table shows that 
when the data is misclassified there is quite a difference between the observed 
proportion of 1iy  and the predicted  1Pr iy , while the two are practically the 
same when there is no misclassification in the data. The table also shows that when 10 
per cent of the data is misclassified, the groups with the most negative characteristics 
have around 10 per cent of observations with 1iy  and a very low or zero average 
predicted  1Pr iy . This arises because these misclassified observations cannot be 
explained by the covariates in the model. Similarly, only 90 per cent of the groups 
with the most positive characteristics have 1iy  and they essentially have an average 
predicted  1Pr iy  of 1. 
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Probit Models with and without Misclassification*  
 Probit Model with 10% Misclassification Probit Model with No Misclassification 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Absolute 
Difference  
Proportion 
of Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Absolute 
Difference  
Minimum '1ix  0.1004 0.0004 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2-100 0.1013 0.0112 0.0901 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
101-500 0.0990 0.0569 0.0422 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
501-1000 0.1002 0.1299 0.0297 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 
1001-2000 0.1145 0.2389 0.1243 0.0190 0.0239 0.0049 
2001-3000 0.2356 0.3644 0.1288 0.1700 0.1592 0.0108 
3001-4000 0.4459 0.4773 0.0313 0.4320 0.4313 0.0007 
4001-5000 0.6699 0.5784 0.0915 0.7120 0.7121 0.0001 
5001-6000 0.8150 0.6756 0.1394 0.8930 0.9029 0.0099 
6001-7000 0.8863 0.7657 0.1206 0.9830 0.9806 0.0024 
7001-8000 0.8990 0.8467 0.0523 0.9990 0.9982 0.0008 
8001-9000 0.8998 0.9182 0.0184 1.0000 0.9999 0.0001 
9001-9500 0.8994 0.9647 0.0653 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
9501-9900 0.8997 0.9878 0.0881 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
9901-9990 0.8984 0.9979 0.0995 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
9991-9999 0.9000 0.9999 0.0999 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Maximum '1ix  0.9082 1.0000 0.0918 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
* In both models the sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
simulations 
 
Turning to the Hausman et al. estimator, the identification of 0 , or the proportion of 
observations that are misclassified as 1iy  when 0
~ iy , comes from the 
observations with the most negative characteristics. If we take a group of observations 
with the most negative characteristics, we would expect them to have 0~ iy  but if 
some of them are observed as having 1iy  then these cases are probably 
misclassified. For this group, we would expect the observed proportion of 1iy  to be 
higher than the predicted  1Pr iy  because the observations with 1iy  will have a 
very low or zero  1Pr iy  as they have very low values of 
'
1ix . Table 4.3 compares 
the predicted  1Pr iy  with the observed 1iy  by groups of the 
'
1ix  distribution 
for Model 1 from the Hausman et al. model when there is 1 per cent misclassification 
in the data. As before, in each simulation the data are sorted from the observation with 
the largest negative value of '1ix  to the observation with the largest positive value of 
'1ix . 
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Table 4.3: Comparison of Predicted Probabilities with Observed Proportion of 1’s by Groups of 
'1ix  for Model 1 with 1% Symmetric Misclassification, using the Hausman et al. Estimator* 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of True 
1~ iy  
Proportion of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy             
- Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy - 
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy  
Minimum '1ix  0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0040 -0.0040 
2-100 0.0000 0.0101 0.0000 0.0101 -0.0101 
101-500 0.0000 0.0100 0.0000 0.0100 -0.0100 
501-1000 0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 0.0102 -0.0102 
1001-2000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0001 0.0099 -0.0099 
2001-3000 0.0010 0.0110 0.0027 0.0083 -0.0083 
3001-4000 0.0200 0.0296 0.0231 0.0065 -0.0065 
4001-5000 0.0910 0.0992 0.0977 0.0015 -0.0015 
5001-6000 0.3060 0.3097 0.2815 0.0282 -0.0282 
6001-7000 0.5530 0.5520 0.5664 -0.0144 0.0144 
7001-8000 0.8320 0.8252 0.8377 -0.0125 0.0125 
8001-9000 0.9780 0.9685 0.9751 -0.0066 0.0066 
9001-9500 0.9960 0.9860 0.9991 -0.0131 0.0131 
9501-9900 1.0000 0.9897 1.0000 -0.0103 0.0103 
9901-9990 1.0000 0.9921 1.0000 -0.0079 0.0079 
9991-9999 1.0000 0.9921 1.0000 -0.0079 0.0079 
Maximum  '1ix  1.0000 0.9921 1.0000 -0.0079 0.0079 
* The sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations 
 
The table shows that around 1 per cent of the observations in the groups with the 
lowest values of '1ix  have 1iy . However, the associated predicted  1Pr iy  for 
these observations is essentially zero because based on their values of '1ix  we would 
expect these cases to have 0iy . In fact, the table also shows the true proportion of 
1~ iy  and we can see that it is zero for these groups. The difference between the 
proportion of 1iy  and the predicted  1Pr iy  for the groups with the most 
negative values of ix1  is approximately 1 per cent and this type of measure can be 
used to identify 0 . As the estimator uses observations in the bottom part of the 
'
1ix  
distribution to identify 0 , it will only be able to accurately identify it if there are 
observations with very low values of '1ix  where 1iy . 
 
In an analogous way, we can see how 
1 , or the proportion of cases that are 
misclassified as having 0iy  when truly 1
~ iy , is identified. We would expect 
observations with very high values of '1ix  to have 1
~ iy  so observations with very 
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high values of '1ix  that have 0iy  are likely to be misclassified. In this case, we 
would expect the predicted  1Pr iy  to exceed the proportion of 1iy  for groups 
with the most positive characteristics. The bottom part of Table 4.3 shows that groups 
with the most positive values of '1ix  have a predicted  1Pr iy  of essentially 1 yet 
only around 99 per cent of each of the groups is observed with 1iy . The difference 
between the predicted  1Pr iy  and the proportion of 1iy  for these groups yields 
an estimate of 
1 . Therefore to identify 1  there needs to be observations with 0iy  
when '1ix  takes on very high values. Appendix Tables 4.1 to 4.3 show a similar 
comparison of predicted probabilities and observed proportions of 1iy  for Model 1 
when there is 5 per cent, 10 per cent and 20 per cent misclassification respectively, in 
the data. From these tables, we can see that the misclassification probabilities are 
identified from the groups of observations with the most negative and most positive 
values of the '1ix  distribution.  
 
The range of  1~Pr iy  in each of these models is from 0 to 1 meaning that 
'
1ix  gets 
sufficiently large in magnitude in each model to generate such probabilities. This will 
become more relevant in Section 4.5 where an example is given of when the estimator 
performs poorly. 
 
4.4 Extensions to the Basic Model Specification 
This section considers a range of changes and extensions to the basic model 
specification outlined in Section 4.3. The aim of the section is to ascertain how the 
Hausman et al. estimator performs in different situations and consequently to 
determine conditions under which the estimator is appropriate to use to control for 
misclassification. 
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4.4.1 Weakening the Impact of the Explanatory Variable in the Model 
The next set of Monte Carlo simulations consider two models, identical to Model 1 in 
all respects except that the effect of the explanatory variable becomes progressively 
weaker, as follows:
34,35
 
 
Model 2:  
iii xy  1
* 0.11  
Model 3: iii xy  1
* 5.01  
 
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations are shown in Table 4.4. The results show 
that the estimated misclassification probabilities remain close to their true values even 
when the effect of the explanatory variable becomes weaker. However, there is a loss 
in estimation efficiency for each given level of misclassification. This is also reflected 
in the increase in the range of estimates for 0  and 1 .  
 
Table 4.4 shows that some of the Monte Carlo simulations have generated negative 
estimates of the misclassification probabilities, particularly for Model 3. For example, 
in the simulations run on Model 3 when 1 per cent of the data is misclassified there 
are 10 cases where the estimate of 0  is negative. In all cases, misclassification is 
assumed to be independent of the covariates so that each observation with 1iy  or 
0iy  has an equal chance of being misclassified in any given simulation. A negative 
0  could be generated if none or very few of the observations in the left tail of the 
'1ix  distribution are misclassified as 1iy . In this case, the proportion of cases with 
1iy  in the group with the most negative values of 
'
1ix  would be very low or it 
could be zero and this value could be below the predicted  1Pr iy  for the group. 
This could yield a negative value for 0 . In the case of Model 3 it appears that 
because the effect of the explanatory variable is considerably weaker and the 
                                                          
34
 In one respect, these models are similar to introducing measurement error in the explanatory variable 
as that leads to downwards bias in the coefficient estimate. 
35
 Reducing the effect of the explanatory variable in the true underlying model also serves to reduce the 
proportion of 1~ iy in the data. For example, the proportion of 1
~ iy  in Model 1 is 38 per cent and 
this proportion falls to 33 per cent and 25 per cent in Models 2 and 3 respectively. Appendix Table 4.4 
shows the proportion of 1~ iy in each of the models considered in the chapter. 
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proportion of 1~ iy  is smaller than in Models 1 and 2, that in some simulations, there 
may not be sufficient support at low values of the index '1ix  to accurately identify 
0 .
36
 
 
To illustrate this point, I chose one of the simulations generating a negative estimate 
of 0  and looked closely at the dataset. Table 4.5 reports results for a simulation 
where the estimate of 0  is negative in Model 3 when there is 1 per cent symmetric 
misclassification. In this case, it appears that essentially none of the observations with 
very negative values of '1ix  have been misclassified as 1iy  because the observed 
proportion of 1iy  is equal to the true proportion 1
~ iy  for the groups with the 
lowest values of '1ix . For some of the groups with very negative values of 
'
1ix  the 
proportion of observed 1iy  is smaller than the predicted  1Pr iy  (highlighted in 
bold in the table) and this produces a negative estimate of 0 . A similar argument 
about none or very few cases being misclassified in the right tail can explain how a 
negative estimate of 
1  could be generated. This highlights how the Hausman et al. 
estimator only uses the observations with strong characteristics to identify the 
misclassification probabilities. In the simulation reported in Table 4.5, even though 1 
per cent of the data is misclassified, none of the data in the left tail of the '1ix  
distribution has been misclassified and so 0  is not estimated accurately. This result 
shows that even when the misclassification probabilities are independent of the 
covariates, negative estimates of 0  are possible. 
 
In a real world dataset, a negative misclassification probability could indicate that 
misclassification is not independent of the covariates. For example, if 
misclassification depends on ix1  in such a way that only observations with 
intermediate values of ix1  are misclassified, then the estimator would not be able to 
identify the misclassification rates from the groups with the extreme values of '1ix .
                                                          
36
 This idea is explored further in Section 4.4.2 where the sample size in Model 3 is increased to 
100,000 in an attempt to ascertain whether increasing the number of cases that are misclassified in 
absolute terms helps to improve the estimates from the Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Table 4.4: Estimates of Misclassification Probabilities for Models 1-3* 
Level of 
Misclassification 
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
0ˆ  
Std 
Error 
0ˆ  
MSE 
0ˆ  
Min 
0ˆ  
Max 
0ˆ  
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Std 
Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  
Min  
1ˆ  
Max 
1ˆ  
No. of 
Sims 
 
Model 1: 
iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Repeated from Table 4.1) 
1% 0.0100 0.0092 0.0018 0.0000 0.0043 0.0148 0.0100 0.0103 0.0029 0.0000 0.0025 0.0204 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0487 0.0038 0.0000 0.0367 0.0624 0.0501 0.0497 0.0058 0.0000 0.0327 0.0657 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0983 0.0052 0.0000 0.0832 0.1172 0.1000 0.0988 0.0077 0.0000 0.0760 0.1235 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1985 0.0068 0.0000 0.1780 0.2162 0.2001 0.1984 0.0102 0.0001 0.1686 0.2306 1,000 
             
 
Model 2: iii xy  1
* 0.11   (Note: Weaker Effect of ix1 ) 
1% 0.0100 0.0095 0.0021 0.0000 0.0036 0.0154 0.0100 0.0099 0.0046 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0241 999 
5% 0.0500 0.0491 0.0043 0.0000 0.0346 0.0630 0.0501 0.0491 0.0085 0.0000 0.0202 0.0725 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0989 0.0058 0.0000 0.0825 0.1161 0.1000 0.0980 0.0112 0.0001 0.0674 0.1315 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1990 0.0076 0.0000 0.1790 0.2219 0.2002 0.1971 0.0145 0.0002 0.1358 0.2387 1,000 
             
 
Model 3: iii xy  1
* 5.01  (Note: Weaker Effect of ix1 ) 
1% 0.0100 0.0075 0.0035 0.0000 -0.0022 0.0180 0.0100 0.0198 0.0303 0.0003 -0.0233 0.0672 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0462 0.0068 0.0000 0.0267 0.0641 0.0502 0.0546 0.0371 0.0008 -0.0287 0.1428 1,000 
10%** 0.1000 0.9041 0.0089 0.6467 0.8757 0.9314 0.1000 0.8997 0.0435 0.6409 0.8087 1.0691 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0959 0.0089 0.0001 0.0686 0.1243 0.1000 0.1003 0.0435 0.0013 -0.0691 0.1913 1,000 
20% 0.2000 0.1959 0.0117 0.0001 0.1593 0.2317 0.2004 0.1940 0.0534 0.0027 -0.0926 0.3119 1,000 
* The sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations 
** In this case each simulation estimates 1- 0 , 1- 1  and  . This arises because the condition 110   which is needed for identification has not been imposed in the Monte Carlo 
simulations. When the true values of   from Model 3 are given as starting values the simulation results (given in the following line of the table) are sensible 
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Table 4.5: Comparison of Predicted Probabilities with Observed Proportion of 1’s by Groups of 
the ix1  Distribution for Model 3 with 1% Symmetric Misclassification when 0ˆ  is -0.0014 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of True 
1~ iy  
Proportion of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy             
- Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy - 
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy  
Minimum '1ix  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2-100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0005 
101-500 0.0025 0.0025 0.0040 -0.0015 0.0015 
501-1000 0.0020 0.0120 0.0123 -0.0003 0.0003 
1001-2000 0.0190 0.0310 0.0310 0.0000 0.0000 
2001-3000 0.0550 0.0680 0.0619 0.0061 -0.0061 
3001-4000 0.0790 0.0880 0.1009 -0.0129 0.0129 
4001-5000 0.1370 0.1420 0.1479 -0.0059 0.0059 
5001-6000 0.2260 0.2310 0.2086 0.0224 -0.0224 
6001-7000 0.2720 0.2780 0.2857 -0.0077 0.0077 
7001-8000 0.3910 0.3860 0.3843 0.0017 -0.0017 
8001-9000 0.5320 0.5280 0.5192 0.0088 -0.0088 
9001-9500 0.6680 0.6640 0.6640 0.0000 0.0000 
9501-9900 0.8325 0.8300 0.7986 0.0314 -0.0314 
9901-9990 0.9444 0.9444 0.9202 0.0243 -0.0243 
9991-9999 1.0000 1.0000 0.9861 0.0139 -0.0139 
Maximum '1ix  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
4.4.2 Effect of Sample Size 
It is important to ascertain how sensitive the results are to changes in sample size. The 
simulation results presented so far have been based on datasets where the sample size 
is 10,000. Two additional models are considered. The first uses the same equation as 
Model 1 (which performed well) but where the sample size is reduced to 1,000 
(Model 4) and the second uses the same equation as Model 3 but the sample size is 
increased to 100,000 (Model 5). The Monte Carlo simulation results are presented in 
Table 4.6. 
 
The results for Model 4 when there is 5%, 10% and 20% symmetric misclassification 
show that the average estimates of the misclassification probabilities are quite close to 
their true values, which is encouraging because of the small sample size. However 
there is a marked increase in the average standard errors associated with the estimates 
compared to those in Model 1.  
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The results for this model when there is 1% symmetric misclassification are 
disappointing. First, some of the estimates of the misclassification probabilities are 
excessively large in magnitude and this will be discussed in Section 4.5.1. The results 
indicate that some of the estimates, particularly for 
0  are being driven by extreme 
values so it may be more appropriate to consider the median estimates. The median 
estimate of 
0  is 0.0087 and the median estimate of 1  is 0.0120, both of which are 
close to the true misclassification rates. Second, the estimator only converges in 542 
out of 1,000 simulations. In this model, the sample size is only 1,000 and the 
proportion of 1~ iy  is .377 (see Appendix Table 4.4). This means that 1
~ iy  for 377 
cases and 0~ iy  for the remaining 623 cases. If 1 per cent of each group is 
misclassified, then on average only around 4 cases where 1~ iy  and around 6 cases 
where 0~ iy  will be misclassified. In this case, because the number of misclassified 
cases in any given simulation is so small in absolute terms the estimator has difficulty 
in identifying the model in some simulations. 
 
Table 4.6 also reports the results for this model when there is 1 per cent symmetric 
misclassification when the true parameters from the hypothetical dataset are used as 
starting values for 0  and 1 . The simulation results are much better when these 
starting values are given. The results show that on average the estimates of 0  and 1  
are close to the true misclassification rates and although some of the estimates are 
negative, there are no extreme estimates. However, even giving the true population 
parameters as starting values in each simulation, the estimator only converges in 677 
out of 1,000 simulations. 
 
The third panel in Table 4.6 shows the simulation results where the sample size is 
increased to 100,000 (Model 5). This model uses the same equation as Model 3. The 
reason for using this equation is that when Model 3 was run with a sample of 10,000 
negative probabilities were estimated in some instances.  One of the arguments put 
forward as to why this may happen is that when the effect of the explanatory variable 
is weaker there may not be a sufficient number of cases in the tails of the distribution 
to accurately identify the misclassification probabilities. The results should be 
compared to those of Model 3 in Table 4.4. The results show that the range of 
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estimates for both misclassification probabilities is much tighter than before and no 
estimates are negative. This indicates that increasing the number of misclassified 
cases in absolute terms helps with the identification of the estimates. The average 
estimate of 
1  for each model is further from the true rates of misclassification than is 
the case with Model 3. This is somewhat surprising but the negative estimates in 
Model 3 help to pull down the average estimates of the misclassification probabilities. 
The tables also report the mean square errors (MSE) associated with the estimates of 
the misclassification probabilities. Although the average estimates of 
1  from Model 
5, where the sample size is 100,000, are further from the true values than for Model 3, 
where the sample size is 10,000, the MSEs of the estimates are lower, indicating the 
estimates from Model 5 are superior to those from Model 3. 
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Table 4.6: Estimates of Misclassification Probabilities for Models 4-6*  
Level of 
Misclassification 
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
0ˆ  
Std 
Error 
0ˆ  
MSE 0ˆ  Min 0ˆ  
Max 
0ˆ  
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Std 
Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  
Min  
1ˆ  
Max 
1ˆ  
No. 
of 
Sims 
 
Model 1: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Repeated from Table 4.1, note: sample size is 10,000) 
1% 0.0100 0.0092 0.0018 0.0000 0.0043 0.0148 0.0100 0.0103 0.0029 0.0000 0.0025 0.0204 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0487 0.0038 0.0000 0.0367 0.0624 0.0501 0.0497 0.0058 0.0000 0.0327 0.0657 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0983 0.0052 0.0000 0.0832 0.1172 0.1000 0.0988 0.0077 0.0000 0.0760 0.1235 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1985 0.0068 0.0000 0.1780 0.2162 0.2001 0.1984 0.0102 0.0001 0.1686 0.2306 1,000 
             
 
Model 4: Effect of Reducing Sample Size, iii xy  1
* 5.11    (Note: Sample size is 1,000) 
1% 0.0104 -3002.15 93.5732 926000000 -535392.6 0.0291 0.0116 0.0025 0.0131 0.0060 -0.7475 0.0386 542 
Model 4: 1% Misclassification with the true values of   given as starting values 
1%  0.0102 0.0092 0.0054 0.0000 -0.0103 0.0291 0.0114 0.0108 0.0112 0.0001 -0.0609 0.0386 677 
5% 0.0500 0.0473 0.0117 0.0001 0.0139 0.0823 0.0505 0.0476 0.0182 0.0002 -0.0081 0.1084 992 
10% 0.1000 0.0965 0.0163 0.0001 0.0452 0.1474 0.1001 0.0951 0.0249 0.0004 0.0151 0.1664 998 
20% 0.2000 0.1963 0.0220 0.0002 0.1224 0.2575 0.2000 0.1935 0.0335 0.0008 0.0696 0.2936 999 
              
 
Model 5: Effect of Increasing Sample Size, iii xy  1
* 5.01    (Note: Sample size is 100,000 and the equation is the same as in Model 3) 
1% 0.0100 0.0087 0.0011 0.0000 0.0057 0.0117 0.0100 0.0251 0.0097 0.0002 0.0095 0.0434 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0484 0.0021 0.0000 0.0423 0.0558 0.0500 0.0633 0.0118 0.0002 0.0332 0.0878 1,000 
10%** 0.0999 0.0984 0.0027 0.0000 0.0913 0.1065 0.1000 0.1118 0.0136 0.0003 0.0740 0.1444 1,000 
20% 0.2000 0.1988 0.0035 0.0000 0.1870 0.2079 0.2000 0.2093 0.0158 0.0003 0.1467 0.2522 1,000 
              
            
 Model 6: Increasing the Proportion of 1~ iy  in the Sample, iii xy  1
* 5.11    (Note: Change in Intercept) 
1% 0.0100 0.0092 0.0027 0.0000 0.0023 0.0175 0.0100 0.0096 0.0018 0.0000 0.0045 0.0149 1,000 
5% 0.0499 0.0490 0.0058 0.0000 0.0302 0.0663 0.0501 0.0493 0.0038 0.0000 0.0384 0.0603 1,000 
10% 0.0998 0.0987 0.0078 0.0000 0.0720 0.1212 0.1001 0.0992 0.0051 0.0000 0.0837 0.1145 1,000 
20% 0.1998 0.1987 0.0102 0.0001 0.1641 0.2311 0.2003 0.1994 0.0068 0.0000 0.1757 0.2189 999 
* The sample size is 10,000 unless otherwise stated and the results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations 
** In this set of Monte Carlo simulations, the true values of   are used as starting values, otherwise each simulation produces estimates of 1- 0 , 1- 1  and 
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4.4.3 Increasing the Proportion of 1~ iy  in the Sample 
The Monte Carlo simulation results for each model and each level of misclassification 
reported in the previous tables show that the average standard errors of the estimates 
for 
1  exceed those of 0 . For example, in Model 1 the average standard errors of 1  
are around 1.5 times the magnitude of those of 0 . This arises because there are 
relatively fewer observations with 1~ iy  than 0
~ iy . In Model 1 around 38 per cent 
of observations have 1~ iy . Model 6 changes the intercept in Model 1 from –1 to +1 
and this has the effect of increasing the proportion of observations with 1~ iy  to 62 
per cent.
37
 The Monte Carlo simulation results (reported in bottom panel of Table 4.6) 
show that the average standard errors of 0  are now around 1.5 times those of the 
estimates of 
1 . 
4.4.4 Asymmetric Misclassification 
This section investigates how the estimator performs when misclassification is 
asymmetric (i.e. 10   ). Table 4.7 shows the simulation results for Model 1 for 
three different examples of asymmetric misclassification. In Model 7 0 =5% and 
1 =20%, in Model 8 0 =25% and 1 =1% and in Model 9 0 =5% and 1 =50%. In 
each case, the estimator performs well with the average estimates of the 
misclassification probabilities being close to their true values.  
 
However in Model 8, where 0 =25% and 1 =1%, the estimator only converges in 
917 out of 1000 simulations. A further set of simulations were run on Model 8 with 
0 =25% but 1  was increased from 1% to 5%.  In these simulations (not reported in 
the table) the model converges in 999 out of 1,000 simulations. 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Appendix Table 4.4 shows the proportion of 1~ iy in each of the models considered in the chapter. 
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Table 4.7: Asymmetric Misclassification in Model 1*  
Level of 
Misclassification 
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate  
0ˆ  
Std 
Error 
0ˆ  
MSE 
0ˆ  
Min 
0ˆ  
Max 
0ˆ  
Actual 
Misclassification 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Std 
Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  Min 1ˆ  
Max 
1ˆ  
No. of 
Sims 
 
Model 7: 
iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: 0 =5% and 1 =20%) 
0 =5% and 
1 =20% 
0.0500 0.0487 0.0038 0.0000 0.0364 0.0628 0.2001 0.1990 0.0101 0.0001 0.1691 0.2321 1000 
              
            
Model 8: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: 0 =25% and 1 =1%) 
0 =25% and 
1 =1% 
0.2510 0.2497 0.0073 0.0000 0.2301 0.2684 0.0100 0.0098 0.0028 0.0000 0.0024 0.0202 917 
              
            
Model 9: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: 0 =5% and 1 =50%) 
0 =5% and 
1 =50% 
0.0500 0.0491 0.0038 0.0000 0.0360 0.0633 0.5003 0.4994 0.0123 0.0001 0.4592 0.5379 1000 
              
* The sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations 
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Table 4.8 compares the predicted  1Pr iy  with the observed 1iy  by groups of the 
'1ix  distribution for Model 9 where 0  is equal to 5 percent and 1  is equal to 50 
per cent. As before, in each simulation the data are sorted from the observation with 
the largest negative value of '1ix  to the observation with the largest positive value of 
'1ix . The table shows that around 5 per cent of the observations in the groups with 
the lowest values of '1ix  have 1iy  and the associated predicted  1Pr iy  for these 
observations are essentially zero. The difference between these two values provides 
the estimate of 
0 . The bottom part of the table shows that groups with the most 
positive values of '1ix  have a predicted  1Pr iy  of essentially 1 yet only around 50 
per cent of each of the groups is observed with 1iy . The difference between the 
predicted  1Pr iy  and the proportion of 1iy  for these groups is how the estimate 
of 
1  is identified. 
 
Table 4.8: Comparison of Predicted Probabilities with Observed Proportion of 1’s by Groups of 
the '1ix  Distribution for Model 9 where 0 =5% and 1 =50% 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of True 
1~ iy  
Proportion of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy             
- Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy - 
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy  
Minimum '1ix  0.0000 0.0466 0.0000 0.0466 -0.0466 
2-100 0.0000 0.0511 0.0000 0.0511 -0.0511 
101-500 0.0000 0.0498 0.0000 0.0498 -0.0498 
501-1000 0.0000 0.0503 0.0000 0.0503 -0.0503 
1001-2000 0.0000 0.0502 0.0002 0.0500 -0.0500 
2001-3000 0.0010 0.0506 0.0035 0.0471 -0.0471 
3001-4000 0.0200 0.0591 0.0258 0.0333 -0.0333 
4001-5000 0.0910 0.0909 0.1022 -0.0113 0.0113 
5001-6000 0.3060 0.1875 0.2850 -0.0974 0.0974 
6001-7000 0.5530 0.2982 0.5648 -0.2666 0.2666 
7001-8000 0.8320 0.4237 0.8319 -0.4082 0.4082 
8001-9000 0.9780 0.4899 0.9716 -0.4817 0.4817 
9001-9500 0.9960 0.4984 0.9986 -0.5002 0.5002 
9501-9900 1.0000 0.4994 1.0000 -0.5006 0.5006 
9901-9990 1.0000 0.4939 1.0000 -0.5061 0.5061 
9991-9999 1.0000 0.4909 1.0000 -0.5091 0.5091 
Maximum '1ix  1.0000 0.4909 1.0000 -0.5091 0.5091 
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4.4.5 When the Explanatory Variable is Dichotomous 
Various attempts were made to estimate a model where the explanatory variable is a 
dummy variable. One example used the same equation as Model 1 only with a binary 
explanatory variable that is equal to 1 with a 50% probability. A simple probit model 
on the true (correctly classified) data estimates that  1~Pr iy  is either 0.0006 or 
0.1654. When some proportion of the data is misclassified the approach experiences 
serious convergence problems.
38
 In previous sections 
0  and 1  were identified from 
subgroups of the data with the most negative and positive characteristics. When the 
explanatory variable is binary, there are only two subgroups in the data with distinct 
values of the explanatory variable so the estimator tries to use the entire subgroup 
where 
ix =1 to estimate 0  and similarly the entire subgroup where ix =0 to estimate 
1  (i.e. the entire dataset is needed to just estimate the two misclassification 
probabilities).  
 
Increasing the number of dummy regressors helps the Hausman et al. estimator 
converge to a solution. Model 10 includes 3 dummy variables as follows: 
 
 Model 10: iiiii xxxy  321
* 5.045.21  
 
where ix1 =1 with probability ½, 12 ix  with probability 1/3 and ix3 =1 with 
probability ¼. In this case the range of  1~Pr iy  is from 0.0001 to 0.7004. The 
results of the Monte Carlo simulations are shown in Table 4.9. The estimates of 0  
for 1 per cent and 20 per cent misclassification are reasonably close to their true 
values and the average of the standard errors of the estimates are quite low. At first 
glance, the estimator of 0  when there is 5 per cent and 10 per cent misclassification 
does not perform quite as well. However, it is important to note that when there is 1 
per cent and 20 per cent misclassification in the simulations only 814 and 788 
respectively of the models converge and this is probably accounts for why some of the 
results appear superior to the 5 per cent and 10 per cent cases. When the 
                                                          
38
 Different models with a single dummy explanatory variable were simulated; where the effect of 
1  
is very strong, with and without a constant term and when the true population parameters are used as 
starting values. In each case, the iterations do not make any progress from about the third iteration. 
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misclassification rate is 5 per cent, each simulation estimates 
01  , 11   and  . 
Using the true values of   as starting values in the simulations (Model 11 in Table 
4.9) results in 
0 , 1  and   being estimated. When there is 10 per cent symmetric 
misclassification the average of the estimates of 0  is being driven by some extreme 
estimates. The median estimates of 
0  are near to their true values; although in the 
case of 5 per cent misclassification this is only true when the true values of   are 
used as starting values in the simulations. The estimates for 
1  are inferior to the 
estimates of 0 . They are further away from their true values, the range of estimates 
is wider and more negative probabilities are estimated. In addition, when the level of 
misclassification increases there are more instances of extreme estimates of 
1 . While 
using the true values of   as starting values in the simulations results in there being 
no extreme estimates of 0  when there is 10 per cent misclassification, the same is 
not true for the estimates of 
1  when there is 10 per cent and 20 per cent 
misclassification. 
 
The third panel of Table 4.9 shows the simulation results when we extend Model 10 
to include 5 dummy variables as follows: 
 
 Model 12: iiiiiii xxxxxy  54321
* 15.15.045.21  
 
where ix1 =1 with probability ½, 12 ix  with probability 1/3, ix3 =1 with probability 
¼, ix4 =1 with probability ¼ and ix5 =1 with probability 0.4. In this case the range of 
 1~Pr iy  if from 6.37e-07 to 0.9817. This model performs better than Models 10 and 
11. The average of the estimates are quite close to their true values, the models 
converge in practically every case and no extreme values are estimated. 
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Table 4.9: Estimates of Misclassification Probabilities when the Models only include Dummy Variables*  
Level of 
Misc‟n 
Actual 
Misc‟n 
Rate 
0ˆ  
Median 
0ˆ  
Std Error 
0ˆ  
MSE 
0ˆ  
Min 
0ˆ  Max 0ˆ  
Actual 
Misc‟n 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Median 
1ˆ  
Std Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  Min 1ˆ  Max 1ˆ  
No. of 
Sims 
 
Model 10: 
iiiii xxxy  321
* 5.045.21  (Note: 3 binary regressors) 
1% 0.0100 0.0077 0.0078 0.0041 0.0000 -0.0050 0.0173 0.0100 -0.0068 -0.0023 0.1478 0.0027 -0.2684 0.1027 814 
5% 0.0501 0.9554 0.9531 0.0097 0.8196 0.9353 0.9990 0.0500 1.0120 0.9759 0.2261 0.9594 0.7381 4.1972 987 
10% 0.1000 16.5083 0.1002 36.9314 242694 -0.0487 14983.15 0.0999 -248063 0.1153 603011.50 5.69E+13 -229000000 1.1132 925 
20% 0.2001 0.1794 0.1913 0.0404 0.0038 -1.1008 0.2246 0.2003 -4008068 0.1726 11900000 2.62E+15 -908000000 0.3925 788 
                
                
Model 11: iiiii xxxy  321
* 5.045.21  (Note: same 3 binary regressors as Model 10 and the true values of   given as starting values) 
1% 0.0100 0.0081 0.0088 0.0038 0.0000 -0.0050 0.0173 0.0100 -0.0043 0.0008 0.1460 0.0025 -0.2683 0.1028 975 
5% 0.0500 0.0446 0.0469 0.0096 0.0001 0.0010 0.0647 0.0501 -0.0115 0.0241 0.2234 0.0372 -3.1789 0.2619 997 
10% 0.1000 0.0907 0.0953 0.0159 0.0004 -0.1133 0.1155 0.1000 -224707.40 0.0661 578306.90 4.87E+13 -217000000 0.3155 966 
20% 0.2000 0.1793 0.1910 0.0432 0.0039 -1.1036 0.2246 0.2006 -1681924 0.1750 5202606 5.9E+14 -519000000 0.3925 778 
                
                
Model 12:: iiiiiii xxxxxy  54321
* 15.15.045.21  (Note: 5 binary regressors) 
1%** 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0023 0.0000 0.0029 0.0177 0.0100 -0.0064 -0.0069 0.0089 0.0003 -0.0210 0.0192 1,000 
5%** 0.0500 0.0493 0.0494 0.0046 0.0000 0.0361 0.0628 0.0501 0.0313 0.0313 0.0150 0.0005 -0.0095 0.0743 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0992 0.0993 0.0062 0.0000 0.0812 0.1165 0.0999 0.0800 0.0804 0.0199 0.0007 0.0208 0.1512 995 
20% 0.2001 0.1991 0.1993 0.0081 0.0000 0.1739 0.2206 0.2002 0.1822 0.1836 0.0262 0.0009 0.0734 0.2581 1,000 
                
 
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations 
** In this set of Monte Carlo simulations, the true values of   are used as starting values, otherwise each simulation produces estimates of 1- 0 , 1- 1  and    
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4.4.6 Coefficient Estimates from Hausman et al. and Probit Models 
Table 4.10 compares the Hausman et al. estimates for   from the simulations with 
those from a standard probit model. In each case the Hausman et al. estimator 
outperforms a standard probit estimator, although there is evidence of bias as the level 
of misclassification increases and when the sample size is small.
39
 
 
When observations are misclassified we expect the probit estimates to be biased 
downwards. Intuitively, in a model without misclassification observations with strong 
positive characteristics are the ones we expect to see with 1iy , if the model fits the 
data well. However, if some of these observations are misclassified as having 0iy , 
then we will observe observations with these strong characteristics that have 1iy  as 
well as some with 0iy . As the standard probit model ignores misclassification, the 
estimated effect of this characteristic will be weaker as there are more observations 
with these strong characteristics with 0iy . The striking feature of the probit 
estimates is the extent of their bias and how the bias increases as the level of 
misclassification increases. For example, in Model 1 when there is 10 per cent 
misclassification, the average estimate of 
1  is -0.5 compared to the true value of -
1.5. Also, their average standard errors are much smaller than the corresponding 
Hausman et al. estimates; in fact the average standard errors of the probit estimates 
fall as the level of misclassification increases. This implies that not only are the probit 
estimates biased but that their precision is exaggerated.
 
 
                                                          
39
 The average Hausman et al. estimate of 
1  for Model 4 when there is 1% symmetric 
misclassification is superior to the probit estimate despite the fact that the average estimate of 
1  
(given in Table 4.6) is quite poor; however the MSE of 0ˆ  from the probit model is below that of the 
Hausman et al. model. Also the Hausman et al. estimator only converges in 542 out of 1,000 
simulations while probit estimates are available for all simulations. In this set of simulations there are 
15 cases where the estimate of 0  is excessively large in magnitude – these estimates range from -
7863.92 to -535392.6. For this subset of cases, the average Hausman et al. estimate of 
1  is -0.0623 
and the average estimate of 0  is 4.0998. The comparable probit estimates are -1.1761 for 1  and -
0.8080 for 0 .  For this subset of cases, where extreme misclassification probabilities are estimated, 
the probit estimates are much closer to the true   than the Hausman et al. estimates.   However, when 
the true values for 0  and 1  are used as starting values in the simulations of the Hausman et al. 
model, the estimates have a lower MSE than the probit estimates, although the Hausman et al. 
estimator only converges in 677 out of 1,000 simulations. 
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The table also reports the MSEs associated with the estimates of  . For Models 1 to 
9, in practically every case, the MSEs of the Hausman et al. estimates are below the 
MSEs of the probit estimates.40 For Model 10, which includes three dummy 
regressors, the MSEs associated with the probit estimator are generally below the 
Hausman et al. estimator, apart from when the misclassification rates are high. 
However, when the true parameters for   are used as starting values in the 
simulations (see Model 11 in Table 4.10), the Hausman et al. estimates outperform 
the probit estimates in terms of having lower MSEs, although the model does not 
always converge. In Model 12, where the number of dummy regressors increases to 
five, the Hausman et al. estimator is superior to the probit estimator as their MSEs are 
lower and the model converges in almost every case. 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 There are two cases where the MSEs of the probit estimates are below those of the Hausman et al. 
estimates. The first was mentioned in the previous footnote and the second is the estimate of 0  from 
Model 9.  
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Table 4.10: Comparison of Hausman et al. Coefficient Estimates with Probit Model* 
Level of 
Misclassification 
True 
0  
HAUS0ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
HAUS0ˆ  
MSE
HAUS0ˆ
 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
MSE 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
True 
1  
HAUS1ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
HAUS1ˆ  
MSE 
HAUS1ˆ
 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
MSE 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
No. of 
Sims 
Hausman 
Model 1: 
iii xy  1
* 5.11  
1% -1 -0.9311 0.0311 0.0049 -0.7233 0.0217 0.0771 -1.5 -1.4343 0.0368 0.0046 -1.1020 0.0202 0.1596 1,000 
5% -1 -0.9208 0.0402 0.0069 -0.4621 0.0168 0.2895 -1.5 -1.4190 0.0492 0.0077 -0.6964 0.0120 0.6461 1,000 
10% -1 -0.9131 0.0502 0.0090 -0.3403 0.0150 0.4354 -1.5 -1.4061 0.0623 0.0113 -0.5086 0.0093 0.9830 1,000 
20% -1 -0.9079 0.0754 0.0132 -0.2129 0.0135 0.6197 -1.5 -1.3952 0.0947 0.0186 -0.3150 0.0074 1.4043 1,000 
                
                
Model 2: 
iii xy  1
* 0.11   (Note: Weaker Effect of ix1 ) 
1% -1 -0.9638 0.0285 0.0015 -0.8370 0.0205 0.0269 -1.0 -0.9905 0.0255 0.0003 -0.8533 0.0157 0.0219 999 
5% -1 -0.9599 0.0381 0.0023 -0.5942 0.0165 0.1649 -1.0 -0.9855 0.0351 0.0008 -0.5965 0.0109 0.1630 1,000 
10% -1 -0.9577 0.0486 0.0032 -0.4519 0.0148 0.3005 -1.0 -0.9811 0.0451 0.0017 -0.4477 0.0088 0.3051 1,000 
20% -1 -0.9572 0.0745 0.0066 -0.2895 0.0135 0.5050 -1.0 -0.9758 0.0698 0.0048 -0.2822 0.0073 0.5153 1,000 
                
                
Model 3: iii xy  1
* 5.01  (Note: Weaker Effect of ix1 ) 
1% -1 -0.9440 0.0311 0.0033 -0.9111 0.0176 0.0080 -0.5 -0.4975 0.0214 0.0001 -0.4661 0.0101 0.0012 1,000 
5% -1 -0.9388 0.0420 0.0047 -0.7482 0.0156 0.0635 -0.5 -0.4923 0.0293 0.0005 -0.3699 0.0087 0.0170 1,000 
10%** -1 -0.9374 0.0540 0.0060 -0.6104 0.0144 0.1519 -0.5 -0.4894 0.0376 0.0011 -0.2925 0.0078 0.0431 1,000 
20% -1 -0.9387 0.0838 0.0097 -0.4148 0.0133 0.3426 -0.5 -0.4868 0.0585 0.0031 -0.1910 0.0069 0.0955 1,000 
                
               
Model 4: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: Sample size is 1,000) 
1% -1 -0.8095 0.0977 0.7277 -0.7466 0.0712 0.0700 -1.5 -1.3719 0.1077 0.0671 -1.1091 0.0641 0.1642 542 
Model 4: 1% Misclassification with the true values of   given as starting values 
1% -1 -0.9428 0.1002 0.0051 -0.7466 0.0712 0.0700 -1.5 -1.3910 0.1157 0.0158 -1.1091 0.0641 0.1642 677 
5% -1 -0.9216 0.1280 0.0132 -0.4692 0.0537 0.2841 -1.5 -1.3618 0.1431 0.0285 -0.7014 0.0379 0.6409 992 
10% -1 -0.9160 0.1630 0.0244 -0.3430 0.0476 0.4333 -1.5 -1.3481 0.1839 0.0455 -0.5134 0.0295 0.9747 998 
20% -1 -0.9387 0.2651 0.0738 -0.2137 0.0429 0.6197 -1.5 -1.3738 0.3061 0.1196 -0.3191 0.0234 1.3952 999 
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 unless otherwise stated and the results are based on the average values from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the Probit Models and the number of 
simulations indicated in the table for the Hausman et al. estimator 
** The true parameters for   are used as starting values in this set of simulations of the Hausman et al. model; otherwise each simulation produces estimates of 01  , 11   and   
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Table 4.10 cont’d: Comparison of Hausman et al. Coefficient Estimates with Probit Model* 
Level of 
Misclassification 
True 
0  
HAUS0ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
HAUS0ˆ  
MSE
HAUS0ˆ
 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
MSE 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
True 
1  
HAUS1ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
HAUS1ˆ  
MSE 
HAUS1ˆ
 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
MSE 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
No. of 
Sims 
Hausman 
Model 5: iii xy  1
* 5.01   (Note: Sample size is 100,000 and the equation is the same as in Model 3) 
1% -1 -0.9896 0.0101 0.0001 -0.9487 0.0057 0.0026 -0.5 -0.5039 0.0069 0.0000 -0.4652 0.0032 0.0012 1,000 
5% -1 -0.9869 0.0136 0.0003 -0.7765 0.0050 0.0500 -0.5 -0.5023 0.0096 0.0001 -0.3662 0.0027 0.0179 1,000 
10%** -1 -0.9859 0.0175 0.0004 -0.6324 0.0046 0.1351 -0.5 -0.5020 0.0124 0.0001 -0.2882 0.0024 0.0449 1,000 
20% -1 -0.9857 0.0268 0.0008 -0.4295 0.0042 0.3255 -0.5 -0.5029 0.0193 0.0003 -0.1873 0.0022 0.0978 1,000 
                
                
Model 6: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: Change in Intercept) 
1% 1 0.9681 0.0324 0.0012 0.7342 0.0220 0.0713 -1.5 -1.4735 0.0380 0.0011 -1.1187 0.0206 0.1468 1,000 
5% 1 0.9612 0.0419 0.0023 0.4605 0.0168 0.2913 -1.5 -1.4655 0.0520 0.0026 -0.6982 0.0121 0.6432 1,000 
10% 1 0.9594 0.0526 0.0033 0.3367 0.0150 0.4401 -1.5 -1.4626 0.0668 0.0045 -0.5085 0.0094 0.9832 1,000 
20% 1 0.9574 0.0795 0.0068 0.2093 0.0135 0.6254 -1.5 -1.4607 0.1033 0.0109 -0.3149 0.0074 1.4046 999 
                
                
Model 7: 
iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: 0 = 5% and 1 = 20%) 
0 =5% and 
1  =20% 
-1 -0.9174 0.0472 0.0081 -0.6239 0.0162 0.1417 -1.5 -1.4103 0.0658 0.0109 -0.5116 0.0097 0.9771 1,000 
                
               
Model 8: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: 0 = 25% and 1 =1%) 
0 =25% and 
1  =1% 
-1 -0.9169 0.0620 0.0093 0.1282 0.0142 1.2730 -1.5 -1.4169 0.0608 0.0090 -0.4344 0.0086 1.1355 917 
                
                
Model 9: iii xy  1
* 5.11  (Note: 0 = 5% and 1 = 50%) 
0 =5% and 
1  =50% 
-1 -0.9149 0.0725 0.0113 -0.9233 0.0164 0.0061 -1.5 -1.4084 0.1099 0.0186 -0.3201 0.0085 1.3922 1,000 
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 unless otherwise stated and the results are based on the average values from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the Probit Models and the number of 
simulations indicated in the table for the Hausman et al. estimator 
** The true parameters for   are used as starting values in this set of simulations of the Hausman et al. model; otherwise each simulation produces estimates of 01  , 11   and   
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Table 4.10 cont’d: Comparison of Hausman et al. Coefficient Estimates with Probit Model* 
 
True 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Mean Square 
Error 
No. of Sims 
Hausman 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Mean Square 
Error 
No. of Sims 
Hausman 
Estimate Standard Error Mean Square Error 
 Hausman et al. Estimates Hausman et al. Estimates Probit Estimates 
 Model 10: 
iiiii xxxy  321
* 5.045.21   Model 11: iiiii xxxy  321
* 5.045.21  Model 10: iiiii xxxy  321
* 5.045.21  
 1% Symmetric Misclassification 
0  -1 -0.9609 0.1064 0.0025 814 -0.9610 0.1058 0.0025 975 -0.9326 0.0230 0.0046 
1  -2.5 -2.6428 68.6906 1.9340  -2.9137 53.5238 2.1231  -1.2982 0.0859 1.4514 
2  4 4.1042 68.7541 1.9930  4.3795 53.5770 2.1683  2.7378 0.0865 1.6003 
3  -0.5 -0.5134 0.0819 0.0012  -0.5154 0.0818 0.0013  -0.4854 0.0387 0.0004 
 5% Symmetric Misclassification 
0  -1 0.9743 0.1403 3.9051 987 -0.9740 0.1399 0.0079 997 -0.8341 0.0221 0.0277 
1  -2.5 2.8425 64.4951 30.8031  -2.8462 59.0481 2.3431  -0.7288 0.0515 3.1397 
2  4 -4.2733 64.5896 70.9349  4.2775 59.1415 2.5257  2.0096 0.0527 3.9641 
3  -0.5 0.5027 0.1108 1.0116  -0.5030 0.1107 0.0061  -0.3826 0.0358 0.0143 
 10% Symmetric Misclassification 
0  -1 -0.5365 0.2037 1.0278 925 -1.0107 -1.0107 0.0805 966 -0.7201 0.0213 0.0786 
1  -2.5 -1.3974 80.4521 8.8452  -2.7048 70.9468 2.5065  -0.4938 0.0430 4.0265 
2  4 2.1128 80.6066 18.5293  4.0995 71.0948 2.9189  1.5987 0.0447 5.7679 
3  -0.5 -0.2514 0.1497 0.2589  -0.4921 0.1488 0.0156  -0.2997 0.0335 0.0408 
 20% Symmetric Misclassification 
0  -1 -1.1870 0.3794 0.7897 788 -1.1692 0.3768 0.6880 778 -0.5177 0.0203 0.2329 
1  -2.5 -2.2521 109.1156 2.9820  -2.2503 123.4358 2.9994  -0.2784 0.0370 4.9369 
2  4 3.6152 109.5305 4.3640  3.6180 124.0054 4.3703  1.0733 0.0393 8.5668 
3  -0.5 -0.5047 0.5090 0.0839  -0.5055 0.7908 0.0896  -0.1914 0.0310 0.0960 
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 unless otherwise stated and the results are based on the average values from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the Probit Models and the number of 
simulations indicated in the table for the Hausman et al. estsimator 
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Table 4.10 cont’d: Comparison of Hausman et al. Coefficient Estimates with Probit Model* 
 
True 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Square 
Error 
No. of 
Sims 
Hausman 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Square 
Error 
  Hausman et al. Estimator Probit Model 
Model 12: 
iiiiiii xxxxxy  54321
* 15.15.045.21  
1% Symmetric Misclassification** 
0  -1 -0.9487 0.0325 0.0028 1,000 -0.8860 0.0290 0.0131 
1  -2.5 -2.3260 0.1864 0.0392 1,000 -1.6264 0.0832 0.7712 
2  4 3.7980 0.1983 0.0510 1,000 3.0354 0.0870 0.9396 
3  -0.5 -0.5021 0.0445 0.0002 1,000 -0.4631 0.0404 0.0016 
4  1.5 1.4772 0.0522 0.0009 1,000 1.3708 0.0396 0.0171 
5  -1 -1.0662 0.0454 0.0047 1,000 -0.9863 0.0372 0.0005 
         
5% Symmetric Misclassification** 
0  -1 -0.9444 0.0415 0.0039 1,000 -0.7467 0.0269 0.0644 
1  -2.5 -2.3690 1.3780 0.1549 1,000 -0.9219 0.0525 2.4936 
2  4 3.8268 1.3951 0.1753 1,000 2.0790 0.0551 3.6937 
3  -0.5 -0.5044 0.0519 0.0009 1,000 -0.3465 0.0365 0.0242 
4  1.5 1.4622 0.0653 0.0031 1,000 1.0530 0.0348 0.2003 
5  -1 -1.0530 0.0553 0.0038 1,000 -0.7406 0.0328 0.0679 
         
10% Symmetric Misclassification 
0  -1 -0.9445 0.0524 0.0047 995 -0.6267 0.0256 0.1397 
1  -2.5 -2.5657 10.1775 0.7905 995 -0.6281 0.0435 3.5057 
2  4 4.0157 10.1989 0.8093 995 1.5813 0.0459 5.8521 
3  -0.5 -0.5071 0.0618 0.0020 995 -0.2668 0.0339 0.0551 
4  1.5 1.4539 0.0815 0.0060 995 0.8328 0.0324 0.4458 
5  -1 -1.0463 0.0672 0.0046 995 -0.5686 0.0301 0.1868 
         
20% Symmetric Misclassification 
0  -1 -0.9495 0.0808 0.0078 1,000 -0.4410 0.0242 0.3129 
1  -2.5 -2.9918 29.4103 2.2350 1,000 -0.3621 0.0371 4.5718 
2  4 4.4399 29.4414 2.2325 1,000 1.0192 0.0397 8.8868 
3  -0.5 -0.5112 0.0890 0.0060 1,000 -0.1695 0.0311 0.1101 
4  1.5 1.4540 0.1244 0.0146 1,000 0.5510 0.0304 0.9013 
5  -1 -1.0414 0.0991 0.0089 1,000 -0.3613 0.0275 0.4085 
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 unless otherwise stated and the results are based on the average 
values from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the Probit Models and the number of simulations 
indicated in the table for the Hausman et al. estimator 
** The true parameters for   are used as starting values in these sets of simulations of the Hausman et 
al. model; otherwise each simulation produces estimates of 01  , 11   and   
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4.5 Extensions of the Model where the Estimator Performs Poorly 
This section reports the results of Monte Carlo simulations on models where the 
results from Hausman et al. estimator are disappointing. It also examines under what 
circumstances the estimates can be improved.  
4.5.1 Poor Performance of the Estimator 
In practice, when using this estimator, independent variables in a model may be 
discrete and of limited range (e.g. years of work experience). To show how the 
Hausman et al. estimator performs in this instance Model 13 employs the same basic 
equation as Model 1 only a different explanatory variable is included. In this case the 
independent variable, ix2 , is drawn from a uniform distribution and transformed to 
generate 11 distinct equally spaced numbers over the interval –0.5 to 0.5 i.e. 
 5.0,4.0,3.0,2.0,1.0,0,1.0,2.0,3.0,4.0,5.02 ix . The top panel of Table 4.11 
reports the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations for this model. The 
results show that the Hausman et al. estimator performs very poorly in this instance. 
In some cases, the average estimates of the misclassification probabilities are being 
driven by one or a few extreme values but even when there are no extreme estimates 
the resulting average estimates are quite biased. The table also reports the median 
estimates of the misclassification probabilities and the median estimates of 
1  are 
also quite far from their true values. In addition, when the amount of misclassification 
increases the estimator does not always converge. Even when the true values for 0  
and 
1  are used as starting values in the simulations, the results remain very 
disappointing (see Model 14 reported in the second panel of Table 4.11). 
 
The difficulty with estimating the misclassification probabilities for Model 13, in 
particular for estimating 
1 , appears to be that that the range of 
'
ix  is too limited. 
The misclassification probabilities are identified off cases that have very high and low 
'ix  so if the range of 
'
ix  is very limited then the Hausman et al. estimator cannot 
accurately identify the misclassification probabilities. In fact in Model 13, the range 
of the true  1~Pr iy  is between 0.0496 and 0.3993. 
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Table 4.11: Estimates of Misclassification Probabilities for Models 13-14* 
Level of 
Misc‟n 
Actual 
Misc‟n 
Rate 
0ˆ  
Median 
0ˆ  
Std 
Error 
0ˆ  
MSE 0ˆ  Min 0ˆ  Max 0ˆ  
Actual 
Misc‟n 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Median 
1ˆ  
Std Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  Min 1ˆ  
Max 
1ˆ  
No. of 
Sims 
            
Model 13: iii xy  2
* 5.11  (Note: Range of ix2  is -0.5 to 0.5) 
1% 0.0100 0.0278 0.0285 0.0233 0.0004 -0.0065 0.0477 0.0100 0.38 0.3988 0.24 0.1452 -0.12 0.5024 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0559 0.0620 0.0352 0.0008 -0.1129 0.1024 0.0503 -906293.2 0.3685 2710431 8.06E+14 -898000000 0.5509 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0914 0.1072 0.0458 0.0024 -0.3922 0.1512 0.1001 -1865653 0.3523 5808773 6.13E+14 -599000000 0.5945 994 
20% 0.1999 116389.2 0.2220 185537 1.07E+12 -0.3084 21100000 0.2005 -4837976 0.4923 21600000 1.66E+15 -696000000 1.3035 959 
                
            
Model 14: iii xy  2
* 5.11  (Note: same as Model 13 with the true values of   given as starting values) 
1% 0.0099 0.0402 0.0495 0.0824 0.0022 -0.1193 0.1002 0.0100 -146.3043 0.3638 768.9898 1926722 -24176.33 0.6071 999 
5% 0.0501 -0.0413 0.0886 0.9174 8.4999 -91.6524 0.1542 0.0500 -848581.2 0.4285 5291148 2.79E+14 -464000000 0.6666 991 
10% 0.1000 -110.9671 0.1368 558.37 11300000 -104336.8 0.2062 0.1000 -625675 0.4585 4327738 6.01E+13 -137000000 0.6585 967 
20% 0.2002 -41352.48 0.2276 1439354 4.51E+11 -17300000 0.2964 0.1996 -2185396 0.5187 18100000 4.2E+14 -336000000 0.6635 949 
                
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations 
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4.5.2 Extending the Range of the Explanatory Variable 
One way to increase the range of 'ix  is to increase the range of the explanatory 
variable. This idea is explored in Model 15 where the independent variable, 
ix3 , is 
drawn from a uniform distribution but this time is transformed to generate 41 distinct 
equally spaced numbers over the interval –2 to +2. The true coefficients on the 
constant and explanatory variable are the same as Model 13. The average values from 
the Monte Carlo simulations are reported in Table 4.12. In this case, the Hausman et 
al. estimator performs much better; for every level of misclassification considered the 
average estimates of the misclassification probabilities are very close to their true 
values. Also, the range of estimates for the misclassification probabilities is more 
plausible. This highlights how important it is to have cases with very low and very 
high values of 'ix  in order to identify the misclassification probabilities. In this case 
the range of  1~Pr iy  is from 0.00005 to 0.9776. This model also has a higher 
proportion of observations with 1~ iy  than Model 13; 0.344 compared to 0.192 in 
Model 13 and this also helps with the identification of the model.  
 
In Model 15 both the range and the amount of distinct numbers in the explanatory 
variable were increased. In many practical applications, researchers cannot affect the 
range of an explanatory variable in a model but sometimes they can affect the number 
of categories in, say, a discrete variable. For example, data on education, occupation 
and sector may be collected at a detailed level but a researcher may collapse some of 
the categories. To examine the effect this may have on the estimates, Model 16 
generates the data in the exact same way as Model 15, however, the model is 
estimated using an explanatory variable that collapses the 41 distinct values of the 
explanatory variable in Model 15 to just 4 values. The simulation results are reported 
in the second panel of Table 4.12. The results indicate that the average estimate of 0  
remains close to its true value for each level of misclassification considered; however 
the average estimates of 
1  are considerably further away from their true values than 
in Model 15. 
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4.5.3 Increasing the Importance of the Explanatory Variable 
A second situation that gives rise to an expansion in the range of 'ix  is when the 
importance of the explanatory variable is increased. This is examined in Model 17 
where the range of the explanatory variable is the same as in Model 13 and the 
coefficient on the constant term is also the same but the coefficient on the explanatory 
variable is four times more negative (i.e.
1 =-6). The idea is to investigate whether the 
Hausman et al. estimator yields more sensible estimates if a variable is more 
important in explaining 
iy , even when its range is more limited. The simulation 
results are reported in the third panel of Table 4.12. The results show that for each 
level of misclassification considered the estimates of the misclassification 
probabilities are far superior to those obtained for Model 13. In Model 17, the range 
of  1~Pr iy  is from 0.0000357 to 0.9753194 and the proportion of observations with 
1~ iy  is 0.348, again much higher than in Model 13. 
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Table 4.12: Estimates of Misclassification Probabilities for Models 15-17* 
Level of 
Misc‟n 
Actual 
Misc‟n 
Rate 
0ˆ  
Median 
0ˆ  
Std 
Error 
0ˆ  
MSE 0ˆ  Min 0ˆ  Max 0ˆ  
Actual 
Misc‟n 
Rate 
1ˆ  
Median 
1ˆ  
Std 
Error 
1ˆ  
MSE 
1ˆ  Min 1ˆ  Max 1ˆ  
No. of 
Sims 
            
Model 15: iii xy  3
* 5.11  (Note: Same as Model 13 but range of ix  is increased to -2 to +2) 
1% 0.0100 0.0092 0.0091 0.0020 0.0000 0.0038 0.0157 0.0100 0.0095 0.0095 0.0105 0.0000 -0.0054 0.0245 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0488 0.0488 0.0042 0.0000 0.0340 0.0612 0.0501 0.0469 0.0467 0.0140 0.0001 0.0122 0.0820 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0988 0.0988 0.0057 0.0000 0.0808 0.1210 0.1000 0.0949 0.0952 0.0169 0.0002 0.0455 0.1472 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1989 0.1990 0.0075 0.0000 0.1725 0.2211 0.2002 0.1937 0.1947 0.0210 0.0004 0.1158 0.2499 1,000 
                
            
Model 16: 
iii xy  3
* 5.11  (Note: same as Model 15 but fewer categories in ix  are included in estimated model) 
1% 0.0100 0.0092 0.0091 0.0024 0.0000 0.0033 0.0157 0.0100 -0.0261 -0.0251 0.0382 0.0015 -0.0763 0.0105 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0493 0.0493 0.0050 0.0000 0.0310 0.0656 0.0501 0.0142 0.0161 0.0455 0.0022 -0.0930 0.0906 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0994 0.0995 0.0068 0.0000 0.0752 0.1233 0.1000 0.0643 0.0703 0.0539 0.0033 -0.1112 0.1593 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1989 0.1994 0.0094 0.0001 0.1634 0.2275 0.2002 0.1585 0.1783 0.0812 0.0119 -1.7699 0.2863 1,000 
                
            
Model 17: iii xy  2
* 61  (Note: same as Model 13 but 1  is increased in magnitude to -6) 
1% 0.0100 0.0093 0.0092 0.0019 0.0000 0.0030 0.0168 0.0100 0.0101 0.0099 0.0087 0.0000 -0.0057 0.0242 1,000 
5% 0.0500 0.0486 0.0487 0.0041 0.0000 0.0359 0.0617 0.0501 0.0474 0.0476 0.0119 0.0001 0.0123 0.0730 1,000 
10% 0.1000 0.0984 0.0983 0.0055 0.0000 0.0818 0.1137 0.1000 0.0958 0.0964 0.0145 0.0002 0.0477 0.1362 1,000 
20% 0.2001 0.1984 0.1982 0.0073 0.0000 0.1774 0.2200 0.2002 0.1947 0.1962 0.0182 0.0003 0.1271 0.2366 1,000 
                
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 and the results are based on the average values from the Monte Carlo simulations
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Finally Table 4.13 compares the estimates for the coefficient on the constant, and the 
coefficient on the explanatory variable, from the simulations of the Hausman et al. 
estimator for Models 13 and 15 to 17 with those from a standard probit model. The 
probit estimates for Model 13 outperform the Hausman et al. estimates as they have 
lower MSEs associated with them.  However, the reverse is true for Models 15 and 
17, where the range of the explanatory variable in the models is increased, as the 
Hausman et al. estimates are closer to their true values and have lower MSEs than the 
probit estimates.  In addition, the estimates show that the bias in the probit estimates 
increases as the level of misclassification increases. The results for Model 16 are more 
mixed. The probit estimates for 0  are superior to the Hausman et al. estimates while 
the Hausman et al. estimates for 
1  outperform the probit estimates. 
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Table 4.13: Comparison of Coefficient Estimates from Hausman et al. Model and Probit Model for Models 13, 15-17*  
Level of 
Misclassification 
True 
0  
HAUS0ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
HAUS0ˆ  
MSE
HAUS0ˆ
 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
MSE 
PROBIT0ˆ
 
True 
1  
HAUS1ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
HAUS1ˆ  
MSE 
HAUS1ˆ
 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
Standard 
Error 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
MSE 
PROBIT1ˆ
 
No. of 
Sims 
Hausman 
Model 13: iii xy  2
* 5.11  (Note: Range of ix2  is -0.5 to 0.5) 
1% -1 -0.6787 0.2438 0.1069 -0.9405 0.0157 0.0036 -1.5 -2.1282 0.7265 0.4403 -1.4269 0.0503 0.0056 1,000 
5% -1 -0.8345 0.4105 0.3406 -0.8216 0.0148 0.0319 -1.5 -1.9529 0.8797 0.5134 -1.1830 0.0471 0.1013 1,000 
10% -1 -1.2103 0.5553 1.4863 -0.6980 0.0140 0.0913 -1.5 -1.7885 0.9539 0.7857 -0.9581 0.0447 0.2947 994 
20% -1 -0.5885 0.6482 5.5117 -0.4939 0.0132 0.2563 -1.5 -0.6924 1.0955 4.7299 -0.6351 0.0419 0.7494 959 
                
                
Model 15: iii xy  3
* 5.11  (Note: Same as Model 13 but range of ix  is increased to -2 to +2) 
1% -1 -0.9367 0.0295 0.0042 -0.8221 0.0215 0.0319 -1.5 -1.4650 0.0473 0.0017 -1.3115 0.0228 0.0359 1,000 
5% -1 -0.9332 0.0388 0.0052 -0.5762 0.0170 0.1798 -1.5 -1.4518 0.0628 0.0041 -0.9711 0.0166 0.2800 1,000 
10% -1 -0.9332 0.0491 0.0059 -0.4317 0.0150 0.3231 -1.5 -1.4438 0.0800 0.0071 -0.7549 0.0139 0.5553 1,000 
20% -1 -0.9345 0.0746 0.0087 -0.2715 0.0135 0.5308 -1.5 -1.4376 0.1226 0.0163 -0.4934 0.0119 1.0133 1,000 
                
                
Model 16: iii xy  3
* 5.11  (Note: same as Model 15 but fewer categories in ix  are included in estimated model) 
1% -1 1.0254 0.1271 4.1043 1.0638 0.0265 4.2596 -1.5 -1.3282 0.0759 0.0305 -1.2697 0.0218 0.0533 1,000 
5% -1 1.0240 0.1626 4.1086 0.8473 0.0240 3.4129 -1.5 -1.3297 0.1054 0.0353 -0.9687 0.0167 0.2825 1,000 
10% -1 1.0240 0.2126 4.1285 0.6861 0.0227 2.8433 -1.5 -1.3338 0.1446 0.0445 -0.7630 0.0143 0.5434 1,000 
20% -1 1.0420 0.7819 4.3527 0.4662 0.0215 2.1502 -1.5 -1.3628 0.6767 0.1389 -0.5042 0.0124 0.9918 1,000 
                
               
Model 17: iii xy  2
* 61  (Note: same as Model 13 but 1  is increased in magnitude to -6) 
1% -1 -0.9415 0.0300 0.0036 -0.8134 0.0219 0.0351 -6 -5.8353 0.1819 0.0342 -5.1565 0.0891 0.7179 1,000 
5% -1 -0.9335 0.0391 0.0051 -0.5577 0.0171 0.1958 -6 -5.7630 0.2385 0.0823 -3.7677 0.0634 4.9879 1,000 
10% -1 -0.9303 0.0494 0.0064 -0.4138 0.0151 0.3438 -6 -5.7236 0.3033 0.1334 -2.9173 0.0527 9.5058 1,000 
20% -1 -0.9277 0.0748 0.0095 -0.2582 0.0135 0.5504 -6 -5.6818 0.4634 0.2608 -1.9021 0.0447 16.7949 1,000 
                
* In each case the sample size is 10,000 unless otherwise stated and the results are based on the average values from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations on the Probit Models and 
the number of simulations indicated in the table for the Hausman et al. procedure 
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4.6 Conclusions 
There are many sources of misclassification in models that employ binary dependent 
variables, such as coding error, self-reporting, recall error and where a dummy 
variable is used to serve as a proxy for some true underlying variable. 
Misclassification in a binary dependent variable results in estimates that are biased 
and inconsistent.  
 
This chapter uses Monte Carlo simulations to explore the performance of the 
Hausman et al. estimator which controls for misclassification. It shows that 
identification of the misclassification probabilities comes from misclassified 
observations in the tails of the 'ix  distribution. It finds that the estimator outperforms 
a probit model even when the effect of the explanatory variable is weak. In the case of 
asymmetric misclassification the estimator is superior to a probit model although the 
model does not always converge when one of the rates of misclassification is low. 
When the explanatory variables in the model are dichotomous the Hausman et al. 
estimator is superior to a probit estimator if there is a considerable range and support 
in 'ix . However, when the range of 
'
ix  is more limited the estimator is only better 
when misclassification rates are high. The chapter also finds that when the sample 
size is reduced, although some of the estimates of the misclassification probabilities 
are not sensible, especially for small amounts of misclassification, the Hausman et al. 
estimator still outperforms a probit model, especially when starting values equal to the 
true parameters are given. However, the results also show that the Hausman et al. 
model fails to converge in many incidences when the sample size is low and the rates 
of misclassification are also low. 
 
In cases where the true underlying model has a limited range of 'ix , some of the 
Hausman et al. estimates of the misclassification probabilities are not sensible. As the 
misclassification probabilities are identified off observations with very high and low 
values of 'ix , it is necessary to have sufficient range and variation in a dataset that  
can have such values.  The simulation results indicate that when the range and support 
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of 'ix  is limited, the coefficient estimates from the probit model are superior to the 
Hausman et al. estimates.  
 
Given the severity of the bias in the probit estimates and the fact that the bias 
increases as the level of misclassification increases it is important to control for it in 
cases where misclassification is likely. From a practitioners‟ point of view, looking 
for consistency in data or comparing data to a second source may be useful when 
misclassification is suspected. In this situation, the Hausman et al. estimator can 
provide a useful alternative to a probit estimator.  The simulation results reported in 
the chapter indicate that it is important to be working with a sizeable sample when 
using the Hausman et al. estimator. It is also imperative to closely consider the 
variables included in the basic regression, as considerable range and support in 'ix  is 
needed to identify the extent of misclassification in the data. Finally, it may be 
important to experiment with a range of starting values. 
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Appendix Table 4.1: Comparison of Predicted Probabilities with Observed Proportion of 1’s by 
Groups of '1ix  for Model 1 with 5% Symmetric Misclassification 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of True 
1~ iy  
Proportion of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy             
- Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy - 
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy  
Minimum '1ix  0.0000 0.0434 0.0000 0.0434 -0.0434 
2-100 0.0000 0.0511 0.0000 0.0511 -0.0511 
101-500 0.0000 0.0498 0.0000 0.0498 -0.0498 
501-1000 0.0000 0.0503 0.0000 0.0503 -0.0503 
1001-2000 0.0000 0.0502 0.0001 0.0501 -0.0501 
2001-3000 0.0010 0.0510 0.0030 0.0480 -0.0480 
3001-4000 0.0200 0.0680 0.0244 0.0436 -0.0436 
4001-5000 0.0910 0.1317 0.1001 0.0316 -0.0316 
5001-6000 0.3060 0.3250 0.2837 0.0413 -0.0413 
6001-7000 0.5530 0.5476 0.5659 -0.0183 0.0183 
7001-8000 0.8320 0.7987 0.8353 -0.0366 0.0366 
8001-9000 0.9780 0.9304 0.9740 -0.0436 0.0436 
9001-9500 0.9960 0.9459 0.9990 -0.0531 0.0531 
9501-9900 1.0000 0.9496 1.0000 -0.0504 0.0504 
9901-9990 1.0000 0.9485 1.0000 -0.0515 0.0515 
9991-9999 1.0000 0.9484 1.0000 -0.0516 0.0516 
Maximum  '1ix  1.0000 0.9484 1.0000 -0.0516 0.0516 
 
 
Appendix Table 4.2: Comparison of Predicted Probabilities with Observed Proportion of 1’s by 
Groups of '1ix  for Model 1 with 10% Symmetric Misclassification 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of True 
1~ iy  
Proportion of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy             
- Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy - 
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy  
Minimum '1ix  0.0000 0.0972 0.0000 0.0972 -0.0972 
2-100 0.0000 0.1019 0.0000 0.1019 -0.1019 
101-500 0.0000 0.0991 0.0000 0.0991 -0.0991 
501-1000 0.0000 0.1002 0.0000 0.1002 -0.1002 
1001-2000 0.0000 0.1001 0.0002 0.1000 -0.1000 
2001-3000 0.0010 0.1009 0.0033 0.0976 -0.0976 
3001-4000 0.0200 0.1161 0.0255 0.0906 -0.0906 
4001-5000 0.0910 0.1728 0.1022 0.0706 -0.0706 
5001-6000 0.3060 0.3444 0.2852 0.0592 -0.0592 
6001-7000 0.5530 0.5426 0.5650 -0.0224 0.0224 
7001-8000 0.8320 0.7651 0.8329 -0.0678 0.0678 
8001-9000 0.9780 0.8829 0.9728 -0.0899 0.0899 
9001-9500 0.9960 0.8966 0.9989 -0.1023 0.1023 
9501-9900 1.0000 0.8998 1.0000 -0.1002 0.1002 
9901-9990 1.0000 0.8989 1.0000 -0.1011 0.1011 
9991-9999 1.0000 0.8974 1.0000 -0.1026 0.1026 
Maximum  '1ix  1.0000 0.8974 1.0000 -0.1026 0.1026 
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Appendix Table 4.3 Comparison of Predicted Probabilities with Observed Proportion of 1’s by 
Groups of '1ix  for Model 1 with 20% Symmetric Misclassification 
Groups of '1ix  
Proportion 
of True 
1~ iy  
Proportion of 
Observed 
1iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy             
- Predicted 
 1Pr iy  
Predicted 
 1Pr iy - 
Proportion of 
Observed
1iy  
Minimum '1ix  0.0000 0.1867 0.0000 0.1867 -0.1867 
2-100 0.0000 0.2019 0.0000 0.2019 -0.2019 
101-500 0.0000 0.1990 0.0000 0.1990 -0.1990 
501-1000 0.0000 0.2010 0.0000 0.2010 -0.2010 
1001-2000 0.0000 0.2003 0.0002 0.2001 -0.2001 
2001-3000 0.0010 0.2011 0.0037 0.1974 -0.1974 
3001-4000 0.0200 0.2116 0.0268 0.1847 -0.1847 
4001-5000 0.0910 0.2549 0.1041 0.1508 -0.1508 
5001-6000 0.3060 0.3835 0.2862 0.0973 -0.0973 
6001-7000 0.5530 0.5317 0.5638 -0.0320 0.0320 
7001-8000 0.8320 0.6985 0.8301 -0.1316 0.1316 
8001-9000 0.9780 0.7873 0.9712 -0.1838 0.1838 
9001-9500 0.9960 0.7970 0.9986 -0.2016 0.2016 
9501-9900 1.0000 0.7997 1.0000 -0.2003 0.2003 
9901-9990 1.0000 0.7942 1.0000 -0.2058 0.2058 
9991-9999 1.0000 0.7947 1.0000 -0.2053 0.2053 
Maximum  '1ix  1.0000 0.7947 1.0000 -0.2053 0.2053 
 
 
Appendix Table 4.4: Proportion of 1~ iy  in Each Model 
 Proportion of 1~ iy  
Model 1 0.3779 
Model 2 0.3312 
Model 3 0.2475 
Model 4 0.3770 
Model 5 0.2375 
Model 6 0.6208 
Model 7 0.3779 
Model 8 0.3779 
Model 9 0.3779 
Model 10 0.2675 
Model 11 0.2675 
Model 12 0.2816 
Model 13 0.1902 
Model 14 0.1902 
Model 15 0.3440 
Model 16 0.3440 
Model 17 0.3522 
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5. Measurement Error in Survey Data: 
A Model of Job Mobility for Ireland 
5.1 Introduction 
Many studies of labour market dynamics use survey data. Therefore it is valuable to 
know about the quality of the data collected. There may be ambiguity in a survey 
question, respondents may misunderstand the question, they may have an incentive to 
misreport, they may have poor recall or responses may be coded incorrectly. This 
chapter investigates job mobility or employment-to-employment transitions in Ireland 
over the period 1995 to 2001 using the Living in Ireland Survey (LIS), the Irish 
component of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). As is common 
with many surveys, there is no direct question in the LIS about job mobility; instead it 
is inferred from the responses of individuals to a question about tenure. The chapter 
highlights a potentially serious measurement error problem in the responses used to 
determine job changes. As a result, there is a risk of misclassifying cases as being job 
changes when truly no change took place and vice versa.  The extent of measurement 
error is similar to what has been found in other studies (e.g. Brown and Light (1992)). 
 
In estimating the determinants of job mobility it is important to control for 
misclassification, otherwise it can lead to estimates that are biased and inconsistent. 
The estimator developed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) and 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4 is used to control for misclassification in the 
dependent variable. The chapter finds that by ignoring misclassification the true 
number of job changes may be substantially underestimated. In addition, ignoring 
misclassification leads to diminished covariate effects in models of job change. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 examines the reasons for and 
prevalence of reporting errors in labour market survey data and, in particular, focuses 
on studies relevant to job mobility. Section 5.3 explores the extent of measurement 
error in the LIS data. Hausman et al. (1998) show how their estimator can be extended 
to allow for covariate dependent measurement error and this is presented in Section 
5.4. Section 5.5 provides estimation results and Section 5.6 concludes. 
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5.2 Labour Market Survey Data 
Many studies of job mobility use survey data and usually surveys do not contain a 
direct question asking if the respondent has changed jobs in the past year. Instead job 
changes are inferred from the length of time an employee reports to have been with 
their current employer. Therefore questions about tenure play a crucial role in many 
empirical studies of job mobility. There are several reasons to suspect that responses 
to questions about tenure are measured with error. Respondents may find it difficult to 
remember when they started working in their current job. Bound et al. (2001) describe 
studies that categorise the question and answer process in a survey as a four-stage 
procedure. These stages include understanding the question, recovering the 
information from memory, considering whether the information matches what was 
requested and communicating the response.  Much of the measurement error literature 
focuses on the stage where respondents retrieve the information from memory. A 
general principle from this literature is that the longer the length of the recall period 
the greater the expected bias due to respondent retrieval error. Therefore we might 
expect respondents with longer tenure to be most likely to misreport tenure. In one 
sense, this does not pose a serious problem for calculating job changes as job changes 
are associated with people who have short tenures; provided those with longer tenures 
who misreport do not significantly underestimate their tenure.  Farber (1999) and 
Ureta (1992) find a heaping of tenure responses at round counts of years or round 
calendar years and this rounding indicates that individuals do not provide precise 
responses about tenure.  
 
There may also be ambiguity in the wording of the question about tenure or there may 
be changes to the wording of the question in other waves of a survey. Farber (1999) 
points out how the mobility supplements to the Current Population Survey in the US 
from 1951 to 1981 asked workers what year they “…started working at their present 
job or business” while in later years the supplement asked workers how many years 
they have “…been working continuously for the present employer”. The earlier 
question refers to time on the present job rather than time with the present employer. 
Workers may experience other types of internal labour mobility (e.g. promotion, 
reassignment) which means that their tenure on the job will be shorter than their 
tenure with the employer. The interviewer notes for the LIS provide clarity in 
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distinguishing between employer changes and other types of internal labour mobility 
as they state that the question refers to when they started working with their present 
employer even if there have been position changes with that employer. In addition, 
there were no changes to the wording of the question about tenure in the LIS. The 
interviewer notes in the LIS do not provide guidance on how to handle interrupted 
employment spells (in particular when someone returns to a previous employer). 
Farber (1999) mentions that if no reference is made to the continuity of employment 
that the natural inclination of workers will be to ignore interruptions of “reasonable” 
length.  
 
Brown and Light (1992) examine the extent of measurement error in tenure responses 
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They find that tenure responses are 
frequently inconsistent with calendar time.
41
 In addition, they perform a validation 
exercise to gauge the accuracy of their measure of job changes. They adopt various 
definitions of job mobility (based on tenure responses) and use them to partition the 
data into distinct jobs. They assess the accuracy of the various definitions by 
comparing the number of jobs and the number of times each job is observed with 
those identified by the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS). The NLS contains 
unique employer codes which can be compared across interviews and so provides a 
more accurate count of the „true‟ number of jobs.  
 
Brown and Light (1992) investigate various measures of job mobility and examine 
which one performs best when there is measurement error in tenure data. One 
definition of job mobility they employ is to assume that a job change has taken place 
whenever reported tenure is less than the time elapsed since the previous interview. If 
tenure was never misreported and if respondents never returned to previous employers 
then this method would identify job changes without error. They also adopt another 
set of definitions of job mobility by assuming that a job change occurs whenever the 
change in tenure between adjacent interviews varies “too much” or “too little” in 
either direction. In another definition, a job change is defined whenever the change in 
tenure is not exactly equal to the change in calendar time between interviews. This 
permits no inconsistency in tenure responses within jobs.  
                                                          
41
 The level of inconsistencies in reported tenure in the PSID is described in Section 5.3.2 where 
comparisons are made to the LIS data. 
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They also adopt more flexible measures that permit various amounts of inconsistency 
in reported tenure within jobs. They define another four measures of job mobility 
when the change in tenure differs from the change in calendar time by more than 6, 
12, 18 and 24 months in either direction.  As these latter definitions identify job 
changes when tenure changes by “too much” as well as by “too little” they are more 
likely to separate continuing jobs
42
 but less likely to link jobs that are truly separate
43
 
than when job changes are defined as occurring whenever reported tenure is less than 
the time elapsed since the previous interview. They find the definition of job mobility 
that is the most accurate when compared to the NLS data is that a job change has 
occurred whenever reported tenure is less than the time elapsed between interviews. 
This is essentially the definition of job change that is adopted in my study. 
 
These types of validation studies are also useful because they provide evidence on the 
magnitude of the measurement error in tenure data. Bound et al. (2001) point to the 
fact that few studies have investigated the quality of tenure data. Duncan and Hill 
(1985) present results from a validation study of a large manufacturing company in 
which administrative records are used to validate survey responses from a sample of 
workers from the company. Overall they find very little evidence of bias in the 
interview reports. They find that reported tenure is typically quite accurate; 45 per 
cent of the sample accurately reported the year they were hired and 90 per cent were 
able to report year of hire to within one year. However, the unit of analysis in the 
study is defined in terms of years and these types of error margins in a dataset could 
be problematic if we were to use the measure of tenure to calculate job changes. As 
job changes are identified from those who report short tenures the under or over 
                                                          
42
 For example, consider an individual who truly hasn‟t changed jobs and who reports tenure of 24 
months in one interview and exactly a year later misreports their tenure and says they have been in their 
job for 45 months when their true tenure is 36 months. When we define a job change as having 
occurred when reported tenure is less than the time between interviews then we conclude this person 
hasn‟t changed jobs. However, if we define job mobility as occurring when the change in reported 
tenure differs from the change in calendar time by more then, say, 12 months then we classify this 
person as having changed jobs. 
43
 For example, consider an individual who truly has changed jobs and is interviewed 12 months apart. 
In the first year they report tenure of 5 months and in the subsequent year they report tenure of one 
month. When we define a job change as having occurred when reported tenure is less then the time 
between interviews then we conclude this person has changed jobs. Using the other definitions of job 
mobility we would not classify this person as having changed jobs. 
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reporting of tenure by a year, in particular by those with short tenures, could lead us to 
misclassify job changes and vice versa.  
 
Bound et al. also cite a study where workers‟ reported starting dates are compared to 
employer records. The study by Weiss et al. (1961) finds that 71 per cent of jobs in 
the prior 5 years had reported starting dates within one month of company records. 
They also find that validity significantly declines as a function of the length of time 
between the job start date and the date of interview. To capture job mobility, tenure, at 
least for those who have not been in their jobs long, needs to be reported accurately. 
These validation studies suggest that the quality of tenure data may not be sufficient 
to do this. 
 
5.3 Measurement Error 
5.3.1 Dataset and Defining Job Changes 
This chapter uses the same sample of workers from the LIS and defines job changes in 
an equivalent way as described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. As mentioned in Section 
3.2.2, there is no explicit question in the LIS about whether or not a person has 
changed jobs; instead job mobility is inferred from responses to the question about 
when they started working with their present employer. If a person is employed in two 
consecutive years and in the second year they report a starting date that falls between 
the two interview dates we conclude that this person has changed jobs during that 
period. Table 5.1 shows the number of workers employed in consecutive two-year 
periods from the revolving balanced panel and the number of job changes each year.
44
  
 
Table 5.1: Number of Workers and Job Changes 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of workers 1,163 1,175 1,211 1,276 1,341 1,376 1,434 
No. Job Changes  76 85 102 139 146 184 156 
Job Mobility Rate 6.5% 7.2% 8.4% 10.9% 10.9% 13.4% 10.9% 
 
 
                                                          
44
 This table replicates Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
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However, in the absence of exogenous job change information we cannot be certain 
that the number of job changes reported in Table 5.1 is correct.
45
 For example, a 
worker may forget their starting date, they may misunderstand the question or their 
response could be coded incorrectly. In addition, respondents may consider multiple 
spells with the same employer differently. These problems could be overcome if the 
LIS contained a direct question about changing jobs or if it contained unique 
employer codes that could be compared across interviews.  
 
Responses to questions about tenure are frequently inconsistent. For example, in one 
year a person may report that they started working with their current employer say in 
January 1995 while the following year they may report that they started working with 
their current employer in January 1993. The concern in this chapter is not necessarily 
that tenure is misreported but rather that if tenure is misreported there is a risk that 
cases may be misclassified as job changes and vice versa. For example, suppose a 
worker is interviewed in January 1995 and January 1996 and in January 1996 they 
report that they started working with their current employer is January 1993. Using 
the measure of job-to-job mobility defined above, we would conclude that no job 
change has taken place between the interviews in 1995 and 1996. However, suppose 
this person cannot accurately recall when they started working with their current 
employer and they misreport their starting date to be January 1995. Then we would 
erroneously conclude that this person has changed jobs between their interviews in 
1995 and 1996. Now, suppose that their true starting date is January 1995 so that they 
have truly changed jobs between interviews but they misreport their starting date to be 
January 1993. In this case we would erroneously conclude that no job change has 
taken place between interviews. In an attempt to ascertain how reliable the responses 
to the question about when a worker started working with their current employer are 
the next section examines the consistency of these responses over time.  
 
Given that we cannot be sure that the number of job changes defined in Table 5.1 is 
correct, an alternative assumption that exploits the monthly activity reports contained 
in the LIS was also used to identify job changes. The resulting measure of job 
                                                          
45
 No attempt is made to distinguish between different types of mobility. Respondents are asked to state 
why their last job ended and usually we would use their answer to determine whether the job change 
was voluntary or involuntary. However, if we cannot be certain that job changes have been accurately 
identified, we cannot know which of a worker‟s previous jobs the response refers to.  
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mobility is discussed in Appendix 5A; however it appears implausibly low for a 
booming economy with a flexible labour market and so is not used in the analysis. 
5.3.2 Consistency of Starting Dates within Jobs 
Given the possibility of measurement error in the data we need to try to ascertain how 
reliable the information on starting dates is and therefore how useful it is for deducing 
job changes. If there were no measurement error in the data then starting dates would 
be constant within jobs. By partitioning the dataset into distinct jobs and comparing 
starting dates across interviews we can investigate how consistent the data is.  
 
To convert this data into separate jobs, we begin with the 1995 data.  There are 1,163 
workers in 1995 but as 76 workers changed jobs a total of 1,239 distinct jobs are 
observable in that year (see Table 5.1). For this year alone, the previous jobs of those 
who changed jobs are excluded from the analysis. We only have one observation on 
their previous jobs (the starting date in 1994) so we cannot check the consistency of 
responses whereas we can track the new jobs across subsequent interviews. Therefore, 
we start the analysis with 1,163 distinct jobs in 1995. In each subsequent year one of 
four alternatives occurs:  
1) A worker can stay in their job so the total number of jobs remains the same 
and we observe the job surviving an additional year. 
2) A worker can drop out of the sample if they enter a period of unemployment, 
leave the labour force for more than a year or if they are over the age of 60. In 
this case, the total number of jobs remains the same but we no longer observe 
that particular job. Workers who are unemployed or leave the labour force 
may re-enter the analysis in later years. 
3) A worker can change jobs and accordingly the total number of jobs increases 
by one and we stop observing the previous job. 
4) There can be a new entrant to the sample of workers. This would be someone 
from the revolving balanced panel who is now 20 and so was excluded in 
earlier years. This increases the total number of jobs by one. In addition, a 
worker who was unemployed or out of the labour force may come back into 
the analysis and this would increase the total number of jobs observed by one. 
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This results in 2,529 jobs observable for various durations over the period 1995 to 
2001. Of these jobs, there are 1,755 jobs observable for more than one year and it is 
this set of jobs that is considered in the analysis in this section (so there are at least 
two starting dates to compare for each job).
46
 Table 5.2 shows how many jobs display 
consistency in starting dates. Of the 1,755 jobs considered in the analysis, only 352 or 
20 per cent have the same reported starting date in each year the job is observed. 
 
If we adopt a less stringent definition of consistency such as all starting dates being 
within 3 months of each other then 37 per cent of jobs meet the criterion. If we relax 
the criterion further to consider jobs where all starting dates are within 6 months of 
each other then 42 per cent of jobs display consistent responses. This leaves 1,014 or 
58 per cent of jobs that survive for more than one year where all starting dates do not 
fall within 6 months of each other. 
 
Table 5.2: Consistency of Starting Dates within Jobs 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 
  Jobs with All Starting Dates:  
 Jobs Equal 
Within 3 
months 
Within 6 
months 
Remaining 
jobs 
Number of jobs 1,755 352 649 741 1,014 
% of Jobs  20% 37% 42% 58% 
      
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, taken from Brown and Light (1992) 
Number of jobs 3,318 246 1,170 1,514 1,804 
% of Jobs  7% 35% 46% 54% 
 
This level of inconsistency in starting dates is quite alarming; however, it is in line 
with what has been found in other datasets. Brown and Light (1992) take a sample 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1976 to 1985, partition the 
data into distinct jobs in an analogous fashion and examine the consistency of 
reported start dates within jobs. They find that only 7 per cent of the jobs in their 
                                                          
46
 This means there are 774 jobs that only survive for one year. For example, in 2001 there are 257 jobs 
recorded as surviving for one year. Of this figure, 156 are job changers in 2001, 22 observations are 
new entrants to the sample of workers (i.e. 20 year olds) and the remaining 79 observations have 
rejoined the sample of workers having been unemployed or out of the labour force. As the survey ends 
in 2001, there is no later data to compare the starting dates in 2001 to. 
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sample have identical starting dates in each year the job is observed, while 54 per cent 
of jobs have starting dates that do not all fall within 6 months of each other.  
 
Brown and Light (1992) highlight another aspect of this definition of consistency that 
may be quite restrictive. Suppose a job is observed in every year of the LIS and every 
starting date given between 1995 and 2001 is equal with the exception of one which is 
different to the others by 7 months, then this job will not meet any of the measures of 
consistency define above. They argue most researchers would agree that this outlier 
could be „fixed‟ to match up to the other observations for that job. One can further 
extend the measure of consistency used in Table 5.2 by requiring that only a majority 
of observations for a given job be in agreement.   
 
Table 5.3 shows how many jobs have a majority of starting dates in agreement. A 
total of 654 jobs or 37 per cent have a majority of starting dates in agreement, while 
84 per cent of all jobs identified have a majority of starting dates that are within 3 
months of each other.  The bottom panel of the table reports comparable statistics for 
the PSID taken from Brown and Light (1992). As before, the magnitudes of the 
consistency measures are broadly comparable with the Irish data. Given that both 
datasets display similar discrepancies, it is likely that any study using a similar 
question to deduce job changes contains measurement error. 
 
Table 5.3: Consistency of the Majority of Starting Dates within Jobs  
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 
  Jobs with a Majority of Starting Dates:   
 All Jobs Equal 
Within 3 
months 
Within 6 
months 
Remaining 
jobs 
Number of jobs 1,755 654 1,471 1,513 242 
% of Jobs  37% 84% 86% 14% 
      
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, taken from Brown and Light (1992) 
Number of jobs 3,318 676 2,116 2,471 847 
% of Jobs  20% 64% 74% 26% 
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The method for partitioning the dataset into distinct jobs uses job changes to identify 
when one job ends and another one begins. The analysis presented in this section 
implies that the measure of job change may not accurately identify the true number of 
job changes i.e. there are probably cases identified as job changes when no change in 
jobs took place and vice versa. This means we may over or underestimate the true 
number of jobs and therefore the level of inconsistent starting dates within jobs. For 
example, consider a person who truly hasn‟t changed jobs and started working in their 
current job in January 1993 and in 1995 they report their true starting date but in 1996 
they report that they started working in January 1996. This case will be erroneously 
classified as a job change in 1996; two separate jobs will be identified for this person 
and no inconsistency in starting dates will be recorded. In addition, suppose this 
person truly changed jobs in January 1996 but they misreport the starting date to be 
January 1995. This will be recorded as one job with an inconsistent starting date in 
1996 when it is truly two jobs with an incorrect starting date in 1996. As the number 
of job changes (and jobs) is measured imperfectly so too will the amount of 
inconsistencies evident in the data. If the definition of job change accurately allowed 
us to define jobs then Table 5.2 would show the true amount of inconsistencies within 
jobs. As the definition of job changes only provides us with an imperfect measure of 
the number of jobs the data presented in the table reflects both the inconsistencies in 
starting dates and the fact that we have not accurately identified the true number of 
jobs. 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 focus on the extent and magnitude of inconsistencies evident in the 
data and it is clear that there is the possibility of substantial measurement error. In this 
study, the main concern about measurement error is not directly that starting dates are 
misreported but rather that the misreporting of starting dates may cause cases to be 
misclassified as job changes and vice versa (that truly distinct jobs would be linked or 
continuing jobs would be separated).  
 
There are cases where it is very unlikely that we will erroneously assign a case to be a 
job change, even though there are inconsistencies in starting dates. For example, 
suppose an individual gives the following starting dates in successive interviews for a 
job observed from 1995 to 1998: January 1980, February 1975, May 1972 and 
January 1982. It is unlikely that this person has changed jobs at any point between 
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1995 and 1998 but rather they found it difficult to recall the starting date of their job. 
Although the responses for this job would fail to meet any of the consistency 
measures described in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, all of the reported starting dates are 
sufficiently long ago so as to not cause much concern about erroneously defining 
recent job changes.  
 
Of particular concern are inconsistencies in short jobs (i.e. where reported tenure is 
low). For example, suppose we observe a job every year between 1995 and 2001; it is 
more likely that this person has changed jobs at some point over this period and it has 
not been captured if the inconsistency in starting dates falls close to or within that 
period. However, if all inconsistencies in reported starting dates refer to a time period 
sufficiently far back then it is more likely that this person hasn‟t changed jobs recently 
and just cannot accurately recall when they started working in their current job.  
 
Table 5.4 examines the timing of inconsistencies in reported starting dates within 
jobs. It takes the total number of jobs and reports how many of these jobs have the 
dates of all inconsistencies occurring at least three years prior to the date that we first 
start observing the job.
47
 There are 722 jobs where all discrepancies fall reasonably 
far in the past so that these are probably truly continuing jobs. However, there are 681 
jobs where the reported inconsistencies are more recent and it is more likely in these 
cases that we have linked jobs that are distinct or divided continuing jobs.  
 
 Table 5.4: Timing of Inconsistencies within Jobs 
 No. of Jobs 
Equal 
Starting 
Dates 
All inconsistencies at least 3 
years prior to date job is first 
observed 
Remaining 
jobs 
Number of jobs 1,755 352 722 681 
% of Jobs  20% 41% 39% 
 
If the true number of jobs has been under or overestimated (and therefore the true 
number of job changes has been under or overestimated), it may be more likely to do 
so for certain types of worker.  As mentioned above, it may be more likely to under or 
overestimate the number of jobs where reported inconsistencies are recent (i.e. jobs 
                                                          
47
 For example, if we observe a job for the first time in 1995, this measure counts all jobs where each 
inconsistency refers to dates earlier than or in 1992. 
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that have inconsistencies when tenure is low).  As tenure and years of work 
experience are correlated we may expect to see differences in inconsistencies in 
starting dates by years of experience. There may also be differences by gender; as 
women experience more interrupted employment spells than men it may be harder for 
them to accurately report starting dates. There could also be differences by full-time 
and part-time status because part-time workers are less attached to the labour force 
and so may be more likely to experience interrupted employment spells. 
 
Table 5.5 examines the 681 jobs that have recent reported inconsistencies (from Table 
5.4) by years of work experience, gender and whether a job is part-time or full-time. 
These jobs are labelled as „problematic‟ in the table in the sense that it is more likely 
for these cases that truly distinct jobs would be linked or continuing jobs would be 
separated (i.e. that job changes are misclassified and vice versa). This is not to say 
that workers in short jobs are more likely to be misreport when they started working 
in their job than workers in long jobs, but rather that the misreporting by those in short 
jobs is more likely to lead to misclassifying cases as job changes and vice versa. 
 
The table shows that the incidence of problematic jobs declines with years of work 
experience.
48
 For example, 60 per cent of jobs that have less than ten years of work 
experience associated with them are classified as problematic and this percentage 
declines as years of experience increases so that only 17 per cent of jobs with more 
than 30 years of work experience associated with them fall into this category. As there 
are more of these problematic jobs in low experience categories and job mobility is 
negatively correlated with experience, this may indicate that we are underestimating 
the true number of job changes. There is also some difference when we look at the 
incidence of these problematic jobs by gender; 35 per cent of all jobs held by men fall 
into this category while the comparable figure for women is 10 percentage points 
higher. Similar figures are observed when the frequency of these problematic jobs is 
broken down by part-time and full-time employment status. This is unsurprising as 
women are more likely to be part-time workers.  
                                                          
48
 In assigning years of work experience to a worker in a job we use their experience in the first year 
that the job is observed. For example, if we observe a job each year between 1995 and 2001 the 
experience assigned to that job when comparing all combinations of starting dates over the period is the 
years of experience of that person in 1995. Similarly, a job is assigned as being part-time or full-time 
using the status in the first year the job is observed. 
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Table 5.5: ‘Problematic’ Jobs by Worker Characteristics 
 Years of Work Experience 
 Total <10 10-19 19-29 30+ 
No. Problematic Jobs 681 315 201 111 54 
Total Number of Jobs 1,755 523 530 383 319 
Problematic jobs as % of total  39% 60% 47% 29% 17% 
      
 Gender 
 Total Men Women   
No. Problematic Jobs 681 388 293   
Total Number of Jobs 1,755 1,099 656   
Problematic jobs as % of total  39% 35% 45%   
      
 Full-Time/Part-Time Status
49
 
 Total Full-Time Part-Time   
No. Problematic Jobs 678 542 136   
Total Number of Jobs 1,746 1,456 290   
Problematic jobs as % of total  39% 37% 47%   
 
This section focussed on examining discrepancies in reported starting dates within 
jobs. It used jobs as the unit of analysis for looking at measurement error. In the 
remainder of the chapter, the focus will be on how measurement error may lead us to 
misclassify a worker in a given year as being a job changer and vice versa so the unit 
of analysis switches to workers.  
 
5.4 Binary Choice Model with Misclassification 
A binary choice model can be used to explain the decision to change jobs. Given the 
level of measurement error in the data, it is likely that incorrect inferences have been 
made about whether or not a worker has changed jobs so it is essential to control for 
misclassification. When the dependent variable is dichotomous, misclassification can 
lead to estimates that are biased and inconsistent. The empirical analysis in Section 
5.5 uses the estimator developed by Hausman et al. (1998) which was analysed in 
detail in Chapter 4, to control for misclassification in the dependent variable.  Section 
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 In this case, nine jobs are excluded from the analysis because the information on whether the job is 
full-time or part-time is missing from the LIS Survey. 
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5.4.1 discusses a simple extension of the estimator that allows for covariate dependent 
measurement error. 
5.4.1 Covariate Dependent Misclassification 
The analysis of the Hausman et al. estimator in Chapter 4 focussed on the case where 
misclassification is independent of the covariates or where the probabilities of 
misclassification are constant across all workers. Assuming that the probabilities of 
misclassification are constant across all types of workers may be quite restrictive. As 
indicated in Section 5.3.2 (in particular in Table 5.5) it is possible that the 
misclassification probabilities vary across different types of workers. Hausman et al. 
consider a simple extension to the model to allow for some covariate dependent 
misclassification error as follows:
50
 
 
Assume that the misclassification probabilities depend on some or all of the covariates 
ix : 
 
     iiii xyyx ,0~1Pr0                 (5.1) 
     iiii xyyx ,1~0Pr1                 (5.2) 
 
The expected value of the observed dependent variable is given by: 
 
           '100 1()1Pr( iiiiiiii xFxxxxyxyE                          (5.3) 
 
For example, suppose misclassification only depends on one covariate ix1 , then the 
expression given in (5.3) becomes: 
 
           '111010 1()1Pr( iiiiiiii xFxxxxyxyE              (5.4) 
 
The likelihood function is similar to equation (4.14) in Chapter 4 only the two 
misclassification probabilities appear as functions of ix1 . The model can be identified 
                                                          
50
 The notation is the same as that used in Chapter 4. 
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in a similar manner to what was described in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4.  To see this, 
first consider the case where 
ix1  is a dummy variable:  
 
 
1100 x                   (5.5) 
and   
1101 x                  (5.6) 
 
Therefore when 11 x   100     and 101                                (5.7) 
          and when 001 0  x     and  01                (5.8) 
 
In this case, the expected value of the observed dependent variable becomes: 
 
        '110110110 )1()1Pr( iiiii xFxxxxyxyE             (5.9) 
 
Intuitively if misclassification depends on 
ix1 , then the probabilities of 
misclassification are constant within the two subgroups where 11 ix  and 01 ix . 
Then 0  is identified from the group of workers who truly have a very low probability 
of changing jobs and who have 01 ix , while 1  is identified from the group of 
workers who truly have a very low probability of changing jobs and who have 11 ix . 
Similar to what was described in Section 4.2.2, identification of 0  and 1  is achieved 
from the group of workers for whom 'ix  is highly negative and who are therefore 
very unlikely to be job changers but some of them will be misclassified.  However,  in 
this case we effectively divide this group of workers, with very negative 
characteristics, into two subgroups where 11 ix  and 01 ix .  A comparable argument 
can be made for the identification of 0  and 1  where the group of workers for whom 
'ix  is highly positive is used to identify the two parameters. When ix1  is a dummy 
variable there are four misclassification probabilities to estimate. 
 
Another way of illustrating the identification of the model, is to note that in equation 
(5.9) as 'ix  becomes more negative (where 
'
ix  excludes ix1 ) it tends to 0  when 
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01 ix  and to 10    when 11 ix . Similarly as 
'
ix  becomes more positive (where 
'ix  excludes ix1 ) it tends to  01   when 01 ix  and to  101    when 11 ix . 
 
If 
ix1  is a discrete variable, then all observations within the subgroups that have the 
same values for 
ix1  will have constant misclassification probabilities and 
identification is achieved in a similar way as described above. However, if we have 
many subgroups it will be harder to estimate 
210 ,,   etc and 210 ,,   etc as there 
may not be sufficient workers in the tails of the index with the full range of values of 
ix1 . Finally, if ix1  is a continuous variable, we can define cut-off points 321 ,, ccc etc 
such that if 
11 cxi   the misclassification probabilities are constant (or almost constant) 
within each group.  
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, identification is only possible because the 
misclassification probabilities enter the likelihood function in an additive way and 
their sum must be less than one. 
 
5.5 Estimation Results 
In this section, we formally control for misclassification in job changes in models of 
job mobility. The section begins by presenting results from job change models where 
misclassification is assumed to be independent of the covariates and then in Section 
5.5.2 the analysis is extended to allow for covariate dependent measurement error. 
5.5.1 Estimation Results: Misclassification Independent of Covariates 
Table 5.6 shows the estimates from a standard probit regression of the probability of 
job change and the Hausman et al. estimates that control for misclassification. This 
provides estimates of the probabilities of misclassification and allows comparisons to 
be made of the effect of response error on the estimated coefficients. The data for 
1995 to 2001 have been pooled so that there are 8,736 observations from which 851 
job changes are identified.
51
 The explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 
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 The total number of observations is 240 lower and the total number of job changes is 37 lower than 
reported in Table 5.1. These observations are excluded because data is missing or not available for at 
least one of the explanatory variables. 
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5.2. All the explanatory variables (apart from the year dummies) are lagged by a year 
so they refer to the workers‟ characteristics and situation prior to changing jobs or in 
the previous year. Zero misclassification probabilities are used as starting values in 
estimating the model with misclassification.
52
 
 
The estimated probability of misclassification for non-job changers, 
0 , is very small 
at less than one per cent and the estimated probability of misclassification for job 
changers, 
1 , is high at 61 per cent.  Significance tests on 0  and 1  can be used as 
tests of misclassification. Although 0  is not significant, 1  is highly significant and 
so we reject the model without misclassification. Workers who have truly changed 
jobs are more likely to be misclassified, as 
1  exceeds 0 . This means that the 
measure of job change is likely to undercount the true number of job changes. To put 
this estimate of 
1  in context, the average conventionally defined mobility rate in the 
dataset is around 9.7 per cent and the estimate implies that the true mobility rate is 
around 15.6 per cent. 
 
Hausman et al. also apply the estimator to a model of job change using US data from 
the January 1987 Current Population Survey from the Census Bureau. Their study 
provides external estimates of the misclassification probabilities. They estimate 0  to 
be 6.1 per cent and 
1  to be 30.9 per cent.  
 
When we allow for misclassification, the estimated coefficients have higher standard 
errors implying that errors in responses lead to a loss in estimation efficiency. The 
results also indicate that ignoring misclassification leads to diminished covariate 
effects. It is easier to interpret differences in the estimates from the two regressions if 
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 A range of different starting values for 0  and 1  are used to check the robustness of the results. If 
1 is given a starting value of 0, the results are robust for any starting value of 0  between 0 and 1. If 
0 is given a starting value of 0, the results are robust for any starting value of 1  between zero and 
0.90. Above this value the likelihood function encounters flat or discontinuous regions and the model 
does not converge. If starting values for   from the probit model are used then the results are robust 
for any starting value of 
1  up to 1. If 0  and 1  are given the same starting values, the results are 
robust up to starting values of 0.28. For higher starting values the likelihood function encounters flat or 
discontinuous regions and the model does not converge. If starting values for   from the probit model 
are used then the results are robust up to and including starting values of 1. 
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we look at marginal effects instead of coefficient estimates. These are presented in 
Table 5.7.  
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Table 5.6: Coefficient Estimates from Models of Job Change* 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Robust 
Standard 
Errors 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
0ˆ  
  0.0063 0.0049 
1ˆ  
  0.6061 0.0763 
Experience -0.0655 0.0096 -0.1142 0.0263 
Experience squared 0.0009 0.0002 0.0016 0.0005 
Female 0.0465 0.0850 0.0637 0.1507 
Child -0.0085 0.0656 -0.0122 0.1083 
Living in a Couple 0.0500 0.0923 0.0474 0.1584 
Female* Living in a Couple -0.2637 0.1080 -0.3776 0.1871 
Education- medium -0.1304 0.0576 -0.1953 0.1020 
Education- high -0.2502 0.0986 -0.4533 0.1935 
(Ref: Education – low)     
Working Part-Time 0.3704 0.1044 0.8147 0.2697 
Female* Working Part-Time -0.1738 0.1271 -0.4672 0.2621 
Recent Training 0.2148 0.0769 0.4722 0.1714 
Public Sector -0.2197 0.0810 -0.3479 0.1355 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.1462 0.0521 -0.2555 0.1000 
Overskilled 0.2131 0.0421 0.3453 0.0856 
Occupation of Origin:     
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.4555 0.1031 -0.7572 0.2440 
    Professional -0.3413 0.0832 -0.5421 0.1534 
    Clerk -0.2941 0.0749 -0.5239 0.1813 
    Skilled -0.3361 0.0733 -0.4954 0.1298 
Sector of Origin:     
(Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining & Utilities -0.3448 0.1210 -0.5364 0.2272 
    Manufacturing     -0.1833 0.1053 -0.3099 0.1805 
    Building 0.3898 0.1188 0.7448 0.2674 
    Market Services 0.1583 0.0846 0.2869 0.1509 
Year Dummies:     
(Ref: 1995)     
    1996 0.0297 0.0826 0.0703 0.1394 
    1997 0.0193 0.0908 0.0494 0.1529 
    1998 0.2050 0.0980 0.4047 0.2110 
    1999 0.1443 0.1119 0.2697 0.2046 
    2000 0.2505 0.1212 0.4783 0.2452 
    2001 0.1087 0.1327 0.2813 0.2565 
Dublin Region -0.1113 0.0832 -0.1970 0.1521 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0296 0.0246 -0.0458 0.0416 
Constant -0.2931 0.2346 0.9320 0.5204 
     
N 8,736 8,736 
Wald chi2 540.67 69.71 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001 
Log pseudolikelihood -2416.2094 -2410.1338 
* Note: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people 
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Table 5.7: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change* 
Variable 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
Ratio of 
Marginal 
Effects 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model  
0ˆ  
  0.0063 0.20  
1ˆ  
  0.6061 0.00  
Experience -0.0088 0.00 -0.0427 0.00 4.9 
Experience squared 0.0001 0.00 0.0006 0.00 5.1 
Female 0.0063 0.58 0.0160 0.67 2.5 
Child -0.0011 0.90 -0.0030 0.91 2.7 
Living in a Couple 0.0066 0.59 0.0117 0.77 1.8 
Female* Living in a Couple -0.0317 0.02 -0.0846 0.04 2.7 
Education- medium -0.0172 0.02 -0.0478 0.06 2.8 
Education- high -0.0293 0.01 -0.0950 0.02 3.2 
(Ref: Education – low)      
Working Part-Time 0.0599 0.00 0.2532 0.00 4.2 
Female* Working Part-Time -0.0211 0.17 -0.0963 0.08 4.6 
Recent Training 0.0329 0.01 0.1395 0.01 4.2 
Public Sector -0.0275 0.01 -0.0804 0.01 2.9 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0190 0.01 -0.0612 0.01 3.2 
Overskilled 0.0288 0.00 0.0867 0.00 3.0 
Occupation of Origin:      
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)      
    Manager -0.0464 0.00 -0.1356 0.00 2.9 
    Professional -0.0404 0.00 -0.1175 0.00 2.9 
    Clerk -0.0352 0.00 -0.1132 0.00 3.2 
    Skilled -0.0393 0.00 -0.1071 0.00 2.7 
Sector of Origin:      
(Ref: Non Market Services)      
    Agriculture, Mining & Utilities -0.0383 0.00 -0.1087 0.02 2.8 
    Manufacturing     -0.0226 0.08 -0.0701 0.09 3.1 
    Building 0.0659 0.00 0.2363 0.01 3.6 
    Market Services 0.0220 0.06 0.0745 0.06 3.4 
Year Dummies:      
(Ref: 1995)      
    1996 0.0040 0.72 0.0180 0.61 4.4 
    1997 0.0026 0.83 0.0125 0.75 4.8 
    1998 0.0306 0.04 0.1146 0.06 3.7 
    1999 0.0208 0.20 0.0733 0.19 3.5 
    2000 0.0381 0.04 0.1376 0.05 3.6 
    2001 0.0154 0.41 0.0765 0.27 5.0 
Dublin Region -0.0140 0.18 -0.0455 0.20 3.2 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0040 0.23 -0.0171 0.27 4.3 
      
N 8,736 8,736  
Wald chi2 540.67 69.71  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001  
Log pseudolikelihood -2416.2094 -2410.1338  
* Notes: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
 
 112 
Although both models indicate that the same factors determine job mobility the effect 
of misclassification in the dependent variable on the marginal effects of the various 
explanatory variables is sizeable. In the theoretical literature on job mobility, years of 
labour market experience is a key determinant of job change. Workers with less 
labour market experience are more likely to changes jobs as they have less knowledge 
of the labour market and their own preferences and abilities for different jobs. Both 
models provide findings that are consistent with this. However, in the model that does 
not allow for misclassification, an additional year of experience reduces the 
probability of changing jobs by 0.9 percentage points, while the marginal effect in the 
misclassification model is almost five times larger, so an additional year of experience 
reduces the probability of changing jobs by 4.3 percentage points.  
 
The models of job mobility have a range of individual controls that include household 
structure and personal characteristics. We may expect women to be more likely to 
change jobs as they have a weaker attachment to the labour force but the results do 
not indicate any significant gender difference in the probability of changing jobs.  The 
marginal effect of having children is small and insignificant implying that the 
presence of children does not affect the probability of changing jobs. Workers may be 
less likely to change jobs if they are more constrained by non-market variables, such 
as being married or living in a couple, and we would expect this effect to be stronger 
for women. When misclassification is controlled for, the results indicate that women 
who are married or living in a couple are 8.5 per cent less likely to change jobs and 
the result is significant at the 5 per cent level. This effect is more than double what the 
probit estimates imply. 
 
The results also indicate that the negative effect of human capital on the probability of 
changing jobs is more marked in the misclassification model. For example, general 
human capital is proxied by education level and in the model incorporating 
misclassification the marginal effect of third level education is more than three times 
higher than in the probit model. The marginal effect indicates that those with third 
level education are 9.5 per cent less likely to change jobs than those who have at most 
Junior Certificate education. In addition, the marginal effects of higher levels of 
occupational attainment relative to those in elementary occupations are higher in the 
misclassification model. The results also show that workers who have undergone 
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recent training are more likely to change jobs. This may reflect the fact that, typically, 
training is undertaken at the beginning of a job and there is a high hazard of new jobs 
ending early. 
 
The job mobility models also contain variables that try to capture some job and firm 
characteristics. We would expect a positive relationship between working part-time 
and job mobility as part-time workers typically have a lower attachment to the labour 
force and firms may be less willing to invest in training for them etc. The results 
provide strong evidence of this relationship. However, women who work part-time are 
less likely to change jobs. A variable to capture overskilling is included as it may 
signify a poor job match. The results show a positive relationship between being 
overskilled and job mobility and the effect from the misclassification model of being 
overskilled is 3 times the impact from the probit model. A firm size effect is included 
to capture the fact that those working in a large firm may have more alternative 
employment opportunities within the firm and so are less likely to change jobs. The 
results indicate that workers in firms with more than 50 employees have a lower 
probability of changing jobs and, as before, the impact is more marked in the 
misclassification model.  
 
Working in the public sector is found to exert a negative effect on the probability of 
changing jobs and the marginal impact of working in the public sector in the 
misclassification model is almost treble the impact than in the model without 
misclassification. The effect of the sector a worker was in the previous year (or for job 
changers the sector they previously worked in) is similar in both models but again the 
marginal effects are higher in the misclassification model. The results also show that 
workers in the construction and market services sector are more likely to change jobs 
than those in the nonmarket services sector.  
 
A Dublin city dummy variable and regional unemployment rates are included to 
control for factors such as access to alternative jobs and local labour market 
conditions. Neither of these effects is significant in either model. We would expect the 
Dublin city effect to be positive reflecting the fact that living in Dublin city means a 
worker has more alternative employment opportunities. Also, we would expect the 
impact on the unemployment rate to be negative as a lower unemployment rate may 
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signal to workers that jobs are more abundant and that job search is likely to result in 
them finding an alternative job. The impact of the regional unemployment rate is 
negative, as expected, but insignificant. It is likely that the unemployment rate 
variable is correlated with the time dummy variables. In fact, when the year dummies 
are dropped the effect of the unemployment rate is highly significant. 
 
A useful way to demonstrate the differences between the two models is to graph the 
marginal effects of the variables. Figure 5.1 plots the marginal effect of experience 
from both models. The curves slope down as the probability of job change decreases 
as years of experience increases (i.e. the marginal effect on experience is negative). 
The slopes of the curves are steep at lower values of experience and then flatten out at 
higher years of experience indicating that an additional year of experience reduces the 
probability of changing jobs but at a declining rate (i.e. the marginal effect of years of 
experience squared is positive). Overall, the graph shows that the effect of ignoring 
misclassification error is large, especially at low values of experience.  
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Figure 5.1: Marginal Effect of Experience in Models of Job Mobility 
 
5.5.2 Estimation Results: Covariate Dependent Misclassification  
The results in Section 5.5.1 show that misclassification has a very big impact on the 
marginal effects of experience and working part-time.
53
 Section 5.3.2 argued that 
there might be differences in measurement error in the data by experience, gender and 
working part-time. Table 5.8 reports the results for the misclassification model where 
the misclassification probabilities depend on experience.
54
 Table 5.9 reports the 
results where the misclassification probabilities depend on gender. Even though 
gender is not an important determinant of job mobility, Section 5.3.2 argued that there 
could be gender differences in measurement error. Table 5.10 shows the results when 
misclassification depends on working part-time.
55
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 The effect of misclassification is largest on some of the year dummies although the marginal effects 
tend to be insignificant. 
54
 A categorical experience variable is used in the model when we allow the misclassification 
probabilities to depend on experience. 
55
 A series of models were run where misclassification was allowed to depend separately on each of the 
covariates but either none of the additional probabilities estimated were significant or the models did 
not converge. In addition, a model was run where the probability of misclassifying job changes was 
allowed to depend on all the covariates but the model failed to achieve convergence. 
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In the model that allows the misclassification probabilities to depend on experience, 
the estimate of the probability of misclassifying a non-job change remains 
insignificantly different from zero for each of the experience categories (see Table 
5.8). However, there is some variation within experience groups in terms of 
misclassifying job changes. The probability of misclassifying a job change for a 
worker with less than 20 years of experience, 
0 , is 58 per cent. The additional effect 
for someone with more than 20 years experience is given by 
1  and the estimate 
indicates that these workers are almost 22 percentage points less likely to be 
misclassified as not having changed jobs than someone with less than 20 years 
experience. Although this is the sign we would expect, the estimate is not significant 
at the 10 per cent level. In general, the marginal effects are similar to the model where 
misclassification is independent of the covariates.  
 
When the misclassification probabilities depend on gender, the probability of 
misclassifying a non-job change is not statistically different from zero for men and 
women. The probability of misclassifying a job change is around 60 per cent for men 
and the additional effect of misclassifying a job change for women is small and not 
significant. Table 5.10 reports the results for when misclassification depends on 
working part-time. The table shows that the probability of misclassifying a non-job 
change is not significantly different from zero for part-time and full-time workers. 
The probability of misclassifying a job change for a full-time worker is 53 per cent. 
The additional effect for someone who works part-time is that they are 17 percentage 
points more likely to be misclassified as not having changed jobs than someone who 
works full-time. However, the estimate is not significant. It may be the case the 
variation in the data is not sufficient to accurately identify covariate dependent 
misclassification or the results presented in Tables 5.8 to 5.10 may indicate that 
misclassification is independent of the covariates.  
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Table 5.8: Model of Job Change where Misclassification Depends on Experience*  
Variable Marginal Effect 
Robust Standard 
Error 
P>|Z| 
Misclassification Depends on:  Experience 
0ˆ if experience < 20 years 
0.0086 0.0076 0.26 
1ˆ if experience >= 20 years 
-0.0049 0.0068 0.47 
0ˆ  if experience < 20 years 
0.5807 0.0896 0.00 
1ˆ  if experience >= 20 years 
-0.2177 0.1454 0.13 
    
Experience -0.0361 0.0250 0.00 
Experience squared 0.0005 0.0005 0.00 
Female 0.0114 0.1393 0.71 
Child -0.0035 0.0974 0.87 
Living in a Couple 0.0134 0.1421 0.66 
Female* Living in a Couple -0.0657 0.1755 0.05 
Education- medium -0.0375 0.0962 0.07 
Education- high -0.0745 0.1871 0.03 
(Ref: Education – low)    
Working Part-Time 0.1925 0.2271 0.00 
Female* Working Part-Time -0.0688 0.2195 0.09 
Recent Training 0.1084 0.1638 0.01 
Public Sector -0.0630 0.1223 0.01 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0459 0.0911 0.02 
Overskilled 0.0685 0.0769 0.00 
Occupation of Origin:    
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)    
    Manager -0.1078 0.2245 0.00 
    Professional -0.0912 0.1379 0.00 
    Clerk -0.0837 0.1612 0.01 
    Skilled -0.0847 0.1191 0.00 
Sector of Origin:    
(Ref: Non Market Services)    
    Agriculture, Mining & Utilities -0.0826 0.1997 0.02 
    Manufacturing     -0.0558 0.1623 0.08 
    Building 0.1754 0.2296 0.01 
    Market Services 0.0546 0.1444 0.09 
Year Dummies:    
(Ref: 1995)    
    1996 0.0134 0.1338 0.65 
    1997 0.0095 0.1446 0.77 
    1998 0.0862 0.1879 0.06 
    1999 0.0528 0.1872 0.23 
    2000 0.0991 0.2238 0.08 
    2001 0.0541 0.2298 0.32 
Dublin Region -0.0397 0.1365 0.14 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0140 0.0383 0.23 
    
N  8,736  
Wald chi2  82.11  
Prob > chi2  0.0000  
Log pseudolikelihood  -2407.1317  
* Notes: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 5.9: Model of Job Change where Misclassification Depends on Gender*  
Variable Marginal Effect 
Robust Standard 
Error 
P>|Z| 
Misclassification Depends on:  Gender 
0ˆ if male 
0.0052 0.0065 0.43 
1ˆ if female  
0.0023 0.0078 0.77 
0ˆ  if male 
0.6042 0.0880 0.00 
1ˆ  if female 
-0.0018 0.0839 0.98 
    
Experience -0.0422 0.0272 0.00 
Experience squared 0.0006 0.0005 0.00 
Female 0.0112 0.2910 0.88 
Child -0.0039 0.1083 0.89 
Living in a Couple 0.0137 0.1636 0.73 
Female* Living in a Couple -0.0869 0.2025 0.05 
Education- medium -0.0472 0.1032 0.06 
Education- high -0.0946 0.2002 0.02 
(Ref: Education – low)    
Working Part-Time 0.2507 0.2751 0.00 
Female* Working Part-Time -0.0949 0.2743 0.09 
Recent Training 0.1378 0.1749 0.01 
Public Sector -0.0798 0.1353 0.01 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0607 0.1002 0.01 
Overskilled 0.0858 0.0858 0.00 
Occupation of Origin:    
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)    
    Manager -0.1342 0.2510 0.00 
    Professional -0.1166 0.1534 0.00 
    Clerk -0.1112 0.1875 0.01 
    Skilled -0.1061 0.1338 0.00 
Sector of Origin:    
(Ref: Non Market Services)    
    Agriculture, Mining & Utilities -0.1059 0.2346 0.03 
    Manufacturing     -0.0672 0.1898 0.12 
    Building 0.2345 0.2706 0.01 
    Market Services 0.0749 0.1499 0.05 
Year Dummies:    
(Ref: 1995)    
    1996 0.0176 0.1388 0.62 
    1997 0.0123 0.1522 0.75 
    1998 0.1116 0.2151 0.07 
    1999 0.0705 0.2096 0.22 
    2000 0.1328 0.2555 0.07 
    2001 0.0734 0.2601 0.30 
Dublin Region -0.0445 0.1529 0.21 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0177 0.0416 0.26 
    
N  8,736  
Wald chi2  69.84  
Prob > chi2  0.0001  
Log pseudolikelihood  -2410.0709  
* Notes: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
 119 
Table 5.10: Model of Job Change where Misclassification Depends on Working Part-Time*  
Variable Marginal Effect 
Robust Standard 
Error 
P>|Z| 
Misclassification Depends on:  Working Part-Time 
0ˆ if working full-time 
0.0044 0.0060 0.46 
1ˆ if working part-time 
0.0090 0.0146 0.54 
0ˆ  if working full-time 
0.5254 0.1658 0.00 
1ˆ  if working part-time 
0.1650 0.1363 0.23 
    
Experience -0.0391 0.0322 0.00 
Experience squared 0.0006 0.0006 0.01 
Female 0.0137 0.1383 0.67 
Child -0.0037 0.1025 0.88 
Living in a Couple 0.0155 0.1465 0.65 
Female* Living in a Couple -0.0771 0.1830 0.04 
Education- medium -0.0454 0.1011 0.05 
Education- high -0.0799 0.2082 0.05 
(Ref: Education – low)    
Working Part-Time 0.3590 0.3748 0.00 
Female* Working Part-Time -0.0915 0.2887 0.09 
Recent Training 0.1191 0.1912 0.02 
Public Sector -0.0742 0.1339 0.01 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0525 0.1064 0.03 
Overskilled 0.0760 0.0926 0.00 
Occupation of Origin:    
(Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)    
    Manager -0.1164 0.2614 0.01 
    Professional -0.1019 0.1524 0.00 
    Clerk -0.0954 0.1923 0.02 
    Skilled -0.0952 0.1259 0.00 
Sector of Origin:    
(Ref: Non Market Services)    
    Agriculture, Mining & Utilities -0.0915 0.2215 0.03 
    Manufacturing     -0.0606 0.1751 0.10 
    Building 0.1865 0.2971 0.03 
    Market Services 0.0632 0.1565 0.10 
Year Dummies:    
(Ref: 1995)    
    1996 0.0091 0.1322 0.77 
    1997 0.0077 0.1429 0.82 
    1998 0.0832 0.2103 0.13 
    1999 0.0546 0.1938 0.26 
    2000 0.1017 0.2456 0.12 
    2001 0.0513 0.2428 0.40 
Dublin Region -0.0341 0.1417 0.27 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0196 0.0391 0.18 
    
N  8,736  
Wald chi2  56.61  
Prob > chi2  0.0023  
Log pseudolikelihood  -2406.5278  
* Notes: Standard errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates job mobility in Ireland over the period 1995 to 2001. It finds 
that there are substantial inconsistencies in responses to a question about tenure in the 
LIS. The extent of the measurement error is similar to what has been found in other 
studies. Survey data on tenure are very often used to deduce job changes and given 
the extent of response error evident in the data it is likely that cases are misclassified 
as job changes when they truly no job change has taken place and vice versa. 
 
The decision to change jobs can be set in a binary choice framework. 
Misclassification in a binary dependent variable can lead to estimates that are biased 
and inconsistent so it is important to control for misclassification. An estimator 
developed by Hausman et al. is used to control for misclassification. The results 
indicate that, by ignoring misclassification, the true number of job changes is 
underestimated by around 60 per cent.  The average mobility rate in the dataset is 
calculated at around 9.7 per cent and the estimate for 
1 , the misclassification rate for 
job changes, implies that the true mobility rate is around 15.6 per cent. 
 
In addition, the chapter finds that ignoring misclassification leads to diminished 
covariate effects. The chapter also examined the possibility of misclassification 
depending on some of the characteristics of workers. However, it does not find strong 
support for covariate dependent misclassification. 
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Appendix 5A: An Alternative Measure of Job Mobility 
The LIS contains monthly activity reports where respondents are asked to describe 
their main activity in each month over the period that extends back to January of the 
previous year. This appendix describes an alternative way of capturing job changes 
using the responses to these monthly activity reports. We can define a job change to 
occur when someone is observed to be working in one month, where they were 
reported to be unemployed or out of the labour force in the previous month given that 
they were working in an earlier month. Appendix Table 5.1 shows the mapping 
between the two measures of job mobility for the total number of person-year 
observations (from Table 5.1).  
 
The monthly activity reports imply that there are a total of 240 job changes observable 
over the period and this is consistent with an average job mobility rate of around 2.7 
per cent over the period.
56
 This seems to be an implausibly low mobility rate for a 
booming economy with a flexible labour market. It is also much lower than the 
number of job changes defined using reported start dates. In fact, the two measures 
only agree on 160 cases that a job change has taken place. The table shows that there 
are 80 cases where a job change has been defined using the monthly activity reports 
where one has not been defined using the reported job start dates, indicating that 
perhaps the definition using reported job start dates may undercount the true number 
of job changes. However, what is striking from the table is that the measure of job 
mobility using the monthly activity reports classifies 728 cases as being job stays 
while the measure based on reported start dates defines these cases to be job changes. 
However, it is important to note that if a worker was not unemployed or out of the 
labour force between jobs then this case would be classified as a job change using job 
start dates but not as one using the measure based on monthly activity reports. Also, if 
the amount of time between jobs was reasonably short a worker may ignore this when 
reporting their monthly activity status and so this type of case would not be classified 
as a job change using the monthly activity reports.  
 
                                                          
56
 The empirical analysis in the chapter uses annual data. The measure of job changes based on monthly 
activity reports defines a maximum of one job change per person per year (or between interviews). Of 
course, there are cases where using the monthly activity reports would indicate there is more than one 
job change within a year. 
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Appendix Table 5.1: Number of Workers and Job Changes 
 
Job Changes (defined using monthly activity 
reports) 
 
Job Changes (defined 
using job start dates) 
Job Stay Job Change Total 
Job Stay 8,008 80 8,088 
Job Change 728 160 888 
Total 8,736 240 8,976 
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Appendix Table 5.2: Explanatory Variables: Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Experience Number of years in employment 19.5 11.5 
Experience Squared Number of years in employment squared 510.2 507.8 
Female Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if female 
and zero if male 
0.35 0.48 
Child Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person has children and zero otherwise 
0.56 0.50 
Couple Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person is married or living in a couple and zero 
otherwise 
0.69 0.46 
Female*Couple Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person is female and married or living in a couple 
and zero otherwise 
0.22 0.42 
Education- low 
(Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest 
educational qualification is Junior Certificate and 
zero otherwise 
0.46 0.50 
Education- medium Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest 
educational attainment is above Junior Certificate 
but below degree level and zero otherwise 
0.41 0.49 
Education- high Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest 
educational qualification is a degree or above and 
zero otherwise 
0.13 0.34 
Part-Time Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person works less than 30 hours per week and 
zero otherwise 
0.15 0.36 
Female*Part-Time Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person is female and works less than 30 hours per 
week and zero otherwise 
0.11 0.31 
Recent Training Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person has been in education or training in the 
past year and zero otherwise 
0.08 0.27 
Public  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
person was working in the public sector in the 
previous year and zero otherwise 
0.28 0.45 
Number of Employees Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
number of employees in the firm in the previous 
year is more than 50 and zero otherwise. 
0.35 0.48 
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Overskilled Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
worker reported that they felt they had skills and 
qualifications to do a more demanding job and 
zero otherwise. 
0.48 0.50 
Occupation of Origin:    
    Manager Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is manager, senior official or 
legislator and zero otherwise 
0.09 0.29 
    Professional Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is professional, technician or 
associated professionals and zero otherwise 
0.25 0.43 
    Clerk Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is clerk, service, shop or sale 
worker and zero otherwise. 
0.23 0.42 
    Skilled Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation of origin is skilled agricultural or 
fishery worker or a skilled craft or trades worker 
and zero otherwise. 
0.22 0.41 
    Elementary 
    (Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
occupation in the previous year is plant or 
machine operator or assembler, or elementary 
occupation and zero otherwise. 
0.21 0.40 
Sector of Origin:    
    Agriculture, Mining 
    and Utilities 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is agriculture, fishing, mining or quarrying, 
or utilities and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    Manufacturing     Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is manufacturing and zero otherwise. 
0.19 0.39 
    Building Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is building and zero otherwise. 
0.08 0.27 
    Market Services Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is distribution, hotels and restaurants, 
transport, storage and communications, financial 
intermediation, or real estate, renting and business 
activities and zero otherwise. 
0.35 0.48 
    Non-Market Services 
    (Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if sector of 
origin is education, public administration and 
defence or health and social work and zero 
otherwise. 
0.25 0.43 
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Year Dummies:    
    1995 
    (Reference Category) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1995 and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    1996 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1996 and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    1997 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1997 and zero otherwise. 
0.13 0.34 
    1998 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1998 and zero otherwise. 
0.14 0.35 
    1999 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 1999 and zero otherwise. 
0.15 0.36 
    2000 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 2000 and zero otherwise. 
0.15 0.36 
    2001 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year 
is 2001 and zero otherwise. 
0.16 0.37 
Dublin Dummy variable that take the value 1 if the 
household the person is living in is situated in 
Dublin city 
0.11 0.32 
Regional Unemployment 
Rate 
Constructed from the NUTS3 regional data and 
labour force status available in the LIS 
5.14 1.76 
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6. Measurement Error in Survey Data: Models of Job 
Mobility Across Europe 
6.1 Introduction and Motivation 
The previous chapter investigated job mobility in Ireland using the Living in Ireland 
Survey (LIS), the Irish component of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). There is no direct question in the LIS about job mobility; instead it is 
inferred from responses of individuals to a question about tenure. One of the main 
findings of the chapter was that there is substantial measurement error in the recorded 
responses which may lead to misclassifying people who have not changed jobs as 
having changed jobs and vice versa.
57
 The chapter also formally controlled for 
misclassification, using the estimator developed by Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-
Morton (1988) and discussed in detail in Chapter 4, and found that that the true rate of 
job mobility is being significantly undercounted in Ireland. In addition, the findings 
show that ignoring misclassification leads to diminished covariate effects in a probit 
model of job mobility. Given the serious impact misclassification can have, it is 
imperative to control for it in cases when misclassification is likely. This chapter 
extends the analysis and explores misclassification in job changes in twelve European 
countries over the period 1995 to 2001 using the ECHP. 
 
The chapter finds that the true rates of job mobility are undercounted in several 
countries, typically in the peripheral countries of the EU. In addition, the chapter finds 
that similar factors are important in determining mobility across countries. Apart from 
age, personal and household characteristics are generally not important in explaining 
the probability of job mobility; occupation and sector of origin have some role, while 
firm and job characteristics have an important role in explaining the decision to 
change jobs. The effect of these variables on the likelihood of changing jobs is much 
stronger in the models that control for misclassification.  
 
                                                          
57
 The reasons for, and prevalence of, reporting errors in labour market survey data and in job mobility 
studies, in particular, were discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 describes the dataset. Section 6.3 
investigates the extent of measurement error in the ECHP data. Section 6.4 provides 
estimation results and Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Dataset and Definition of Job Mobility 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a harmonised, cross-national 
annual survey that collects information on several socio-economic aspects in the 
European Union. It is a longitudinal survey and the data collected on personal and job 
characteristics are very rich which makes it useful for analysing labour market 
dynamics. The survey asks when a person started working with their present employer 
and responses to this question are used to capture job changes.  The survey started in 
1994 and ended in 2001, however not all countries entered the survey at the same 
time; it began in 1995 in Austria, in 1996 in Finland and in 1997 in Sweden. In 
addition, for Germany, the UK and Luxembourg, the original sample has been 
replaced with harmonised versions of household panels that were already being used 
in those countries.  
 
The panel dimension of the ECHP is exploited to identify job changes. Similar to the 
approach for Ireland using the LIS data in Chapters 3 and 5, a revolving balanced 
panel of people aged 20 to 60 years, roughly the prime working age, is selected for 
each country. This means that individuals are included in the sample in every year that 
they meet this age restriction.  
 
As there is no explicit question in the ECHP about changing jobs, job changes are 
identified using the information about when a worker reports that they started working 
with their current employer. Job mobility is defined in terms of employment-to-
employment transitions so to capture this workers need to be employed in two 
consecutive waves. Workers are asked to report the month and year that they started 
working with their current employer. If this date is after their interview in one year 
but before their interview in the following year, this indicates that the person has 
changed jobs between the two waves.
58
  
 
                                                          
58
 This is the same definition of job change as is used in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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The analysis proceeds with 12 out of the 15 countries in the ECHP, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
59
 Sweden, Luxembourg and the UK are excluded 
from the analysis. Sweden is excluded because there is no panel element to the data, it 
is a series of cross sections. In this chapter, information on individuals over successive 
waves is used to identify job changes and also all variables are lagged in the models 
of job mobility (so they refer to a person‟s characteristics and situation in the previous 
year or in their previous job) and the Swedish data does not permit this. The data on 
Luxembourg only records when a person started working with their present employer 
from 1998 on and also data on the timing of interviews is missing. Finally, for the UK 
there appears to be significant coding error in the ECHP version of the British 
Household Panel Survey.
60
 
 
Appendix Table 6.1 shows the number of people in the revolving balanced panel, the 
number of workers employed in consecutive two-year periods and the rate of job 
mobility for each country considered in the analysis.
61
 Figure 6.1 shows the annual 
average mobility rate for workers in each country. Across countries, the average 
mobility rate is around 7 per cent per annum. The figure also shows that countries 
with more flexible labour markets (e.g. in terms of employment protection legislation) 
such as Denmark and Ireland have relatively high mobility rates, while countries with 
more highly regulated labour markets such as France, Italy, Greece and Portugal have 
relatively low mobility rates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59
 The ECHP version of the Living in Ireland Survey is used for Ireland in this chapter. The ECHP data 
for Ireland comes from the LIS but is coded differently by Eurostat to ensure some standardisation in 
variables across countries. 
60
 The implied rates of job mobility in the UK for 1995-1998 and 2001 are, on average, over 20 per 
cent. Worryingly, the data for 1999 and 2000 seem entirely inconsistent with the other years for the UK 
as the mobility rate falls to less than 2 per cent. In the data for the 1999 and 2000 waves, there are no 
recorded reports that anyone started working in their jobs in 1999 or 2000 but there is a massive 
increase in the number of cases where this variable is missing.  
61
 For Austria, the revolving balanced panel covers the period 1996 to 2001 and for Finland it covers 
the period 1997 to 2001 as the ECHP Survey only began in 1995 in Austria and in 1996 in Finland. 
Also, a revolving balanced panel over the period 1995 to 1999 is used for Belgium. There was a routing 
problem in the national questionnaire which resulted in huge amounts of missing data for some of the 
key variables used in this paper in later years of the survey. 
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Figure 6.1: Annual Average Mobility Rates derived from the ECHP 
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However, without exogenous job change information we cannot be certain that the 
reported number of job changes is correct. Workers may find it difficult to accurately 
recall when they started working with their current employer, they may misunderstand 
the question or their responses could be coded incorrectly.  
 
As in Chapter 5, the concern is not necessarily that job start dates are misreported but 
rather that if they are misreported there is a risk that cases may be misclassified as job 
changes and vice versa. One way to assess whether the average mobility rates shown 
in Figure 6.1 are sensible is to compare them with estimates from other sources. 
Figure 6.2 compares the job mobility rates from the ECHP with some OECD (2010) 
cross country estimates. The OECD estimates refer to annual average job-to-job 
transition rates over the period 2000 to 2007 and the rates are adjusted for industry 
composition. 
 
OECD (2010) and the related background paper Bassanini et al. (2010) use industry 
level data to construct a measure of job-to-job transitions which they define as the 
number of workers who are employed at both time t and t-1 but who change employer 
between these two dates. Separations are calculated as the difference between hirings 
and employment changes between two years. Hirings rates at the industry level are 
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computed from job tenure data available in European and national labour force 
surveys. Industry level employment growth rates are obtained from OECD STAN and 
EU KLEMS databases. Each industry separation rate is further divided into job-to-job 
and job-to-jobless transition rates. For each industry, the ratio of job-to-job and job-
to-jobless transitions is given by the number of workers with an employer in an 
industry at time t-1 to the average employment in the same industry in time t-1 and t. 
Hirings and separations are re-scaled because of discrepancies between labour force 
surveys and national accounts. This arises because different waves of labour force 
surveys are hard to compare at a disaggregate industry level because the industry 
dimension is not taken into account in the labour force survey sampling design.  
 
Although job mobility is calculated differently in OECD (2010) than in this chapter 
and it considers a later time period, there are some similarities across both measures.  
For example, both sources indicate that countries like Greece and Italy have the 
lowest mobility rates while countries like Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands have 
relatively higher rates of job change. However, what is probably most striking from 
the graph is the fact that the OECD estimates are above the ECHP ones; of course it 
has to be remembered the measures refer to two different time periods. 
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Cross Country Mobility Rates from ECHP and OECD* 
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* Note:  The OECD estimates come from Bassanini et al. (2010), Appendix Table A.1. No estimate is 
reported for Ireland. 
 
 131 
Even though the OECD (2010) measure of job mobility is constructed differently 
from that employed in this chapter, both definitions involve a self reported measure of 
tenure which is subject to measurement error. Other studies use administrative data or 
have matched employee employer data that uses employer records to determine job 
changes. For example, Ibsen, Trevisan and Westergaard-Nielsen (2008) use registered 
data to compare the labour markets in Denmark and in Veneto, a large Italian region. 
They focus on workers aged 25 to 55 and over the period 1995 to 2001 the average 
mobility rate in their data is around 17 per cent in Denmark and around 10 per cent in 
Veneto.
62
 These estimates compare with average calculated mobility rates for workers 
aged between 20 and 60 of 11.5 per cent and 4.4 per cent for Denmark and Italy 
respectively using the ECHP data. 
 
6.3 Measurement Error in Responses 
This section examines the consistency of responses given for job start dates over time 
in order to gauge how reliable the responses are. If workers accurately report the date 
they started working with their current employer and if this information were recorded 
without error, then all starting dates would be constant within jobs. One way to assess 
the reliability of the data on job starting dates is to partition the dataset into distinct 
jobs and to compare the starting dates across interviews.
63
 
 
In order to assess the consistency of reported starting dates within jobs, the 
information on when the job began must be available. Across the countries considered 
in this chapter between 3 per cent (in Denmark) and almost 16 per cent (in Germany) 
of observations that are classified as working in the revolving balanced panels are 
missing the information on the year the person started working with their current 
employer in at least one of the waves. These people are excluded from the analysis in 
this section and Appendix Table 6.2 shows the number of cases that are dropped for 
each country. The data is converted into separate jobs in an analogous manner to 
Section 5.3.2. 
 
                                                          
62
 These average mobility rates for Denmark and Italy are derived from Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in Ibsen 
et al. (2008). 
63
 Given the likelihood of misclassifying cases as job changes and vice versa, we do not attempt to 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary mobility. 
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Table 6.1 reports the total number of jobs observable for various durations for the 12 
countries. We can only assess the consistency of reported job start dates if we observe 
the job surviving for longer than a year (or more precisely for longer than the amount 
of time between interviews) so that we will have at least two reported starting dates to 
compare. The table shows that for each country between 18 and 32 per cent of all jobs 
are only observed for one year. These jobs are excluded from the analysis in this 
section as there is only one starting date associated with each of these jobs. For 
example, all new jobs with a reported start date in 2001 are excluded from the 
analysis because the survey ended in 2001 so there is no other response to compare to 
that given in the 2001 survey. Other cases that are excluded from the analysis in this 
section include workers who start a new job in one wave but who are either 
unemployed or out of the labour force in the next wave. These excluded jobs are all 
recent jobs in the sense that they began (and some of them ended) over the period of 
the survey. 
 
Table 6.1: Number of Jobs Observed over the Sample Period 
 Total No. of 
Jobs 
No. of Jobs Observable for 
one year 
No. of Jobs Observable for one 
year as a % of Total 
Austria 2,764 517 19% 
Belgium 2,493 633 25% 
Denmark 3,017 845 28% 
Finland 3,140 819 26% 
France 5,466 1,087 20% 
Germany 6,789 1,762 26% 
Greece 4,087 728 18% 
Ireland 2,557 766 30% 
Italy 5,579 1,042 19% 
The Netherlands 3,864 857 22% 
Portugal 5,762 1,197 21% 
Spain 5,102 1,611 32% 
 
 
The ECHP only records the starting month associated with a job if the year associated 
with the beginning of the job is, at the earliest, two years before the person joined the 
survey; for other observations only the starting year is recorded. Table 6.2 shows the 
number of jobs that are reported to be recent (i.e. that are reported to have begun at 
the earliest two years before the person joined the survey) and that are observed more 
than once over the survey period (so we have at least two starting dates to compare 
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within jobs).
64
 The table shows that between 16 and 35 per cent of all jobs across 
countries are classified as recent and are observed more than once over the survey 
period.  
 
The table also reports how many of these recent jobs have inconsistencies in reported 
start dates in any of the years that the job is observed (i.e. that the reported started date 
is not the same across waves). The table shows that there are substantial 
inconsistencies in reported start dates within recent jobs; on average around 9 per cent 
of all recent jobs have inconsistencies in reported start dates. In addition, there are 
some marked differences across countries. For example, in France only 2 per cent of 
recent jobs that are observed at least twice have inconsistencies in reported start dates, 
whereas the comparable figure in Greece is over 18 per cent. 
 
Table 6.2: Number of ‘Recent’ Jobs Observed over the Sample Period 
 
No. of „Recent‟ Jobs 
that are Observed at 
least twice 
No. of „Recent‟ Jobs that are 
Observed at least twice as a 
% of Total 
% of „Recent‟ Jobs that 
have Inconsistencies in 
Starting Dates 
Austria 731 26% 5.5% 
Belgium 404 16% 5.2% 
Denmark 1,064 35% 6.7% 
Finland 730 23% 4.2% 
France 1,336 24% 2.0% 
Germany 1,817 27% 3.6% 
Greece 1,227 30% 18.3% 
Ireland
65
 830 32% 16.7% 
Italy 1,402 25% 10.6% 
The Netherlands 1,164 30% 7.2% 
Portugal 1,650 29% 11.0% 
Spain 1,512 30% 17.8% 
 
Given the level of inconsistencies in reported start dates in recent jobs, we cannot be 
confident that all cases classified as job changes are truly job changes, and similarly 
that cases classified as continuing jobs are truly continuing jobs.
66
 
 
                                                          
64
 In addition, only jobs where the data on both the month and year that the job started is available are 
considered. In most countries there are a relatively small number of cases where the information on the 
month that a person reports to have started their job is missing and these jobs are excluded from the 
analysis.  
65
 The inconsistency rate reported for recent jobs in the ECHP version of the Irish data appears to 
conflict with the measurement error reported in Chapter 5 for Ireland using the LIS data. This issue is 
explored in Appendix 6A. 
66
 In the analysis, job changes are used to partition the data into distinct jobs. The analysis suggests that 
the measure of job change may not accurately identify the true number of job changes i.e. it is likely 
there are cases identified as job changes when truly no change in jobs took place and vice versa. This 
means we may over or underestimate the true number of jobs and therefore the level of inconsistencies 
in starting dates within jobs. 
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This analysis is limited in two ways. Firstly, the analysis only considers jobs that are 
recorded to be recent. There may be observations where tenure is overestimated, 
particularly in the earlier years of the survey, and these cases cannot be considered 
because the month that the person started working in their current job will not be 
recorded in the survey. Secondly, across countries on average around 24 per cent of 
jobs are only observed once and these jobs are excluded from the analysis. 
 
6.4 Estimation Results 
To consider this more formally, models of job change are estimated using both a 
standard probit estimator and the Hausman et al. (1998) estimator that controls for 
misclassification. Tables 6.3 to 6.14 show the marginal effects from both estimators 
for 12 European countries. The annual data for each country have been pooled and 
year dummies are included to control for factors that affect all workers but that vary 
over time. Various model specifications were tried for each of the countries; in some 
instances the models would not converge or misclassification probabilities greater 
than one in magnitude were estimated. The specifications reported in this chapter 
exclude workers in any year that they report to be working part-time (i.e. less than 30 
hours a week).
67
 Appendix Table 6.6 provides some basic descriptive statistics of the 
final samples used for each country.
68
 The same explanatory variables are used in 
each country model.
69
 With the exception of the year dummies, all the explanatory 
variables have been lagged so they refer to the worker‟s characteristics and situation 
in their previous job or in the previous year. Zero misclassification probabilities and 
estimates from ordinary probit models of job change are used as starting values in 
estimating the Hausman et al. model.  
                                                          
67
 In addition, separate models by gender were considered for each country but in many instances the 
models did not converge. 
68
 The number of observations in each country model is lower than those reported in Appendix Table 
6.1 as observations are excluded when data for at least one of the explanatory variables is missing or if 
the worker is reported to be working part-time in a given year. 
69
 There are a few exceptions to this. Regional variables are not available for Denmark and the 
Netherlands so the national unemployment rate is included in those country models rather than the 
local unemployment rate. The variable indicating firm size is excluded from the models for France and 
Denmark, as it would reduce the final samples for those countries by 67 per cent and 28 per cent 
respectively. The overeducation and satisfaction variables are not available for Germany because either 
the relevant questions were not asked or the information is not available for other reasons. 
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Table 6.3: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Austria* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0000 1.00 
1ˆ    0.5559 0.23 
Age -0.0046 0.00 -0.0246 0.12 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.10 0.0002 0.27 
Female -0.0060 0.39 -0.0144 0.43 
Child -0.0024 0.64 -0.0035 0.79 
Female*Child 0.0121 0.18 0.0275 0.22 
Living in a Couple -0.0037 0.54 -0.0100 0.53 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0072 0.37 -0.0153 0.46 
Education: (Ref: Education – low  (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.0049 0.32 0.0115 0.35 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0074 0.52 0.0155 0.57 
Recent Training 0.0028 0.47 0.0066 0.50 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0022 0.69 -0.0046 0.73 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0226 0.00 -0.0522 0.01 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0252 0.00 -0.0631 0.04 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting 0.0055 0.23 0.0135 0.29 
Overeducated 0.0003 0.93 0.0019 0.84 
Public -0.0280 0.00 -0.0685 0.02 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0106 0.01 -0.0273 0.08 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0145 0.09 -0.0359 0.14 
    Professional -0.0098 0.39 -0.0247 0.38 
    Technicians -0.0104 0.17 -0.0275 0.23 
    Clerks -0.0170 0.01 -0.0434 0.09 
    Service -0.0132 0.06 -0.0348 0.19 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0136 0.30 -0.0346 0.31 
    Craft & Trades -0.0073 0.30 -0.0184 0.32 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0083 0.32 -0.0186 0.37 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0191 0.12 -0.0488 0.20 
    Manufacturing     0.0042 0.62 0.0077 0.71 
    Building 0.0106 0.30 0.0204 0.41 
    Market Services 0.0132 0.09 0.0280 0.12 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1996)     
    1997 -0.0033 0.53 -0.0074 0.57 
    1998 -0.0054 0.31 -0.0135 0.34 
    1999 -0.0048 0.35 -0.0129 0.37 
    2000 -0.0065 0.42 -0.0172 0.43 
    2001 -0.0042 0.58 -0.0114 0.57 
Region: (Ref: Ostösterreich)     
    Südösterreich -0.0054 0.30 -0.0160 0.37 
    Westösterreich -0.0065 0.56 -0.0178 0.55 
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0020 0.68 0.0096 0.68 
   
N 9,925 9,925 
Wald chi2 391.13 40.76 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.3085 
Log pseudolikelihood -1733.2982 -1732.9355 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1226  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates are positive. 
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Table 6.4: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Belgium* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0022 0.84 
1ˆ    0.3462 0.88 
Age -0.0089 0.00 -0.0222 0.48 
Age Squared 0.0001 0.07 0.0002 0.53 
Female -0.0072 0.56 -0.0115 0.69 
Child -0.0222 0.02 -0.0349 0.49 
Female*Child 0.0437 0.01 0.0704 0.53 
Living in a Couple 0.0113 0.26 0.0172 0.44 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0218 0.13 -0.0352 0.57 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.0009 0.92 0.0020 0.90 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0003 0.98 0.0002 0.99 
Recent Training 0.0145 0.03 0.0234 0.52 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0101 0.20 -0.0156 0.39 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0078 0.38 -0.0119 0.55 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0141 0.08 -0.0219 0.39 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0162 0.06 -0.0261 0.54 
Overeducated 0.0092 0.16 0.0144 0.38 
Public -0.0066 0.49 -0.0118 0.68 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0182 0.00 -0.0279 0.41 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0053 0.73 -0.0083 0.75 
    Professional -0.0104 0.45 -0.0160 0.56 
    Technicians -0.0138 0.27 -0.0221 0.51 
    Clerks -0.0131 0.25 -0.0208 0.50 
    Service 0.0161 0.27 0.0253 0.57 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery 0.0015 0.96 0.0018 0.97 
    Craft & Trades 0.0022 0.86 0.0042 0.87 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0159 0.20 -0.0241 0.41 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0031 0.87 -0.0055 0.87 
    Manufacturing     0.0099 0.39 0.0151 0.63 
    Building 0.0289 0.11 0.0450 0.50 
    Market Services 0.0030 0.74 0.0051 0.78 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 -0.0007 0.96 -0.0030 0.92 
    1997 0.0179 0.15 0.0265 0.38 
    1998 0.0018 0.90 0.0006 0.98 
    1999 -0.0093 0.67 -0.0168 0.74 
Region: (Ref: Région Bruxelles-capitale/Brussels 
hoofdstad gewest) 
    
    Vlaams Gewest -0.0283 0.03 -0.0451 0.53 
    Région Wallonne 0.0182 0.47 0.0309 0.64 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.0114 0.14 -0.0300 0.54 
   
N 4,686 4,686 
Wald chi2 196.89 8.40 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 1.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -940.1600 -940.1238 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0944  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 6.5: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Denmark* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0098 0.88 
1ˆ    0.4980 0.41 
Age -0.0057 0.06 -0.0209 0.34 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.98 0.0000 0.90 
Female -0.0285 0.07 -0.0560 0.12 
Child -0.0050 0.64 -0.0081 0.73 
Female*Child 0.0117 0.45 0.0228 0.52 
Living in a Couple -0.0111 0.38 -0.0238 0.48 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.0175 0.34 0.0372 0.40 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.0083 0.46 0.0143 0.60 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0068 0.60 0.0134 0.72 
Recent Training 0.0102 0.15 0.0225 0.58 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours 0.0046 0.62 0.0107 0.72 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0102 0.32 -0.0232 0.58 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0348 0.00 -0.0785 0.40 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0173 0.05 -0.0372 0.44 
Overeducated 0.0169 0.01 0.0381 0.53 
Public -0.0176 0.11 -0.0361 0.54 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0277 0.13 -0.0642 0.65 
    Professional -0.0350 0.03 -0.0771 0.43 
    Technicians -0.0191 0.23 -0.0467 0.64 
    Clerks -0.0431 0.00 -0.0957 0.49 
    Service -0.0094 0.58 -0.0280 0.71 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery 0.0162 0.62 0.0446 0.79 
    Craft & Trades -0.0032 0.86 -0.0076 0.86 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0044 0.80 -0.0148 0.75 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0333 0.10 -0.0741 0.67 
    Manufacturing     -0.0332 0.02 -0.0677 0.44 
    Building -0.0205 0.25 -0.0397 0.59 
    Market Services -0.0116 0.32 -0.0218 0.65 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1996)     
    1997 0.0068 0.52 0.0150 0.67 
    1998 0.0551 0.00 0.1398 0.48 
    1999 -0.0241 0.05 -0.0501 0.34 
    2000 -0.0289 0.05 -0.0617 0.47 
    2001 -0.0044 0.78 -0.0083 0.82 
National Unemployment Rate -0.0062 0.09 -0.0188 0.46 
   
N 8,106 8,106 
Wald chi2 391.68 14.22 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.9989 
Log pseudolikelihood -2507.0117 -2506.7382 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0864  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
A regional breakdown is not available in the ECHP for Denmark so the national unemployment rate is 
included in the model. Also, the firm size variable is not included in the model as it would reduce the 
sample size by 28 per cent. 
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Table 6.6: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Finland* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0000 0.98 
1ˆ    0.0000 0.95 
Age -0.0078 0.00 -0.0078 0.00 
Age Squared 0.0001 0.13 0.0001 0.13 
Female 0.0310 0.02 0.0310 0.02 
Child 0.0096 0.30 0.0096 0.30 
Female*Child -0.0188 0.12 -0.0188 0.12 
Living in a Couple 0.0109 0.29 0.0109 0.29 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0261 0.08 -0.0261 0.08 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) -0.0063 0.51 -0.0063 0.51 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0038 0.73 0.0038 0.73 
Recent Training -0.0031 0.62 -0.0031 0.62 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0059 0.42 -0.0059 0.42 
Satisfied with Working Times 0.0052 0.51 0.0052 0.51 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0136 0.08 -0.0136 0.08 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0289 0.00 -0.0289 0.00 
Overeducated 0.0228 0.00 0.0228 0.00 
Public -0.0126 0.12 -0.0126 0.12 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0201 0.00 -0.0201 0.00 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0140 0.38 -0.0140 0.38 
    Professional 0.0079 0.64 0.0079 0.64 
    Technicians -0.0076 0.61 -0.0076 0.61 
    Clerks -0.0157 0.30 -0.0157 0.30 
    Service -0.0173 0.23 -0.0173 0.23 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0397 0.03 -0.0397 0.03 
    Craft & Trades 0.0032 0.85 0.0032 0.85 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0043 0.80 -0.0043 0.80 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0190 0.25 -0.0190 0.25 
    Manufacturing     -0.0301 0.01 -0.0301 0.01 
    Building 0.0099 0.56 0.0099 0.56 
    Market Services -0.0075 0.43 -0.0075 0.43 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1997)     
    1998 0.0314 0.00 0.0314 0.00 
    1999 -0.0090 0.66 -0.0090 0.66 
    2000 0.0142 0.60 0.0142 0.60 
    2001 0.0072 0.80 0.0072 0.80 
Region: (Ref: Uusimaa )     
    Etelä-Suomi (incl. Åland) -0.0005 0.97 -0.0005 0.97 
    Itä-Suomi 0.0347 0.36 0.0347 0.36 
    Väli-Suomi 0.0246 0.32 0.0246 0.32 
    Pohjois-Suomi 0.0174 0.54 0.0174 0.54 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.0046 0.33 -0.0046 0.33 
   
N 6,979 6,979 
Wald chi2 348.15 348.15 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood -1679.567 -1679.567 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1057  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates are positive. 
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Table 6.7: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for France* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0050 0.07 
1ˆ    0.2607 0.74 
Age -0.0045 0.00 -0.0075 0.06 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.02 0.0000 0.23 
Female -0.0011 0.81 -0.0024 0.66 
Child 0.0028 0.38 0.0022 0.57 
Female*Child -0.0030 0.54 0.0000 1.00 
Living in a Couple -0.0002 0.97 0.0014 0.74 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0037 0.50 -0.0083 0.26 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.0014 0.64 0.0014 0.70 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0001 0.97 0.0001 0.98 
Recent Training -0.0022 0.42 -0.0013 0.69 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0041 0.17 -0.0042 0.27 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0057 0.05 -0.0072 0.14 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0089 0.00 -0.0106 0.03 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0064 0.03 -0.0072 0.13 
Overeducated 0.0037 0.08 0.0040 0.16 
Public -0.0192 0.00 -0.0224 0.00 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager 0.0203 0.02 0.0215 0.08 
    Professional 0.0083 0.25 0.0111 0.27 
    Technicians 0.0074 0.21 0.0074 0.31 
    Clerks 0.0029 0.62 0.0038 0.58 
    Service 0.0061 0.34 0.0069 0.38 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery 0.0122 0.36 0.0228 0.31 
    Craft & Trades 0.0014 0.81 0.0000 1.00 
    Plant & Machine Operators 0.0034 0.57 0.0029 0.68 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0062 0.43 -0.0085 0.43 
    Manufacturing     0.0031 0.48 0.0057 0.35 
    Building 0.0213 0.00 0.0286 0.05 
    Market Services 0.0078 0.03 0.0109 0.09 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 -0.0089 0.07 -0.0116 0.11 
    1997 -0.0115 0.02 -0.0137 0.06 
    1998 0.0067 0.17 0.0062 0.31 
    1999 0.0045 0.46 0.0036 0.61 
    2000 0.0141 0.06 0.0143 0.14 
    2001 0.0179 0.05 0.0181 0.17 
Region: (Ref: Île de France)     
    Bassin Parisien -0.0081 0.03 -0.0083 0.07 
    Nord - Pas-de-Calais -0.0031 0.68 -0.0043 0.62 
    Est -0.0106 0.01 -0.0111 0.02 
    Ouest -0.0081 0.02 -0.0083 0.05 
    Sud-Ouest -0.0089 0.03 -0.0100 0.06 
    Centre-Est -0.0120 0.00 -0.0129 0.03 
    Méditerranée -0.0058 0.33 -0.0054 0.44 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.0011 0.40 -0.0025 0.33 
   
N 17,673 17,673 
Wald chi2 519.76 27.58 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.9579 
Log pseudolikelihood -2458.722 -2454.819 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1323  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The firm size variable is not included in the model as it would reduce the sample size by 67 per cent. 
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Table 6.8: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Germany* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0000 1.00 
1ˆ    0.7518 0.00 
Age -0.0005 0.74 -0.0127 0.17 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.09 0.0000 0.69 
Female -0.0037 0.64 -0.0268 0.53 
Child -0.0089 0.11 -0.0268 0.30 
Female*Child 0.0137 0.13 0.0510 0.22 
Living in a Couple -0.0039 0.57 -0.0464 0.24 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0091 0.31 -0.0247 0.60 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.0106 0.07 0.0434 0.13 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0174 0.03 0.0585 0.11 
Recent Training 0.0344 0.00 0.1627 0.00 
Public -0.0109 0.11 -0.0511 0.12 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0325 0.00 -0.1533 0.00 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0067 0.53 -0.0060 0.91 
    Professional -0.0124 0.21 -0.0245 0.61 
    Technicians -0.0128 0.14 -0.0331 0.43 
    Clerks -0.0150 0.10 -0.0476 0.28 
    Service -0.0155 0.12 -0.0463 0.35 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0328 0.04 -0.1323 0.09 
    Craft & Trades -0.0174 0.03 -0.0695 0.07 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0208 0.02 -0.0901 0.03 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.0030 0.81 0.0351 0.56 
    Manufacturing     -0.0058 0.49 -0.0072 0.86 
    Building 0.0199 0.06 0.1166 0.04 
    Market Services 0.0141 0.06 0.0924 0.03 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 -0.0093 0.18 -0.0371 0.27 
    1997 -0.0039 0.60 -0.0140 0.71 
    1998 -0.0208 0.00 -0.0914 0.00 
    1999 -0.0171 0.01 -0.0813 0.01 
    2000 -0.0164 0.03 -0.0769 0.04 
    2001 -0.0157 0.05 -0.0676 0.08 
Region: (Ref: Baden-Württemberg )     
    Bayern 0.0158 0.05 0.0696 0.06 
    Berlin 0.0384 0.01 0.1685 0.01 
    Brandenburg 0.0116 0.39 0.0752 0.26 
    Bremen 0.0166 0.54 0.1359 0.32 
    Hamburg -0.0073 0.73 -0.0064 0.95 
    Hessen 0.0152 0.14 0.0526 0.25 
    Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.0058 0.70 0.0345 0.64 
    Niedersachsen 0.0096 0.31 0.0256 0.54 
    Nordrhein-Westfalen -0.0015 0.84 -0.0001 1.00 
    Sachsen 0.0040 0.72 0.0427 0.44 
    Sachsen-Anhalt 0.0240 0.08 0.1442 0.05 
    Schleswig-Holstein 0.0122 0.51 0.0574 0.46 
    Thüringen 0.0235 0.10 0.1171 0.08 
    Rheinland-Pfalz + Saarland -0.0120 0.26 -0.0413 0.42 
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0000 0.98 0.0002 0.98 
   
N 21,394 21,394 
Wald chi2 636.79 125.42 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood -5717.58 -5711.49 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0614  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates are positive. The overeducation 
and satisfaction variables are not available for Germany as either the relevant questions were not asked 
or the information is not available for other reasons. 
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Table 6.9: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Greece* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0047 0.14 
1ˆ    0.8112 0.00 
Age -0.0017 0.15 -0.0186 0.19 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.92 0.0000 0.99 
Female -0.0047 0.37 -0.0341 0.40 
Child -0.0008 0.85 -0.0171 0.60 
Female*Child -0.0139 0.02 -0.0795 0.05 
Living in a Couple -0.0050 0.35 -0.0250 0.49 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.0130 0.09 0.0795 0.16 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) -0.0045 0.21 -0.0185 0.43 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0011 0.83 0.0237 0.52 
Recent Training -0.0087 0.09 -0.0560 0.12 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0007 0.83 -0.0200 0.41 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0008 0.82 -0.0030 0.89 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0075 0.03 -0.0666 0.05 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0057 0.07 -0.0417 0.11 
Overeducated 0.0072 0.01 0.0366 0.05 
Public -0.0090 0.11 -0.0576 0.16 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0039 0.38 -0.0345 0.29 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0077 0.23 -0.0534 0.25 
    Professional 0.0059 0.49 0.0319 0.58 
    Technicians 0.0052 0.56 0.0297 0.62 
    Clerks -0.0122 0.06 -0.0707 0.12 
    Service -0.0029 0.67 -0.0044 0.93 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0256 0.00 -0.1620 0.03 
    Craft & Trades -0.0092 0.12 -0.0619 0.18 
    Plant & Machine Operators 0.0000 1.00 -0.0068 0.88 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.0267 0.03 0.1411 0.06 
    Manufacturing     0.0153 0.06 0.0718 0.17 
    Building 0.0224 0.02 0.1266 0.06 
    Market Services 0.0130 0.05 0.0646 0.13 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 0.0191 0.01 0.1174 0.02 
    1997 0.0558 0.00 0.3791 0.00 
    1998 -0.0053 0.41 -0.0364 0.43 
    1999 0.0015 0.90 -0.0082 0.92 
    2000 -0.0109 0.28 -0.0693 0.33 
    2001 -0.0152 0.09 -0.1034 0.19 
Region: (Ref: Voreia Ellada )     
    Kentriki Ellada -0.0081 0.02 -0.0535 0.04 
    Attiki 0.0053 0.18 0.0358 0.23 
    Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti 0.0041 0.40 0.0427 0.30 
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0009 0.55 0.0073 0.69 
   
N 16,050 16,050 
Wald chi2 579.7700 50.57 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.1016 
Log pseudolikelihood -2561.0613 -2556.9619 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1012  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates are positive. 
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Table 6.10: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Ireland* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0047 0.48 
1ˆ    0.5791 0.00 
Age -0.0086 0.00 -0.0469 0.08 
Age Squared 0.0001 0.03 0.0004 0.12 
Female 0.0147 0.35 0.0433 0.41 
Child 0.0151 0.22 0.0254 0.54 
Female*Child -0.0178 0.28 -0.0359 0.49 
Living in a Couple -0.0128 0.38 -0.0242 0.57 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0056 0.75 -0.0221 0.69 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.0024 0.80 0.0035 0.90 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0050 0.73 0.0123 0.76 
Recent Training 0.0304 0.00 0.0927 0.04 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours 0.0018 0.85 0.0008 0.98 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0352 0.00 -0.0938 0.01 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0306 0.01 -0.0972 0.04 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0326 0.01 -0.1062 0.08 
Overeducated 0.0135 0.06 0.0359 0.11 
Public -0.0485 0.00 -0.1267 0.01 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0202 0.02 -0.0590 0.07 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0565 0.00 -0.1451 0.01 
    Professional -0.0466 0.00 -0.1223 0.02 
    Technicians -0.0416 0.00 -0.1078 0.01 
    Clerks -0.0541 0.00 -0.1430 0.02 
    Service -0.0352 0.01 -0.0993 0.06 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0429 0.01 -0.1054 0.06 
    Craft & Trades -0.0426 0.00 -0.1052 0.00 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0240 0.06 -0.0623 0.10 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0483 0.01 -0.1252 0.05 
    Manufacturing     -0.0333 0.04 -0.0971 0.11 
    Building 0.0504 0.04 0.1624 0.11 
    Market Services 0.0101 0.51 0.0278 0.52 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 -0.0101 0.62 -0.0192 0.73 
    1997 -0.0168 0.47 -0.0391 0.54 
    1998 0.0082 0.79 0.0565 0.55 
    1999 -0.0133 0.69 -0.0173 0.85 
    2000 -0.0050 0.90 0.0157 0.89 
    2001 -0.0148 0.75 -0.0068 0.96 
Region: (Ref: Ireland, excluding Dublin)     
    Dublin -0.0135 0.24 -0.0366 0.32 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.0059 0.29 -0.0229 0.35 
   
N 4,990 4,990 
Wald chi2 350.89 35.58 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.5354 
Log pseudolikelihood -1277.068 -1274.975 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1447  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 6.11: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Italy* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0000 1.00 
1ˆ    0.4532 0.69 
Age -0.0065 0.00 -0.0230 0.22 
Age Squared 0.0001 0.00 0.0002 0.26 
Female 0.0045 0.39 0.0085 0.45 
Child -0.0017 0.69 -0.0035 0.70 
Female*Child 0.0077 0.31 0.0149 0.39 
Living in a Couple -0.0011 0.83 -0.0016 0.88 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0081 0.24 -0.0156 0.34 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) -0.0039 0.25 -0.0088 0.55 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0104 0.12 0.0173 0.17 
Recent Training 0.0044 0.29 0.0076 0.34 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0005 0.88 -0.0005 0.94 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0006 0.86 -0.0019 0.82 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0053 0.09 -0.0099 0.20 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0080 0.01 -0.0151 0.14 
Overeducated 0.0100 0.00 0.0188 0.08 
Public 0.0034 0.55 0.0060 0.56 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0057 0.10 -0.0107 0.21 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0256 0.00 -0.0479 0.06 
    Professional -0.0241 0.00 -0.0448 0.04 
    Technicians -0.0112 0.03 -0.0211 0.14 
    Clerks -0.0242 0.00 -0.0456 0.06 
    Service -0.0133 0.01 -0.0255 0.17 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0208 0.00 -0.0402 0.18 
    Craft & Trades -0.0155 0.00 -0.0299 0.17 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0103 0.05 -0.0202 0.26 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.0347 0.00 0.0649 0.12 
    Manufacturing     0.0105 0.13 0.0205 0.31 
    Building 0.0404 0.00 0.0762 0.15 
    Market Services 0.0156 0.01 0.0287 0.09 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 0.0108 0.05 0.0191 0.09 
    1997 0.0311 0.00 0.0583 0.09 
    1998 0.0136 0.02 0.0247 0.08 
    1999 0.0074 0.24 0.0136 0.30 
    2000 0.0120 0.05 0.0222 0.15 
    2001 0.0158 0.03 0.0290 0.11 
Region: (Ref: Nord Ovest)     
    Lombardia 0.0060 0.41 0.0114 0.46 
    Nord Est 0.0094 0.23 0.0181 0.33 
    Emilia-Romagna 0.0106 0.24 0.0198 0.31 
    Centro  -0.0028 0.66 -0.0060 0.67 
    Lazio -0.0016 0.87 -0.0025 0.90 
    Abruzzo-Molise -0.0193 0.02 -0.0366 0.15 
    Campania -0.0177 0.27 -0.0331 0.33 
    Sud -0.0204 0.10 -0.0384 0.19 
    Sicilia -0.0156 0.34 -0.0296 0.39 
    Sardegna -0.0006 0.98 -0.0296 0.98 
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0008 0.42 0.0027 0.45 
   
N 21,497 21,497 
Wald chi2 500.63 34.05 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.9036 
Log pseudolikelihood -3689.2749 -3689.1539 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0830  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates are positive. 
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Table 6.12: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for The Netherlands* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0022 0.85 
1ˆ    0.0000 0.99 
Age -0.0049 0.09 -0.0046 0.14 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.93 0.0000 0.99 
Female 0.0069 0.61 0.0068 0.61 
Child 0.0020 0.82 0.0019 0.83 
Female*Child -0.0123 0.43 -0.0118 0.46 
Living in a Couple -0.0036 0.76 -0.0035 0.77 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0013 0.94 -0.0017 0.92 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) -0.0068 0.50 -0.0071 0.50 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) -0.0046 0.68 -0.0050 0.67 
Recent Training 0.0192 0.03 0.0190 0.03 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0032 0.70 -0.0031 0.70 
Satisfied with Working Times -0.0104 0.26 -0.0104 0.27 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0508 0.00 -0.0508 0.00 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0170 0.05 -0.0167 0.05 
Overeducated 0.0356 0.00 0.0353 0.00 
Public -0.0013 0.90 -0.0009 0.93 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0240 0.00 -0.0239 0.00 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0004 0.99 -0.0005 0.98 
    Professional 0.0197 0.31 0.0198 0.31 
    Technicians 0.0132 0.48 0.0132 0.48 
    Clerks 0.0022 0.91 0.0020 0.92 
    Service 0.0191 0.38 0.0186 0.39 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery 0.0153 0.61 0.0153 0.61 
    Craft & Trades -0.0061 0.75 -0.0063 0.74 
    Plant & Machine Operators 0.0147 0.49 0.0141 0.51 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities -0.0015 0.94 -0.0007 0.97 
    Manufacturing     -0.0034 0.79 -0.0027 0.84 
    Building 0.0237 0.15 0.0239 0.16 
    Market Services 0.0239 0.02 0.0242 0.04 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1997)     
    1998 0.0321 0.00 0.0324 0.01 
    1999 0.0251 0.12 0.0252 0.13 
    2000 0.0561 0.01 0.0565 0.01 
    2001 0.0542 0.03 0.0547 0.04 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0069 0.36 0.0071 0.36 
   
N 9,251 9,251 
Wald chi2 379.81 127.16 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -2691.562 -2691.535 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0812  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
A regional breakdown is not available in the ECHP for The Netherlands so the national unemployment 
rate is included in the model. The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates 
are positive. 
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Table 6.13: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Portugal* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0054 0.30 
1ˆ    0.7413 0.00 
Age -0.0050 0.00 -0.0419 0.00 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.06 0.0003 0.03 
Female -0.0005 0.94 0.0016 0.96 
Child -0.0036 0.43 -0.0150 0.51 
Female*Child 0.0077 0.31 0.0232 0.50 
Living in a Couple 0.0082 0.11 0.0317 0.19 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0147 0.05 -0.0637 0.09 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) -0.0090 0.08 -0.0491 0.09 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.0030 0.77 0.0116 0.79 
Recent Training 0.0205 0.00 0.0777 0.01 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0019 0.66 -0.0152 0.47 
Satisfied with Working Times 0.0010 0.84 0.0078 0.73 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment 0.0034 0.46 0.0201 0.37 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0111 0.01 -0.0553 0.02 
Overeducated 0.0052 0.09 0.0268 0.10 
Public -0.0153 0.03 -0.0629 0.04 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0157 0.00 -0.0730 0.00 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0132 0.06 -0.0681 0.11 
    Professional -0.0066 0.53 -0.0422 0.36 
    Technicians -0.0144 0.05 -0.0694 0.06 
    Clerks -0.0219 0.00 -0.1005 0.00 
    Service -0.0120 0.03 -0.0621 0.05 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0153 0.06 -0.0735 0.06 
    Craft & Trades -0.0151 0.00 -0.0825 0.02 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0057 0.36 -0.0404 0.22 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.0171 0.13 0.0796 0.14 
    Manufacturing     0.0050 0.56 0.0392 0.37 
    Building 0.0280 0.01 0.1584 0.02 
    Market Services 0.0119 0.11 0.0602 0.10 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 0.0223 0.00 0.1009 0.01 
    1997 0.0253 0.00 0.1125 0.01 
    1998 0.0203 0.00 0.0857 0.01 
    1999 0.0222 0.01 0.0987 0.02 
    2000 0.0422 0.00 0.1919 0.00 
    2001 0.0337 0.00 0.1442 0.00 
Region: (Ref: Norte)     
    Centro 0.0081 0.10 0.0367 0.15 
    Lisboa e Vale do Tejo -0.0110 0.12 -0.0452 0.19 
    Alentejo 0.0162 0.13 0.1046 0.10 
    Algarve 0.0070 0.28 0.0331 0.31 
    Açores -0.0255 0.00 -0.1141 0.00 
    Madeira -0.0344 0.00 -0.1517 0.01 
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0039 0.03 0.0248 0.06 
   
N 21,105 21,105 
Wald chi2 618.19 70.88 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0035 
Log pseudolikelihood -4456.2236 -4450.5016 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0868  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 6.14: Marginal Effects from Models of Job Change for Spain* 
 Standard Probit Model Misclassification Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect  
P>|Z| 
Marginal 
Effect 
P>|Z| 
0ˆ    0.0000 1.00 
1ˆ    0.5816 0.00 
Age -0.0040 0.05 -0.0276 0.01 
Age Squared 0.0000 0.90 0.0001 0.26 
Female -0.0010 0.91 -0.0138 0.61 
Child -0.0135 0.04 -0.0289 0.14 
Female*Child 0.0349 0.01 0.0806 0.02 
Living in a Couple -0.0085 0.29 -0.0345 0.19 
Female*Living in a Couple -0.0144 0.21 -0.0246 0.48 
Education: (Ref: Education –low (ISCED 0-2))     
Education – medium (ISCED 3) -0.0225 0.00 -0.0642 0.00 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) -0.0260 0.00 -0.0795 0.00 
Recent Training 0.0138 0.02 0.0314 0.06 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours -0.0022 0.67 -0.0060 0.68 
Satisfied with Working Times 0.0033 0.53 0.0117 0.43 
Satisfied with Working Conditions/Environment -0.0081 0.12 -0.0245 0.11 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting -0.0266 0.00 -0.0798 0.00 
Overeducated 0.0141 0.00 0.0422 0.00 
Public -0.0084 0.43 -0.0247 0.39 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0229 0.00 -0.0692 0.00 
Occupation of Origin: (Ref: Elementary Occ‟s)     
    Manager -0.0636 0.00 -0.1773 0.00 
    Professional -0.0452 0.00 -0.1340 0.00 
    Technicians -0.0449 0.00 -0.1367 0.00 
    Clerks -0.0552 0.00 -0.1601 0.00 
    Service -0.0341 0.00 -0.1162 0.00 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery -0.0674 0.00 -0.1849 0.00 
    Craft & Trades -0.0287 0.00 -0.0984 0.00 
    Plant & Machine Operators -0.0208 0.01 -0.0774 0.01 
Sector of Origin: (Ref: Non Market Services)     
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.0648 0.00 0.1241 0.01 
    Manufacturing     0.0092 0.47 0.0113 0.74 
    Building 0.0739 0.00 0.2215 0.00 
    Market Services 0.0115 0.30 0.0171 0.56 
Year Dummies: (Ref: 1995)     
    1996 -0.0011 0.90 -0.0030 0.91 
    1997 -0.0047 0.59 -0.0129 0.60 
    1998 0.0295 0.01 0.0785 0.01 
    1999 0.0355 0.02 0.0905 0.03 
    2000 0.0413 0.05 0.1050 0.07 
    2001 0.0600 0.02 0.1531 0.03 
Region: (Ref: Noroeste)     
    Noreste 0.0124 0.30 0.0244 0.44 
    Comunidad de Madrid 0.0212 0.09 0.0547 0.11 
    Centro 0.0070 0.55 0.0144 0.66 
    Este 0.0251 0.03 0.0629 0.04 
    Sur 0.0223 0.29 0.0674 0.25 
    Canarias 0.0436 0.01 0.1061 0.02 
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0018 0.33 0.0057 0.44 
   
N 16,337 16,337 
Wald chi2 993.26 193.30 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood -4665.5915 -4655.6772 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1288  
* Notes: Standard Errors are adjusted to take account of the fact that there are multiple observations on 
the same people. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
The square root of 0 and 1 are estimated to ensure that the estimates are positive. 
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Tables 6.3 to 6.14 provide estimates of the misclassification probabilities for each 
country. The estimated probability of misclassification for job stays, 
0 , is very 
similar across countries and for all countries the estimate is less than 1 per cent. In 
contrast to the estimates of 
0 , the estimated probability of misclassification for job 
changes, 
1 , is far greater and is highly significant in several countries.
70
 Significance 
tests on 
0  and 1  can be used as tests of misclassification.  For Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain the Hausman et al. estimator indicates significant 
misclassification. The range of estimates for 
1 , where it is significant, is from 58 per 
cent in Ireland and Spain to 81 per cent in Greece. The estimate of 
1  for Ireland in 
the previous chapter using the LIS data was 61 per cent (see Table 5.6) which is very 
close to the estimate using the ECHP version of the LIS data. Although there is a 
substantial range in the estimates of 
1 , the results indicate that for several countries 
the true number of job changes is being dramatically undercounted.  
 
To put these estimates of 
1  in context, Table 6.15 shows the average (calculated) 
mobility rates for each country that were used in estimating the individual country 
models and the implied true mobility rates. 
 
Table 6.15: True Mobility Rates Derived from Estimates of 
1  
 Average Mobility Rates Implied True Mobility Rate 
Austria 5.0% same 
Belgium 5.8% same 
Denmark 10.6% same 
Finland 7.6% same 
France 3.8% same 
Germany 8.2% 14.4% 
Greece 4.3% 7.8% 
Ireland 8.9% 14.0% 
Italy 4.6% same 
The Netherlands 9.6% same 
Portugal 6.2% 10.7% 
Spain 10.1% 16.0% 
* Note: Estimates for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy and The Netherlands are not 
significant so we reject the model that controls for misclassification for these countries. 
 
Table 6.16 ranks each of the countries from those with the lowest to the highest 
inconsistency rates observed in the data (taken from Table 6.2). From the table, 
                                                          
70
 The estimates of 
1  are not significant for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, The 
Netherlands and Italy.  
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countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain display the highest level of 
inconsistencies in reported start dates for recent jobs and these countries also have 
high and significant estimates of 
1 . The table also shows that the estimates of 1  for 
countries with lower inconsistency rates observed in the data such as France, Finland, 
Belgium and Austria are not significant.
71
 However for Germany, the level of 
recorded inconsistencies within recent jobs is low and yet the estimate of 
1  is large 
and highly significant. This is surprising given the descriptive analysis in Section 6.3. 
For Germany some of the explanatory variables, such as overeducation, that are used 
in the country models and that are generally important in explaining job changes are 
missing. Also, the effect of age on job mobility is small and insignificant in the model 
for Germany in contrast to the models for the other countries. As shown in Section 
4.3.2, the misclassification probabilities are identified off cases with strong negative 
and strong positive values of the 'ix  distribution and it may be the case that the true 
index does not reach sufficiently large values to capture the rate of misclassification in 
the data.
72
 
 
Table 6.16: Inconsistencies in Job Start Dates and Estimates of 
1 ^ 
 % of „Recent‟ Jobs that have 
Inconsistencies in Starting Dates  
1ˆ  (Misclassification Rate for Job 
Changes) 
France  2.00% Not significant 
Germany  3.60% 0.752*** 
Finland  4.20% Not significant 
Belgium  5.20% Not significant 
Austria  5.50% Not significant 
Denmark  6.70% Not significant 
The Netherlands 7.20% Not significant 
Italy  10.60% Not significant 
Portugal  11.00% 0.741*** 
Ireland  16.70% 0.579*** 
Spain  17.80% 0.582*** 
Greece  18.30% 0.811*** 
^ Note: In the table *** denotes significant at the 1% level 
 
                                                          
71
 The results for both the probit and misclassification models for Finland are identical, as the estimates 
of the misclassification probabilities are zero. It seems likely that this is a case of lack of identification 
of the misclassification probabilities. The analysis of the inconsistencies in reported job starting dates 
for Finland revealed that the rate of inconsistencies were relatively low so there may not be a sufficient 
number of misclassified cases with strong negative and strong positive values of the 'ix  distribution 
to identify the misclassification rates. 
72
 A range of alternative models were run for Germany. A series of models were run that allowed the 
misclassification probabilities to depend on different age groups and also on gender. In addition, 
separate models were run for men and women and for younger and older workers. In each case, either 
the models failed to achieve convergence or the results were very similar to the estimated 
misclassification rates reported in Table 6.8. 
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For the countries where misclassification is been found to be significant, comparing 
the estimates from the probit and Hausman et al. models shows the impact of 
misclassification on the marginal effects of each variable. The results indicate that 
ignoring misclassification leads to diminished covariate effects. The estimates from 
the probit model have much lower standard errors, implying that not only are the 
probit estimates biased, but also that the precision of the estimates is overstated.  
 
The results show that the same factors tend to be important in explaining job mobility, 
although there are some differences across countries. In the theoretical and empirical 
literature on job mobility, age is an important determinant of job change. Younger 
workers are more likely to change jobs as they have less knowledge of the labour 
market and their own preferences and abilities for different jobs. As age and tenure 
are correlated, they are also more likely to have lower tenure. Older workers with long 
tenures are more likely to have acquired job specific human capital, which they may 
be rewarded for, and so younger workers may have less to lose in monetary terms by 
changing jobs. The results show a strong negative relationship between age and the 
probability of job change across countries. When we control for misclassification, this 
negative relationship is more marked. For example, in the probit model of job change 
for Portugal, the marginal effect of age tells us that each additional year reduces the 
probability of changing jobs by 0.5 percentage points. However, the results from the 
model that controls for misclassification indicate that an additional year reduces the 
probability of changing jobs by 4.2 percentage points. The square of age is also 
included in the country models to capture the fact that age may have a non-linear 
effect on the probability of job mobility. The positive estimates of the squared term 
imply that as age increases its negative effect on the predicted probability of changing 
jobs diminishes. 
 
The models of job mobility have a range of individual controls that include household 
structure and personal characteristics. We may expect women to be more likely to 
change jobs as they have a weaker attachment to the labour force but the results do 
not indicate any significant gender difference in the probability of changing jobs. The 
results indicate that Finland is only country where there are gender differences in the 
probability of changing jobs. Workers may be less likely to change jobs if they are 
more constrained by non-market variables, such as having children or living in a 
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couple, and we would expect these effects to be stronger for women. However, the 
evidence for these effects is weak. The marginal effect of having children in the 
household is small and insignificant (apart from in Belgium), implying that the 
presence of children in the household does not affect the probability of changing jobs. 
A gender and children interaction term is included to capture the possible differential 
effect of children on mobility. The effect is not significant across countries with the 
exceptions of Belgium, Spain and Greece. In Belgium and Spain, women with 
children are more likely to change jobs while in Greece the effect is negative. The 
results also indicate that being married, or living in a couple does not affect the 
likelihood of changing jobs. Overall, household structure does not play an important 
role in explaining job mobility. 
 
The relationship between general human capital which is proxied by the education 
level is weak across countries, although a negative relationship is found in Spain and a 
positive one in Germany. For both countries, the impact is more marked in models 
that control for misclassification although for Germany, the Hausman et al. estimates 
are not significant. The occupation variables may also capture human capital and we 
expect a negative relationship between higher occupational attainment and job 
mobility, although this result does not hold across all countries and occupations. 
Workers who have undergone recent training are more likely to change jobs in many 
countries apart from Greece, Finland and France but the effects for these latter two 
countries are not significant.  
 
The job mobility models also contain variables that try to capture some job and firm 
characteristics. A variable to capture overskilling, meaning that workers report they 
have skills and qualifications necessary to do a more demanding job, is included in the 
models as it may signify a poor job match. The results show a positive relationship 
between being overeducated and job mobility. For example, in Spain workers who 
report that they are overeducated are 1.4 per cent more likely to change jobs using the 
probit estimates. In the model that controls for misclassification, the effect of being 
overskilled is 3 times greater. A firm size effect is included to capture the fact that 
those working in a large firm may have more alternative employment opportunities 
within the firm and so are less likely to change employers. The results indicate that 
workers in large firms have a lower probability of changing jobs. This negative effect 
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is consistent across countries and, as before, is more marked in the misclassification 
models.  
 
A range of satisfaction variables are included to try to capture aspects of the job and 
work place such as the organisation of work, conditions in the workplace etc. The 
satisfaction variables are dummy variables constructed from responses to a range of 
questions about how satisfied a worker is with various aspects of their present job. 
These factors are typically unobserved so these subjective measures may provide 
some useful information. Some of these variables may also reveal the workers‟ 
assessment of the quality of the match. Satisfaction is measured on a scale of 1 to 6, 
where 1 denotes not satisfied and 6 denotes fully satisfied. The dummy variables are 
equal to one when the rating is 4 or over. Although the marginal effects associated 
with these variables do not always have the expected sign, a negative relationship 
between these job satisfaction variables and mobility is evident across countries. 
 
Working in the public sector has a negative effect on job mobility in all countries, 
apart from Italy where the effect is positive but insignificant. As before, the marginal 
effects from the models that control for misclassification are much bigger in 
magnitude. The results also generally show that workers in the construction and 
market services sector are more likely to change jobs than those in the nonmarket 
services sector.  
 
Regional dummy variables and regional unemployment rates are included to control 
for factors such as access to alternative jobs and local labour market conditions. The 
unemployment rates are only significant in Portugal and Denmark and the sign of the 
impact differs across countries. We would expect the unemployment rate to have a 
negative effect on voluntary mobility and a positive effect on involuntary mobility. 
However, as these models do not distinguish between different types of mobility, the 
effect of local labour market conditions on overall mobility is ambiguous. 
 
Overall, apart from age, personal and household characteristics are generally not 
important in explaining the probability of job mobility, occupation and sector of 
origin have some role while firm and job characteristics have an important role in 
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explaining decisions to change jobs. The effects of these variables are much stronger 
in the models that control for misclassification.   
 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter finds that there is measurement error in responses to a question about 
tenure in the ECHP. Survey data on tenure are very often used to capture job changes. 
Given the extent of measurement error evident in the data it is likely that cases are 
misclassified as being job changes when truly no change has taken place and vice 
versa. An estimator developed by Hausman et al. (1998) is used to control for 
misclassification. The results indicate that, by ignoring misclassification, the true 
number of job changes is underestimated in several countries. 
 
The range of estimates for this undercounting of job changes varies across countries. 
The results indicate that the true number of job changes is underestimated by around 
58 per cent in Ireland and Spain while the comparable figure for Greece is 81 per cent. 
Countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain display a high level of 
inconsistencies in responses to the question about tenure and these countries also have 
high and significant estimates of misclassification.  
 
In addition, the chapter finds that similar factors are important in determining job 
mobility across countries. Apart from age, personal and household characteristics are 
generally not important in explaining the probability of job mobility; occupation and 
sector of origin have some role while firm and job characteristics have an important 
role in explaining decisions to change jobs. The effect of these variables on the 
probability of changing jobs is much stronger in the models that control for 
misclassification.   
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Appendix Table 6.1: Revolving Balanced Panels, Number of Workers and Job Changes* 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 AUSTRIA 
Revolving Balanced Panel  3,045 3,029 2,992 2,998 2,985 2,963 2,950 
No. of  Workers  1,888 1,945 1,947 1,956 2,012 2,039 
No. of Job Changes  108 104 107 105 98 112 
Job Mobility Rate  5.7% 5.3% 5.5% 5.4% 4.9% 5.5% 
         BELGIUM 
Revolving Balanced Panel  3,121 3,098 3,095 3,088 3,107   
No. of  Workers 1,680 1,722 1,712 1,688 1,702   
No. of Job Changes 54 90 83 92 95   
Job Mobility Rate 3.2% 5.2% 4.8% 5.5% 5.6%   
         DENMARK 
Revolving Balanced Panel  2,191 2,149 2,106 2,084 2,082 2,081 2,078 
No. of  Workers 1,590 1,613 1,579 1,578 1,621 1,639 1,640 
No. of Job Changes 160 180 203 201 155 199 193 
Job Mobility Rate 10.1% 11.2% 12.9% 12.7% 9.6% 12.1% 11.8% 
         FINLAND 
Revolving Balanced Panel   3,189 3,084 3,154 3,147 3,208 3,251 
No. of  Workers   2,090 2,088 2,131 2,161 2,196 
No. of Job Changes   115 204 149 173 171 
Job Mobility Rate   5.5% 9.8% 7.0% 8.0% 7.8% 
         FRANCE 
Revolving Balanced Panel  5,812 5,738 5,690 5,663 5,671 5,704 5,780 
No. of  Workers 3,592 3,804 3,500 3,468 3,679 3,695 3,780 
No. of Job Changes 127 136 113 159 172 203 229 
Job Mobility Rate 3.5% 3.6% 3.2% 4.6% 4.7% 5.5% 6.1% 
         GERMANY 
Revolving Balanced Panel  6,876 6,812 6,741 6,674 6,613 6,611 6,607 
No. of  Workers 4,169 4,372 4,307 4,250 4,281 4,434 4,442 
No. of Job Changes 388 366 355 305 343 360 422 
Job Mobility Rate 9.3% 8.4% 8.2% 7.2% 8.0% 8.1% 9.5% 
         GREECE 
Revolving Balanced Panel  5,013 4,942 4,870 4,850 4,834 4,907 4,939 
No. of  Workers 2,637 2,801 2,757 2,801 2,803 2,816 2,878 
No. of Job Changes 99 146 267 95 100 69 54 
Job Mobility Rate 3.8% 5.2% 9.7% 3.4% 3.6% 2.5% 1.9% 
         IRELAND 
Revolving Balanced Panel  2,470 2,430 2,387 2,355 2,365 2,365 2,422 
No. of  Workers 1,217 1,264 1,297 1,366 1,433 1,466 1,511 
No. of Job Changes 84 90 111 149 157 202 161 
Job Mobility Rate 6.9% 7.1% 8.6% 10.9% 11.0% 13.8% 10.7% 
         ITALY 
Revolving Balanced Panel  8,062 8,045 8,028 8,008 7,984 7,982 7,980 
No. of  Workers 3,941 4,068 4,031 4,010 4,127 4,218 4,273 
No. of Job Changes 140 155 216 193 162 183 210 
Job Mobility Rate 3.6% 3.8% 5.4% 4.8% 3.9% 4.3% 4.9% 
         THE NETHERLANDS 
Revolving Balanced Panel  4,012 3,949 3,896 3,843 3,808 3,806 3,862 
No. of  Workers 2,210 2,392 2,384 2,402 2,455 2,476 2,553 
No. of Job Changes 153 148 163 232 200 283 269 
Job Mobility Rate 6.9% 6.2% 6.8% 9.7% 8.1% 11.4% 10.5% 
         PORTUGAL 
Revolving Balanced Panel  5,582 5,563 5,549 5,574 5,605 5,651 5,724 
No. of  Workers 3,379 3,635 3,670 3,691 3,794 3,836 3,923 
No. of Job Changes 150 206 211 216 209 282 243 
Job Mobility Rate 4.4% 5.7% 5.7% 5.9% 5.5% 7.4% 6.2% 
         SPAIN 
Revolving Balanced Panel  5,956 5,900 5,884 5,892 5,968 6,057 6,084 
No. of  Workers 2,556 2,619 2,629 2,752 2,918 3,096 3,236 
No. of Job Changes 179 201 187 307 328 349 412 
Job Mobility Rate 7.0% 7.7% 7.1% 11.2% 11.2% 11.3% 12.7% 
*Note: Number of workers refers to number of workers employed in consecutive two-year periods  
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Appendix Table 6.2: Revolving Balanced Panels and the Number of Cases where the Year that a 
Worker’s Job Started is Missing  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 AUSTRIA 
Revolving Balanced Panel 3,045 3,029 2,992 2,998 2,985 2,963 2,950 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
169 180 187 194 197 199 196 
 2,876 2,849 2,805 2,804 2,788 2,764 2,754 
         BELGIUM 
Revolving Balanced Panel 3,121 3,098 3,095 3,088 3,107   
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
194 194 192 191 191   
 2,927 2,904 2,903 2,897 2,916   
         DENMARK 
Revolving Balanced Panel 2,191 2,149 2,106 2,084 2,082 2,081 2,078 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
67 70 71 72 72 74 73 
 2,124 2,079 2,035 2,012 2,010 2,007 2,005 
         FINLAND 
Revolving Balanced Panel  3,189 3,084 3,154 3,147 3,208 3,251 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
 156 156 166 171 172 171 
  3,033 2,928 2,988 2,976 3,036 3,080 
         FRANCE 
Revolving Balanced Panel 5,812 5,738 5,690 5,663 5,671 5,704 5,780 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
486 495 490 489 475 466 461 
 5,326 5,243 5,200 5,174 5,196 5,238 5,319 
         GERMANY 
Revolving Balanced Panel 6,876 6,812 6,741 6,674 6,613 6,611 6,607 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
1,021 1,045 1,050 1,051 1,046 1,050 1,045 
 5,855 5,767 5,691 5,623 5,567 5,561 5,562 
         GREECE 
Revolving Balanced Panel 5,013 4,942 4,870 4,850 4,834 4,907 4,939 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
487 486 484 481 465 462 451 
 4,526 4,456 4,386 4,369 4,369 4,445 4,488 
         IRELAND 
Revolving Balanced Panel 2,470 2,430 2,387 2,355 2,365 2,365 2,422 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
132 133 133 133 128 124 126 
 2,338 2,297 2,254 2,222 2,237 2,241 2,296 
         ITALY 
Revolving Balanced Panel 8,062 8,045 8,028 8,008 7,984 7,982 7,980 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
938 959 963 969 963 957 944 
 7,124 7,086 7,065 7,039 7,021 7,025 7,036 
         THE NETHERLANDS 
Revolving Balanced Panel 4,012 3,949 3,896 3,843 3,808 3,806 3,862 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
381 384 387 388 388 389 389 
 3,631 3,565 3,509 3,455 3,420 3,417 3,473 
         PORTUGAL 
Revolving Balanced Panel 5,582 5,563 5,549 5,574 5,605 5,651 5,724 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
446 445 437 433 423 408 401 
 5,136 5,118 5,112 5,141 5,182 5,243 5,323 
         SPAIN 
Revolving Balanced Panel 5,956 5,900 5,884 5,892 5,968 6,057 6,084 
less cases where starting year with 
employer is missing for workers 
528 534 541 540 542 540 530 
 5,428 5,366 5,343 5,352 5,426 5,517 5,554 
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Appendix 6A: Differences in Irish Data between LIS and ECHP 
As noted in Section 6.2, the ECHP data for Ireland is generated from the LIS data but 
is coded differently by Eurostat to ensure some standardisation in variables across 
countries. Appendix Table 6.3 shows the number of jobs that are reported to be recent 
(i.e. that are reported to have begun, at the earliest, two years before the person joined 
the survey) and that are observed more than once over the survey period (so we have 
at least two starting dates to compare within jobs).
73
 This data comes from the ECHP 
version of the Irish data.
74
 The table shows that 16.7 per cent of these recent jobs have 
an inconsistency in reported starting dates.   
 
Appendix Table 6.3: Number of Recent Jobs Observed over the Sample Period using ECHP data  
 
No. of „Recent‟ Jobs 
that are Observed at 
least twice 
% of „Recent‟ Jobs that 
have Inconsistencies in 
Starting Dates 
Ireland 830 16.7% 
 
Appendix Table 6.4 shows the number of recent jobs using the LIS data. It uses two 
definitions of a „recent‟ job. The first counts the number of jobs where the starting 
year associated with the job the first time it is observed is at least 1994 (e.g. this 
implies that a job observed for the first time in 1995 is counted as recent if the starting 
date associated with the job is 1994 or later). The second measure counts the number 
of observations where the starting year associated with the job the first time it is 
observed is at least 1993. Both measures produce a similar estimate of the number of 
recent jobs to what is found in the ECHP data. However, there is a dramatic difference 
in the percentage of these recent jobs that have an inconsistency in reported starting 
dates. Using the LIS data, around 70 per cent of recent jobs have an inconsistency in 
reported starting dates, whereas the ECHP version of the Irish data indicates that the 
inconsistency rate is closer to 17 per cent. 
                                                          
73
 The reason „recent‟ jobs in the ECHP data are examined is that full starting dates (i.e. month and 
year) are only recorded if the person reports that they started working with their current employer at the 
earliest two years before they joined the survey. 
74
 This table repeats the data for Ireland from Table 6.2 in the body of the chapter. 
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Appendix Table 6.4: Number of Recent Jobs Observed over the Sample Period using LIS data  
 
No. of „Recent‟ Jobs 
that are Observed at 
least twice 
% of „Recent‟ Jobs that 
have Inconsistencies in 
Starting Dates 
No. jobs where the start year in the first year the 
job is observed is at least 1994 
801 69.8% (or 559 jobs) 
No. jobs where the start year in the first year the 
job is observed is at least 1993 
858 70.7% (or 607 jobs) 
 
Part of the difference in inconsistency rates between the two datasets can be 
explained. The ECHP only records full starting dates when the date is at the earliest 
two years before the person joined the survey (which for most people will be 
1993/1994). If a person were to dramatically underestimate the year that they started 
working in their current job, then this starting date would not be recorded in the 
ECHP.
75
 Appendix Table 6.5 shows the number of recent jobs in the LIS data that 
have an inconsistency in starting dates, where in at least one year the starting date is 
significantly underestimated (i.e. it is before 1994 or 1993). Around 17 per cent of 
recent jobs with an inconsistency (or 12-13 per cent of all recent jobs) have an 
inconsistency where tenure is significantly underestimated in at least one year where 
the job is observed.  
 
Appendix Table 6.5: Number of Recent Jobs Observed over the Sample Period using LIS data 
that have an Inconsistency in Starting Dates 
 
No. of „Recent‟ Jobs 
that have an 
Inconsistency in 
Starting Dates 
Number of „Recent‟ Jobs 
that have an inconsistency 
in starting dates where 
tenure is significantly 
underestimated in at least 
one year 
No. jobs where the start year in the first year the 
job is observed is at least 1994 
559 105 
No. jobs where the start year in the first year the 
job is observed is at least 1993 
607 102 
 
This type of inconsistency does not happen in the ECHP data (the earliest full starting 
date is January 1993 for jobs in the ECHP dataset) which may indicate that the 
country data is „fixed‟/‟smoothed‟ when it is being coded for the ECHP. Assuming 
that the LIS accurately records the answers that people give, this may indicate that the 
inconsistency rate in the ECHP is being underestimated. 
                                                          
75
 For example, suppose we observe someone in 1995 and 1996 and in 1995 they report that they 
started working in their job in 1994 (i.e. it is a recent job). However in 1996 they could report that they 
started working in their job in 1990. This value will be recorded in LIS but not in the ECHP dataset (or 
the response may be „fixed‟ in the ECHP dataset). 
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Appendix Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics* 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany 
 Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Age 38.6 10.5 38.8 8.7 41.1 9.7 41.1 9.5 40.2 9.2 39.2 10.4 
Age Squared 1602.2 810.9 1579.4 692.2 1780.5 793.7 1781.1 773.2 1701.8 739.8 1642.9 827.0 
Female 0.35 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.48 
Child 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.50 
Female*Child 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.32 
Living in a Couple 0.70 0.46 0.81 0.40 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.39 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43 
Education – low (ISCED 0-2) 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.40 0.35 0.48 0.18 0.38 
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.74 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.57 0.50 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.07 0.25 0.44 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.25 0.44 
Recent Training 0.31 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.14 0.34 0.16 0.36 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours 0.83 0.37 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.35 0.76 0.42 0.54 0.50   
Satisfied with Working Times 0.90 0.30 0.83 0.38 0.88 0.32 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.38   
Satisfied with Working 
Conditions/Environment 
0.93 0.26 0.79 0.41 0.87 0.33 0.82 0.38 0.78 0.41   
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting 0.85 0.35 0.81 0.39 0.85 0.35 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.37   
Overeducated 0.59 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.50 0.50   
Public 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.48 0.18 0.39 
Number of Employees > 50 0.40 0.49 0.52 0.50   0.34 0.47   0.45 0.50 
Occupation of Origin:             
    Manager 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 
    Professional 0.04 0.20 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 
    Technicians 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 
    Clerks 0.13 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.37 0.10 0.31 
    Service 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery 0.14 0.34 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12 
    Craft & Trades 0.19 0.39 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.25 0.43 
    Plant & Machine Operators 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 
    Elementary Occuoations 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 
Sector of Origin:             
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.17 0.37 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.33 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 
    Manufacturing     0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.35 0.48 
    Building 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.31 
    Market Services 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.46 
    Non Market Services 0.21 0.41 0.27 0.45 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.18 0.38 
Local Unemployment Rate 3.73 1.16 6.35 2.14 5.75 1.67 9.35 3.05 10.24 2.36 6.32 2.73 
* Note: A regional breakdown is not available in the ECHP for Denmark or The Netherlands so the figures in the table refer to the national unemployment rate. The overeducation and 
satisfaction variables are not available for Germany as either the relevant questions were not asked or the information is not available for other reasons.  Data on firm size for Denmark and 
France are not included in the table as these variables are not used in the country models because they would dramatically reduce the sample size. 
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Appendix Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics cont’d* 
 Greece Ireland Italy The Netherlands Portugal Spain 
 Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Age 39.9 10.4 38.6 10.9 39.3 10.0 39.3 10.0 38.5 11.0 38.9 10.4 
Age Squared 1697.8 839.0 1609.1 859.3 1644.8 799.0 1644.
8 
799.0 1601.7 864.4 1619.6 819.3 
Female 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.29 0.46 
Child 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Female*Child 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.33 
Living in a Couple 0.75 0.43 0.66 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.70 0.46 
Female*Living in a Couple 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.38 
Education – low (ISCED 0-2) 0.51 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.82 0.38 0.54 0.50 
Education – medium (ISCED 3) 0.31 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.11 0.32 0.20 0.40 
Education – high (ISCED 5-7) 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.25 0.26 0.44 
Recent Training 0.05 0.22 0.21 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.40 
Satisfied with Number of Working Hours 0.52 0.50 0.82 0.39 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.76 0.43 0.60 0.49 
Satisfied with Working Times 0.54 0.50 0.87 0.34 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.82 0.38 0.70 0.46 
Satisfied with Working 
Conditions/Environment 
0.54 0.50 0.88 0.33 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.85 0.36 0.74 0.44 
Satisfied with Distance to Job/Commuting 0.71 0.46 0.88 0.32 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.82 0.38 0.73 0.45 
Overeducated 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.50 
Public 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 
Number of Employees > 50 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.31 0.46 
Occupation of Origin:             
    Manager 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29 
    Professional 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.31 
    Technicians 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 
    Clerks 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 
    Service 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 
    Skilled Ag. & Fishery 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.25 
    Craft & Trades 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 
    Plant & Machine Operators 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.31 
    Elementary Occuoations 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 
Sector of Origin:             
    Agriculture, Mining and Utilities 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.31 
    Manufacturing     0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 
    Building 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 
    Market Services 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.42 0.49 
    Non Market Services 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 
Local Unemployment Rate 10.19 2.51 7.13 2.73 14.50 8.75 14.50 8.75 4.47 1.87 17.74 5.84 
* Note: A regional breakdown is not available in the ECHP for Denmark or The Netherlands so the figures in the table refer to the national unemployment rate. The overeducation and 
satisfaction variables are not available for Germany as either the relevant questions were not asked or the information is not available for other reasons.  Data on firm size for Denmark and 
France are not included in the table as these variables are not used in the country models because they would dramatically reduce the sample size. 
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7. Wage Changes and Job Changes:  
Estimation with Measurement Error in a Binary Regressor 
7.1 Introduction 
Having considered models of job mobility in earlier chapters, we now turn to 
examining the impact of job mobility on wage growth in Ireland. A number of 
theoretical models and empirical studies suggest that job mobility makes an important 
contribution to wage growth, particularly for younger workers. In the empirical 
literature on job mobility, researchers often rely on self-reported accounts of tenure to 
determine whether or not a job change has taken place. In chapters 5 and 6, I raised 
the possibility of substantial inconsistencies or measurement error in these 
responses.
76
  
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to control for misclassification in job changes 
in estimating the impact of job mobility on wage growth. The main results are that the 
probability of undercounting the true number of job changes is high and that ignoring 
misclassification leads to a significant downwards bias when estimating the wage 
effects of job mobility.  
 
The chapter also investigates whether heterogeneity in some unobserved individual 
characteristic can account for the effect of mobility on wages. In addition, it assesses 
whether there are differential wage impacts depending on the reason for job 
separation.  The chapter also addresses the possible two-way causation between job 
mobility and wage growth using an instrumental variables approach. It finds that the 
impact of job mobility on wage growth persists when we control for the endogeneity 
of job mobility.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 describes the econometric problems 
associated with estimating the impact of job mobility on wage growth. It also reviews 
                                                          
76
 See also Brown and Light (1992).   
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the effect measurement error in a binary explanatory variable has on OLS estimates 
and, in particular, discusses an approach to control for misclassification in a binary 
explanatory variable. Section 7.3 provides some descriptive statistics on wage growth 
and job mobility. Section 7.4 presents estimation results and Section 7.5 concludes. 
 
7.2 Econometric Approach 
The focus of this chapter is to estimate the impact of changing jobs on wage growth. 
Assuming a linear relationship, the standard model for estimation is: 
 
  itititit xmw  
*log                   (7.1) 
 
where itw  is the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i at time t, 
*
itm  is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a job change has taken place between t-1 and t, 
itx  is a vector of personal, job and firm characteristics and it  is a random component 
that is mean zero and is uncorrelated with *
itm  and itx . The key parameter of interest, 
 , captures the average percent difference in wage growth between job changers and 
job stayers adjusted for worker and job characteristics. Pooled OLS estimation of 
(7.1) is likely to produce biased estimates. There are three main sources of bias 
namely unobserved heterogeneity across workers, the endogeneity of job mobility and 
measurement error in capturing actual job changes. The first two issues have been 
tackled in the empirical literature and the main contribution of this chapter is to 
control for measurement error in job mobility status when estimating the impact of job 
mobility on wage growth. This section describes each of these three problems and 
also the empirical strategy adopted in the chapter. 
7.2.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
There may be unobserved factors that affect both wage growth and the decision to 
change jobs and this can lead to bias in the parameter estimates. Intuitively, we want 
to compare the wage growth of a job changer with what they would have received had 
they stayed in their job. The estimate of   from (7.1) captures the difference in wage 
growth between job changers and job stayers. This is unlikely to provide an accurate 
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measure of the effect of mobility, if the average wage growth of stayers does not 
accurately reflect the average wage growth job changers would have received if they 
had stayed in their jobs  For example, in the mover-stayer model (Blumen et al. 
(1955)) described in Chapter 2, we may expect stayers to experience higher wage 
growth than job changers because they have some underlying personal characteristic 
that makes them more likely to stay in their job which also makes them more 
productive, which leads to higher wage growth.  Therefore, the mover-stayer model 
suggests the estimated coefficient of the effect of mobility on wage growth from (7.1) 
may be biased downwards.  
 
Several techniques are used in the empirical literature to overcome this problem. One 
approach suggested by Bartel and Borjas (1981) and developed by Mincer (1986) is to 
use a proxy for the wage growth job changers would have obtained had they not 
changed jobs. Mincer proposed using the wage growth of those who do not change 
jobs in the current period but who change jobs in the following period as the proxy. 
The returns to mobility are then measured as the difference between the wage growth 
of workers who change jobs in the current period and the wage growth of workers 
who do not change jobs in the current period but do change jobs in the following 
period. This approach has been used by Abbott and Beach (1994), Campbell (2001) 
and Keith and McWilliams (1999). The key assumption of this approach is that 
workers who stay in their job in the initial period and who change jobs in the 
subsequent period are more similar, in terms of unobservable characteristics, to those 
who change jobs in the initial period than workers who stay in their jobs in both 
periods.
77
  
 
In more recent empirical work, because of the availability of panel data, the issue of 
unobserved heterogeneity has been dealt with in a fixed effects estimation framework. 
This involves explicitly including unobserved heterogeneity into the regression model 
as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
77
 Another approach in the literature is to estimate separate equations for job movers and stayers, 
usually with a correction for sample selection bias associated with job mobility status. This approach 
has been used by Borjas and Rosen (1980), Holmlund (1984), Kidd (1991), Marshall and Zarkin (1987) 
and Simpson (1990).  
 162 
  itititit xmw  
*log  
 
where itiit                   (7.2) 
 
The error component has two distinct parts: the first part, 
i , captures unobservable 
individual-specific effects that can vary across individuals but are constant over time 
for each individual and the second component, 
it , is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the observed and unobserved characteristics across individuals and time.
78,79
 This 
specification takes into account the fact that there could be some unobserved 
individual effect that may be correlated with both wage growth and the decision to 
change jobs and this can lead to bias in the pooled OLS estimate of job mobility on 
wage growth. 
 
With panel data, unobserved heterogeneity is usually handled using a fixed effects or 
random effects model. The fixed effects model allows the individual constant term, i  
to be correlated with other regressors in the model. The estimator transforms all 
variables to deviations from their sample means for all time periods  iit xx  , which 
implies that i  drops out of the equation because it is constant over time. As a result, 
it does not generate coefficient estimates for any variable that is constant over time. 
This approach to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity has been used by Davia 
(2005), Le Grand and Tahlin (2002), Light and McGarry (1998), Naticchiono and 
Panigo (2004), Munasinghe and Sigman (2004) and Pavlopoulos et al. (2007). The 
key difference between the fixed and random effects models is that the random effects 
model assumes that the i  are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model; a 
quite restrictive assumption. In the empirical analysis, individual effects are tested for 
and we also test to discriminate between the fixed and random effects models. 
 
                                                          
78
 In contrast, the pooled OLS model assumes that the intercept is common across all individuals. 
79
 This specification assumes that the only source of unobservable heterogeneity is at the individual 
level. However, the error term can be expanded to include unobservable job-specific effects which 
would capture, say, the quality of the job match e.g. Light and McGarry (1998) control for both 
individual fixed effects and job specific effects. 
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7.2.2 Reverse Causality 
One possible source of endogeneity in model (7.1) is two-way causation; not only is 
wage growth affected by job mobility but also job changes may occur in anticipation 
of higher wage growth. If this feedback from wages to job mobility occurs then *
itm  
will be correlated with it  in (7.1) as 
*
itm  depends on  itwlog  which directly 
depends on it  (i.e.   0*  ititm ). In addition, unobserved factors that affect both the 
decision to change jobs and wage growth can cause endogeneity bias.
80
 
 
One approach in the literature to overcome this problem is to use an instrument for 
mobility status. The idea is to replace the job mobility variable with another variable 
that is highly correlated with job mobility but uncorrelated with the error term in the 
wage growth equation. Possible instruments such as housing tenure status, job 
satisfaction (in particular the components of job satisfaction that do not refer to 
satisfaction with wages) and dummies for the region in which a person lives have 
been suggested in the literature. Davia (2005) uses the predicted probabilities from a 
probit model of job change as an instrument for job mobility.  
7.2.3 Misclassification  
Measurement Error in Binary Regressors 
Measurement error in binary variables takes the form of misclassification (a true 1 can 
be classified as a 0, or a true 0 can be classified as a 1). Define itm  to be a noisy 
indicator of the binary variable *itm . More specifically, we can write the observed 
value, itm , as the sum of the true value, 
*
itm , plus a measurement error, itu , as 
follows: 
 
  ititit umm 
*                  (7.3) 
 
                                                          
80
 A related literature focuses on estimating the returns to tenure (as tenure can be viewed as a series of 
previous quit and layoff decisions).  For example, various studies use an instrumental variable approach 
to control for the endogeneity of tenure (e.g. Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991) and Dustmann 
and Meghir (2005)). 
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where 
itu  is mean zero. When 1
* itm , the variable itm  can only take on two values; 1 
if it is correctly classified so 0itu  (i.e. there is no measurement error), or 0itm  so 
1itu . When 1
* itm , the variable itm  can never overestimate/over-report the true 
value. Likewise, when 0* itm , the variable itm  can never underestimate/under-report 
the true value;  
itu  is either 0 or +1. Therefore the measurement error, itu , is 
negatively correlated with the true variable, *
itm , so misclassification in a dummy 
variable leads to non-classical measurement error. 
 
Aigner (1973) and others have shown that when a binary regressor is misclassified the 
least squares coefficient estimates are biased towards zero and that additional 
assumptions or knowledge about the extent of misclassification in the data is needed 
to correct the estimates. To illustrate this point, consider the model given in (7.1) 
where *itm  denotes true job changes. Suppose we do not observe 
*
itm  but rather we 
observe 
itm  (as defined in (7.3)), which misclassifies some of the observations. Let 
0  denote the probability that a true job stay is misclassified as a job change i.e. 
   01Pr01Pr **0  itititit mumm  and 1  denote the probability that a job 
change is misclassified as a job stay i.e.    11Pr10Pr **1  itititit mumm .81 
Let   denote the mean of *itm . Since 
*
itm  is a binary variable,   corresponds to the 
probability of truly changing jobs; the probability that *itm  is equal to 1. It follows that 
       111Pr 01itm  i.e. the probability that an observation is observed as 
a job change is given by the probability that it truly is a job change    and is 
correctly classified as such  11   plus the probability that it truly is not a job change 
 1  but it has been misclassified as one  0 . In what follows, let 
      pmit   111Pr 01  for simplicity. 
 
Consider, first of all, a model with a single binary regressor: 
 
                                                          
81
 This assumes that the misclassification rates are constant across individuals and time and that they 
only depend on the true value 
*
itm  and not on the other covariates in the model. 
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    ititit mw  
*log                 (7.4) 
 
However, we cannot observe *
itm  only the mismeasured proxy itm , given in (7.3), so: 
 
    itititit umw   log  
        ititit um                  (7.5) 
 
Using itm  as a proxy for 
*
itm  means the measurement error becomes part of the error 
term in (7.5) and therefore creates an endogeneity bias. Estimating the model given in 
(7.5) yields an OLS estimator for   with a probability limit: 
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(as   0,* ititmCov   and   0, itituCov   because itu  and it  are independent errors, 
caused by different things, so we do not expect them to be correlated with each other 
or with *itm ) 
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where  
 
 p
p
po



1
1 1

  
 
where 0  is the attenuation coefficient in a model with a single misclassified 
regressor. As 0 , 1 ,   and p  are all greater than zero but less than one and p , 
the attenuation coefficient 0  given in (7.6) is less than one which implies that the 
OLS estimate of   is biased towards zero. Without knowledge about the 
misclassification rates, 0  and 1 , and the probability that an observation is truly a 
job change,  , we cannot identify the true   from our data. Furthermore, for very 
high levels of misclassification the expression for 0  could be negative yielding an 
OLS estimate of the wrong sign (Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999)). 
 
Attenuation bias is typically exacerbated in multivariate regression (Angrist and 
Krueger (1999)). Card (1996) and others have shown that the attenuation factor in this 
case is given by (see Appendix 7A for details when there are two explanatory 
variables in the model):  
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                (7.7) 
 
 167 
where 0  is the attenuation factor from the model with no other covariates, given in 
(7.6), and 2R  is the theoretical 2R  from a regression of observed job changes on the 
other explanatory variables in the model. 
 
Misclassification will cause both OLS and fixed effects estimates to be biased towards 
zero and inconsistent. However, measurement error bias is likely to be amplified in 
the fixed-effects estimates (Bound et al. (2001)). Correctly measured explanatory 
variables tend to be correlated across time so there is typically much less within-group 
variation in these variables than in the measurement error (as this will typically 
exhibit weak or no serial correlation). Therefore, measurement error in fixed effects 
models tends to reduce the variance in the signal relative to the variance in the noise 
so attenuation bias in this model can be more severe than both measurement error bias 
and heterogeneity bias in a pooled OLS model. 
Implications for Instrumental Variable Estimation 
With a misclassified binary regressor, instrumental variable estimation does not yield 
a consistent estimate of  . The intuition behind this result is straightforward. A valid 
instrument must be correlated with the true value, *itm  , and uncorrelated with the 
error term which is made up of the random error it  and the measurement error itu . 
As the measurement error, itu ,  is correlated with 
*
itm , any variable (potential 
instrument) which is correlated with *itm  will also generally be correlated with the 
measurement error. If an instrument is available, IV estimation will remove the 
correlation between *itm  and it  but not between 
*
itm  and itu  and so the IV estimate of 
  will be biased. 
 
In the case of a model with a single binary (misclassified) explanatory variable the IV 
estimate of   is biased by a factor  101
1
 
 (Angrist and Krueger (1999), Kane, 
Rouse and Staiger (1999)). See Appendix 7B for details. As 100    and generally 
110 
82
, the IV estimate will be biased upwards. The bias only depends on the 
                                                          
82
 If misclassification is so severe that 110  , then the estimate of   will have the wrong sign. 
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misclassification rates and not on the measurement error 
itu . In a bivariate regression 
with a mismeasured binary explanatory variable the OLS estimate is biased 
downwards and the IV estimate is biased upwards so these estimates can be used to 
bound the true coefficient. 
Approaches in the Literature 
There are several approaches in the literature to dealing with measurement error in 
binary regressors. One approach is to exploit external estimates of misclassification 
rates. Validation surveys can be used to provide estimates of misclassification rates. 
For example, Freeman (1984) and Card (1996) examine the impact of union 
membership on wages. They use a validation survey that has both employer and 
worker reports of union status to estimate the misclassification rates in the reporting 
of union status.
83
 Kane, Rouse and Staiger (1999) adopt a different approach and 
propose a generalised method of moments technique to obtain consistent estimates 
when a researcher has two noisy reports of the regressor.   
 
Another approach is to try to bound the estimates. Bollinger (1996) establishes bounds 
for the true coefficients in a linear regression when a binary regressor is 
mismeasured.
84
 In addition, Bollinger shows how these bounds can be made tighter if 
information is available on the misclassification rates. Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) 
extend the procedure proposed by Hausman et al. and compute bounds of the 
misclassification rates without making functional form assumptions. They combine 
these bounds with the OLS coefficient to bound the true effect of the mismeasured 
explanatory variable.  
 
Card (1996) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) provide an expression for the 
inconsistency in OLS estimates due to misclassification, assuming the other 
explanatory variables in the model are perfectly measured, as follows:
85
 
                                                          
83
 Freeman (1984) assumes that the employer report of union status is correctly measured. Card (1996) 
allows for both the employee and employer reports to be measured with error but assumes that the rate 
of misreporting from both groups is equal and that the misclassification rates are equal.  
84
 Bollinger (2001) extends the methodology to include fixed effects models. 
85
 The expression inside the square brackets is equivalent to the reciprocal of the attenuation factor 
given in equation (7.7) when 
0  (from equation (7.6)) and 
10
0
1 





p
 have been substituted in 
for. 
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In the sensitivity analysis in Section 7.4 this expression is used to provide “corrected” 
OLS estimates of the impact of job mobility on wage growth. 
 
Another strand of the literature uses an instrumental variable approach to handle 
mismeasured binary regressors. For example, Mahajan (2006) assumes that additional 
information, in the form of a second variable, is available that is correlated with the 
unobserved true underlying variable but not related to the measurement error in the 
binary variable. 
7.2.4 Empirical Strategy 
This chapter adopts a two-step approach to controlling for misclassification in 
estimating the effect of job mobility on wage growth. The approach closely follows 
Brachet (2008) and is similar to Dustman and van Soest (2001).
86
 The first step uses 
the modified probit estimator developed by Hausman et al. which generates consistent 
estimates of the coefficients as well as the misclassification probabilities and, most 
importantly for this chapter, the probability of truly being a job changer,   1Pr * itm .  
This yields a proxy for *itm  that removes the impact of misclassification. In the second 
step, model (7.1) is estimated using pooled OLS substituting in for *itm  using the fitted 
probabilities that an observation is truly a job change calculated in the first stage. The 
coefficient estimates will be consistent provided the functional form for F(.) in the 
first step has been correctly specified.
87
 
 
The same approach can be used to control for both measurement error in job changes 
and unobserved heterogeneity; the wage growth equation in the second step is 
                                                          
86
 Brachet (2008) examines the effect of maternal smoking on infant health where smoking status may 
be misreported. Dustmann and van Soest (2001) investigate the effect of language fluency of 
immigrants on earnings where self-reported language proficiency may be misclassified. They allow for 
misclassification errors that are independent over time and errors that persist over time (a respondent 
who over (or under) reports once will always tend to over (or under) report). They jointly estimate the 
earnings and language fluency equations to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in both the language 
fluency and earnings equation to be correlated. 
87
 See Appendix 7C for details. 
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estimated using a fixed effects or a random effects estimator. In addition, if we have 
an instrument for job mobility, it can be used in the first stage of the procedure to 
create a proxy for *
itm  that removes both the impact of misclassification and the 
correlation with the error term. It is hard to find good instruments for job mobility. 
This chapter attempts to control for reverse causality using non-wage elements of job 
satisfaction as instruments for job mobility.  
 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the sample of workers employed in 
successive two-year periods from the revolving balanced panel that uses the LIS data, 
as described in Chapter 3.
88
 Two additional restrictions are placed on the sample. The 
first is that only income from paid employment is considered so self-employed 
workers and farmers are excluded from the analysis. These workers are excluded 
because of difficulties in measuring income from self-employment and farming. The 
second restriction is that workers are excluded in any year that they report they are 
working part-time (less than 30 hours).
89
 These restrictions ensure some degree of 
homogeneity in the sample. The key dependent variable in the analysis is the change 
in log real gross hourly wages between period t-1 and period t.
 90
 In each year, there 
are around 90 cases where either the wage in period t-1 or the wage in period t or both 
are not available and these person-year observations are excluded from the analysis. 
The final sample consists of 1,206 workers and 5,346 person-year observations, 
observable for various durations over the period 1995 to 2001. 
 
                                                          
88
 The focus of this chapter is on job-to-job transitions. The sample restrictions and definition of job 
mobility used means that workers cannot be unemployed or leave the labour force for any considerable 
amount of time between jobs (specifically by more than the amount of time between interviews). 
Therefore, the sample is probably a length time biased sample of job changers; in the sense that it may 
over-represent those who experience a relatively short period of unemployment between jobs or who 
leave the labour force for a relatively short period between jobs and under-represent those who are 
unemployed or leave the labour force for longer durations between jobs. 
89
 This means that part-time workers are included in the sample in other waves if they are working full-
time; however the results presented in the next section are similar to those when part-time workers are 
deleted entirely from the sample. 
90
 Another reason for focussing on full-time workers is the possibility of measurement error in reported 
usual hours worked. Baum-Snow and Neal (2009) show that there is substantial measurement error in 
hourly wages for part-time workers. Using US Census data, they perform a validation exercise with the 
Current Population Survey and find that a significant proportion of workers respond to a question about 
usual hours of work per week as if the question asked about usual hours of work per day. 
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Table 7.1 provides preliminary evidence of the relationship between wage growth and 
job mobility. The table shows that the annual average wage growth for all workers is 
8.5 per cent. The next two rows of the table divides workers into job „movers‟ and 
„stayers‟, where job movers are those who change jobs at some point over the period 
1995 to 2001 and stayers are those who are observed in the same job over the entire 
period. Job movers experience higher but more variable wage growth than those who 
stay in their jobs. An examination of real wage growth at different points in the 
distributions for job movers and stayers reveal that they are closest at the 25th 
percentile; however at the median and 75th percentiles wage growth of job changers is 
over 1.5 times that of job movers.  
 
It may also be important to distinguish between different types of mobility when 
looking at wage effects associated with changing jobs. The table shows the number of 
workers that experience voluntary, involuntary and other types of mobility.
91
 
Voluntary movers experience higher wage growth than involuntary movers and 
stayers, as expected. However involuntary movers record higher wage growth than 
job stayers which is surprising. The previous empirical literature has shown that 
involuntary job movers can experience wage losses, not just at the time of job change 
but that these losses can be permanent, especially if there is a period of unemployment 
between jobs (e.g. Garcia Perez and Rebollo Sanz (2005)). This effect is not evident 
in Table 7.1. This may be due to the fact that the sample is one where workers have a 
very high attachment to the labour force; workers need to be employed in consecutive 
two-year periods to be included in the sample. This excludes the type of transition 
where a worker experiences a long spell of unemployment, such as where a worker 
moves from being employed to unemployed for more than a year to employed again. 
In addition, the time period under consideration is one with very strong economic and 
employment growth so it is possible that any reputation effects associated with 
involuntary mobility may be reduced and/or job search costs may be lower as jobs are 
more plentiful.  
 
The table also shows the average wage growth for workers that move once and for 
workers that move more than once. Here, we do not distinguish between the types of 
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 Other movers are those who do not state a reason for their job separation or who experience different 
types of mobility (e.g. they experience both a voluntary and an involuntary quit). 
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move a worker may make, rather the number of moves. Workers who change jobs 
more than once experience higher wage growth than those who only move once. 
There do not appear to be any reputation effects associated with repeated mobiliy.
92
 
 
Table 7.1: Average Within-Person Wage Growth*  
 
 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
All Workers 1,206 0.085 0.005 0.01 0.06 0.13 
       
Job Stayer 766 0.072 0.006 0.01 0.05 0.11 
Job Mover 440 0.109 0.011 0.02 0.08 0.17 
       
Voluntary Job Mover 223 0.118 0.014 0.03 0.10 0.17 
Involuntary Job Mover 78 0.092 0.030 0.01 0.05 0.23 
Other Movers 139 0.105 0.018 0.03 0.08 0.17 
       
Move Once 256 0.101 0.015 0.01 0.07 0.16 
Move more than Once 184 0.120 0.014 0.03 0.11 0.18 
* Note: Wage growth is defined as    1loglog  tt ww  where tw  and 1tw  are real gross hourly 
wages in Euros reported at time t and t-1. 
 
Table 7.1 examines average within-person wage growth. However, it does not control 
for the timing of job changes so the average wage growth reported for job movers 
refers to workers who move in any year over the period. Controlling for the timing of 
job changes helps to disentangle whether the higher wage growth of job movers 
described in Table 7.1 is attributable to a discrete jump in wages at the time of starting 
a new job or if changing jobs shifts a worker onto a higher wage growth profile. Table 
7.2 shows the annual average wage growth for job „moves‟ and job „stays‟. The unit 
of analysis has shifted from people in Table 7.1 to person-year observations so the 
mean wage growth reported in Table 7.2 is simply the average change in log wages 
between t and t-1 across all observations. In the case of job moves this refers to the 
change in log wages associated with the previous job at time t-1 and the new job at 
time t. 
 
There are very large and variable wage gains related to job moves; a job move is 
associated with an average wage increase of around 17 per cent, compared to an 
average wage increase of around 6 per cent for a job stay. Comparing these figures 
with those from Table 7.1 implies that the bulk of the wage increase associated with 
job mobility happens at the time of changing jobs. The table also shows that wage 
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 Of course, we observe people at different stages in their working lives and the analysis cannot 
control for previous mobility history. 
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growth is greatest for voluntary moves and that involuntary moves are associated with 
wage gains higher than those of job stays. Wage growth does not differ much 
depending on the whether it is the first move that we observe a worker making over 
the period or their second or third move etc over the period. 
 
Table 7.2: Average Wage Growth for Job Stays and Job Moves 
 
 
No. of  
Person-Year 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
All Observations 5,346 0.070 0.004 -0.051 0.045 0.190 
       
Job Stays 4,897 0.061 0.004 -0.051 0.041 0.172 
Job Moves 449 0.167 0.019 -0.048 0.134 0.383 
       
Voluntary Job Moves 282 0.200 0.025 -0.022 0.190 0.422 
Involuntary Job Moves 103 0.094 0.040 -0.113 0.076 0.328 
Other Moves 64 0.140 0.046 -0.054 0.073 0.334 
       
First Move 232 0.177 0.026 -0.042 0.155 0.395 
2nd + Move 217 0.157 0.029 -0.050 0.110 0.355 
 
The analysis so far has ignored differences in characteristics across workers and these 
differences may account for some of the variation in wage growth across job movers 
and stayers. Table 7.3 shows average wage growth for workers by different levels of 
labour market experience. The first line of the table indicates that wage growth 
declines with experience or that the wage-experience profile is concave. The next two 
lines of the table show that job changers with less experience record much higher 
wage growth than job stayers, however there is no significant difference in wage 
growth between job changers and stayers who have more than 5 years experience.  
Disaggregating the job movers by reasons for job separation shows that workers with 
less experience who undergo any type of mobility have greater wage growth than job 
stayers with similar levels of experience. This is consistent with there being a bigger 
return to match quality in the first few years of labour market experience. 
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Table 7.3: Average Within-Person Wage Growth by Experience* 
 <=4 Years 5-14 Years 15+ Years 
 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
All Workers 341 0.134 0.011 323 0.089 0.011 542 0.052 0.007 
          
Job Stayer 141 0.094 0.015 191 0.096 0.014 434 0.053 0.006 
Job Mover 200 0.163 0.015 132 0.078 0.017 108 0.048 0.023 
          
Voluntary Job Mover 116 0.160 0.021 71 0.064 0.023 36 0.092 0.025 
Involuntary Job Mover 23 0.194 0.044 20 0.061 0.032 35 0.042 0.057 
Other Movers 61 0.156 0.024 41 0.112 0.034 37 0.011 0.034 
          
Move Once 107 0.161 0.022 84 0.083 0.024 65 0.027 0.034 
Move more than Once 93 0.165 0.021 48 0.071 0.020 43 0.080 0.029 
* Experience refers to years of experience in the first year someone is observed in the sample 
 
As before, Table 7.3 may be misleading as it classifies a worker as a job mover even 
if they only change jobs towards the end of the observation window. Table 7.4 shows 
wage growth by person-year observations, where each wage change between time t-1 
and time t is classified according to whether it is associated with a job move or a job 
stay. The table implies that for all levels of experience most of the wage increase 
associated with job mobility occurs at the time of changing jobs. Table 7.3 showed 
movers with more than 5 years experience have similar wage growth to stayers; 
however Table 7.4 indicates that at the time of job change moves have bigger impacts 
on wages than stays for these workers. In addition, as years of experience increase 
there is a sharp decline in the wage change associated with involuntary mobility as we 
go from one experience group to the next. Workers with more experience (15+ years) 
who undergo involuntary mobility do not record wage gains when moving to a new 
job. 
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Table 7.4: Average Wage Growth for Job Stays and Job Moves by Experience 
 <=4 Years 5-14 Years 15+ Years 
 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
All Observations 716 0.146 0.012 1,567 0.084 0.008 3,063 0.044 0.005 
          
Job Stays 560 0.117 0.012 1,395 0.079 0.008 2,942 0.041 0.005 
Job Moves 156 0.249 0.034 172 0.127 0.032 121 0.119 0.033 
          
Voluntary Job Moves 112 0.245 0.043 107 0.147 0.037 63 0.210 0.048 
Involuntary Job 
Moves 
23 0.236 0.065 41 0.110 0.078 39 -0.007 0.051 
Other Moves 21 0.285 0.077 24 0.065 0.085 19 0.074 0.066 
          
First Move 77 0.283 0.051 82 0.120 0.042 73 0.128 0.037 
2nd + Move 79 0.216 0.045 90 0.133 0.047 48 0.104 0.061 
 
Table 7.5 shows average individual wage growth by gender and Table 7.6 shows 
wage growth by person-year observation and gender. The first row of Table 7.5 
indicates that women experience higher average wage growth than men. This is not as 
expected, although it should be noted that the average wage level for women is around 
three quarters of the male wage.
93
 One of the features of the labour market over this 
period is the dramatic rise in female labour force participation, driven by rising 
educational attainment and also improved labour market conditions which encouraged 
many married women to return to the labour market. In the sample, female 
employment is concentrated in the services sector – almost 80 per cent of female 
workers are in the services sector compared with around 45 per cent of male workers. 
It may be the case that, over this period, the labour market tightened more quickly in 
the sectors that women were more heavily concentrated in and, as a result, they 
experienced faster wage growth than men. 
 
Female job movers have slightly stronger wage growth than their male counterparts. 
Male involuntary job movers do not appear to suffer wage losses, in fact their average 
wage growth is similar to male job stayers. However, wage growth for female 
involuntary job movers is actually higher than for female voluntary movers or 
stayers.
94
 This is highlighted when we look at the between-job wage growth 
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 The average real hourly wage over the period is €12.98 for men and €10.24 for women. 
94
 This result for female involuntary mobility is not being driven by outliers in the data. As a robustness 
check, separate wage regressions by gender were estimated and a quarter of female involuntary movers 
who experience the highest wage growth were excluded from the analysis and it does not have a 
dramatic effect on the coefficient estimates. 
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associated with involuntary mobility; Table 7.6 shows that wage changes at the time 
of involuntary job moves for men are relatively flat while they are very high for 
involuntary moves made by women. As mentioned above, because female 
employment is concentrated in certain sectors, they may face different labour market 
conditions to male workers in other sectors.  
 
Table 7.5: Average Within-Person Wage Growth by Gender 
 Male Female 
 No. of  
People 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
All Workers 753 0.076 0.007 453 0.102 0.009 
       
Job Stayer 477 0.059 0.006 289 0.092 0.011 
Job Mover 276 0.104 0.014 164 0.119 0.015 
       
Voluntary Job Mover 132 0.120 0.019 91 0.115 0.022 
Involuntary Job Mover 52 0.060 0.041 26 0.155 0.035 
Other Movers 92 0.104 0.024 47 0.106 0.023 
       
Move Once 148 0.090 0.022 108 0.117 0.019 
Move more than Once 128 0.120 0.017 56 0.122 0.024 
 
Table 7.6: Average Wage Growth for Job Stays and Job Moves by Gender 
 Male Female 
 No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
All Observations 3,564 0.063 0.005 1,782 0.084 0.006 
       
Job Stays 3,272 0.054 0.005 1,625 0.075 0.006 
Job Moves 292 0.159 0.024 157 0.182 0.031 
       
Voluntary Job Moves 185 0.215 0.031 97 0.172 0.040 
Involuntary Job Moves 71 0.022 0.044 32 0.255 0.079 
Other Moves 36 0.147 0.068 28 0.132 0.061 
       
First Move 144 0.152 0.035 88 0.217 0.037 
2nd + Move 148 0.167 0.034 69 0.136 0.053 
 
Average individual wage growth by education level is reported in Table 7.7. Workers 
with higher levels of education have the highest wage growth. Across each education 
category, job movers experience higher wage growth than stayers, particularly 
voluntary job movers. Involuntary job changers with a medium level of education do 
not record wage gains. For this group of workers, this may reflect shifting onto flatter 
wage profiles as wage gains are recorded at the time of involuntary job moves (see 
Table 7.8).  
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Table 7.7: Average Within-Person Wage Growth by Education 
 Low Education Medium Education High Education 
 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
People 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
All Workers 396 0.071 0.009 595 0.083 0.008 215 0.119 0.010 
          
Job Stayer 247 0.050 0.008 370 0.074 0.009 149 0.102 0.012 
Job Mover 149 0.105 0.018 225 0.098 0.016 66 0.157 0.019 
          
Voluntary Job Mover 59 0.094 0.030 120 0.116 0.020 44 0.157 0.021 
Involuntary Job Mover 45 0.135 0.031 28 -0.005 0.059 5 0.252 0.157 
Other Movers 45 0.090 0.033 77 0.108 0.025 17 0.129 0.025 
          
Move Once 91 0.116 0.026 130 0.073 0.022 35 0.169 0.027 
Move more than Once 58 0.088 0.022 95 0.133 0.022 31 0.143 0.027 
 
Table 7.8: Average Wage Growth for Job Stays and Job Moves by Education 
 Low Education Medium Education High Education 
 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
No. of  
Person-Year 
observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
All Observations 2,232 0.058 0.006 2,389 0.075 0.006 725 0.089 0.010 
          
Job Stays 2,047 0.051 0.006 2,171 0.064 0.006 679 0.079 0.009 
Job Moves 185 0.132 0.029 218 0.181 0.028 46 0.241 0.064 
          
Voluntary Job 
Moves 
103 0.183 0.041 143 0.205 0.036 36 0.229 0.055 
Involuntary Job 
Moves 
57 0.050 0.044 38 0.147 0.069 8 0.156 0.260 
Other Moves 25 0.113 0.080 37 0.123 0.051 2 0.793 0.452 
          
First Move 97 0.154 0.038 110 0.181 0.040 25 0.247 0.072 
2nd + Move 88 0.109 0.044 108 0.181 0.040 21 0.234 0.115 
 
 
7.4 Results 
This section presents formal econometric estimates of the impact of changing jobs on 
wage growth. It first presents pooled OLS results, which give an idea of the initial 
correlation between job mobility and wage growth. It then goes on to control for 
differences in unobservable characteristics and investigates whether there are 
differential wage impacts depending on the type of mobility. Then, crucially for this 
chapter, measurement error in the job change variable is controlled for. A sensitivity 
analysis illustrates the effect misclassification has on the estimated impact of job 
mobility on wage growth. Finally, an attempt is made to control for the bias due to the 
reverse causality between job mobility and wages. 
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Table 7.9 shows the pooled OLS estimates of the effect of changing jobs on wage 
growth. The dependent variable is the change in log wages between time t-1 and time 
t. The first specification in the table (Model 1) contains no additional regressors (other 
than a constant term). The coefficient estimate on the job change dummy implies that 
the average increase in wage growth associated with changing jobs is around 10½ per 
cent and this effect is highly significant.  
 
Model 2 in the table includes the standard set of control variables that determine wage 
growth.
95
 Specifically, it includes traditional human capital variables such as age, 
experience and level of education. In addition, some job characteristics are controlled 
for, such as whether the job is in the public or private sector, the size of the firm etc. 
Year dummies are included to control for changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. These variables are included in an attempt to assess to what extent 
differences in observable characteristics across workers affect the premium associated 
with changing jobs. The estimate on the job change dummy variable is around 8 per 
cent indicating that some (around 2½ percentage points) of the higher wage growth 
associated with changing jobs is attributable to differences in observed 
characteristics.
96
  
 
The results also indicate that wage growth declines with age and experience. This may 
reflect the fact that investment in human capital declines over the life-cycle or career-
cycle or possibly that employers prefer younger workers. Wage growth is higher for 
those with third level degrees and above. The results also indicate that there is no 
significant difference in male and female wage growth or between public and private 
sector wage growth once differences in observable characteristics are controlled for. 
Workers in larger firms are expected to have higher wage growth, as larger firms are 
more likely to have internal labour markets etc, but the estimated effect is negative. 
Workers in sectors that are more exposed to market forces and where competitiveness 
is more important for growth, such as the manufacturing sector, have lower estimated 
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 All the explanatory variables (apart from the year dummies) are lagged by one year, so for job 
changers they refer to their characteristics prior to changing jobs and for job stayers they refer to their 
situation in the previous year. 
96
 Including each of the regressors individually with the job change dummy variable indicates that most 
of them do not have a substantial impact on the estimated effect of changing jobs on wage growth. The 
inclusion of variables like age and experience reduce the estimate on the mobility variable by around 
0.02. 
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wage changes. Working in the construction sector has a positive effect on wage 
growth, probably reflecting the fact that the sector was booming during the period 
under consideration. However, none of these sectoral wage effects are significant. 
 
Finally, Model 3 in the table includes some job transition characteristics to capture the 
multifaceted nature of job mobility, such as controls for whether a job changer moves 
from a small to a big firm. The estimate on the job change dummy variable increases 
to around 9 per cent whereas the estimate from model 2 that does not control for any 
transition characteristics is around 8 per cent, indicating that the wage effect 
associated with changing jobs is not attributable to the nature of the transition. The 
results also indicate that moving to a big firm leads to higher wage growth and 
moving to a smaller firm has a negative effect on wage growth relative to those who 
change jobs but continue in a similar sized firm. The direction of these impacts is as 
expected. However, controlling for the nature of the transition does not affect the 
direction of the estimate on firm size, as it remains negative.  Those who move from 
the private to the public sector experience higher wage growth and those who move 
from the public to the private sector experience wage losses relative to those who 
change jobs but stay in the same sector although the impacts are not significant. In 
addition, changing broad sectoral group leads to wage losses relative to those who 
stay in the same broad group but these effects are not significant. 
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Table 7.9: Pooled OLS Wage Growth Model^ 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
       
 Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Job Change 0.1064*** 0.0178 0.0794*** 0.0182 0.0891*** 0.0239 
       
Age - - -0.0110** 0.0043 -0.0096** 0.0043 
Age Squared - - 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001 
Experience - - -0.0019 0.0022 -0.0027 0.0022 
Experience Squared - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Female - - 0.0014 0.0065 0.0016 0.0065 
Education: (ref: Low Education)       
Education - Medium - - -0.0087 0.0073 -0.0078 0.0072 
Education - High - - 0.0078 0.0110 0.0095 0.0111 
Public Sector - - 0.0070 0.0098 0.0104 0.0100 
Number of Employees > 50 - - -0.0244*** 0.0067 -0.0169*** 0.0063 
Occupation: (ref: Elementary 
Occupations) 
      
      Manager - - -0.0016 0.0111 -0.0047 0.0110 
      Professional - - 0.0210** 0.0099 0.0174* 0.0097 
      Clerk - - 0.0186** 0.0092 0.0157* 0.0089 
      Skilled - - 0.0125 0.0114 0.0110 0.0105 
Sector of Origin: (ref: Non-Market 
Services) 
      
      Agric., Mining & Utilities - - 0.0073 0.0184 -0.0035 0.0153 
      Manufacturing - - -0.0108 0.0130 -0.0072 0.0131 
      Construction - - 0.0133 0.0181 0.0162 0.0188 
      Market Services - - 0.0037 0.0097 0.0073 0.0100 
Year Dummies:       
      1996 - - -0.0168 0.0167 -0.0162 0.0167 
      1997 - - 0.0139 0.0155 0.0114 0.0154 
      1998 - - -0.0199 0.0146 -0.0186 0.0146 
      1999 - - -0.0069 0.0144 -0.0023 0.0143 
      2000 - - 0.0120 0.0140 0.0123 0.0139 
      2001 - - -0.0072 0.0149 -0.0046 0.0149 
Job Transition Characteristics:       
      Private to Public - - - - 0.1145 0.0699 
      Public to Private - - - - -0.0395 0.0683 
      Company Size: Small to Big - - - - 0.0956* 0.0501 
      Company Size: Big to Small - - - - -0.1177** 0.0495 
      Sector: Services to Industry - - - - -0.0677 0.0615 
      Sector: Industry to Services - - - - -0.0103 0.0532 
Constant 0.0608*** 0.0028 0.2987*** 0.0707 0.2709*** 0.0697 
       
Number of Observations 5,346   5,320             5,221   
R-squared 0.0112  0.0294  0.0372  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by person. In the table * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 
1% level of significance. 
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Next, we control for unmeasured individual characteristics that are constant over time. 
Table 7.10 presents results from the two standard panel data models that deal with 
unobserved heterogeneity, namely a fixed effects and a random effects model.
97
 The 
dummy variables capturing job mobility and the other regressors are similar to what 
was included in pooled OLS Model 2 (reported in Table 7.9), the results for which are 
repeated in Table 7.10.  The key point to note about the results is that mobility has a 
strong, positive and significant effect on wage growth even after controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Overall, the fixed effects estimates are broadly comparable to pooled OLS estimates.
98
 
The results indicate that the impact of changing jobs on wage growth is around 11 per 
cent when we control for unobserved heterogeneity and the effect is significant at the 
1 per cent level. This compares with the 8 per cent pooled OLS estimate so 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity leads to an increase in the estimated impact 
of changing jobs on wage growth. This is consistent with the unobservable 
characteristic being negatively correlated with job mobility (and so the OLS estimate 
may be biased downwards).  However, the F-test for the individual effects does not 
reject the null hypothesis that the individual effects are not jointly significantly 
different from zero.
99
 This goes against the prediction of the mover-stayer model. The 
effects of the other variables included in the model are broadly comparable to the 
estimates from the pooled OLS model.
100
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 The fixed effects models for wage growth presented in the tables all exclude time dummies. The 
reason for excluding them is that variables like age, and to some extent experience, change within 
individuals in the same way over time so the effect of a variable like age in a fixed effects model is 
interpretable more as a linear time trend. As a result, there is little reason to include these types of 
variables and also time dummies in a fixed effects model. In addition, the estimate of the effect of job 
change on wage growth when age and experience are excluded and time dummies are included is 
practically identical. The regressions also exclude the education variables as they have little within-
person variation and reported changes in education level may reflect measurement error (in particular 
where the reported education level decreases). 
98
 As with the pooled OLS models the standard errors in the fixed effects models are clustered at the 
individual level. Fixed effects account for the time-constant part of the unobservable differences across 
people. However, it may be the case that unobserved random shocks that influence an individual at 
time t may also affect their behaviour at time t+1 therefore leading to correlated errors within people. 
99
 The F-test for the individual effects is calculated from a regression that does not use clustered 
standard errors because the test is based on the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors. 
100
 There are some differences in estimated effects across the pooled OLS and fixed effects models. For 
example, the estimated effect on the experience variable changes sign. However this variable has low 
within person variation. Consequently, the coefficient estimate may vary significantly and even in the 
other direction from the pooled OLS estimate. Generally, in fixed effects models, it is hard to obtain 
reliable estimates for variables that only change slowly over time. 
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The estimates from the random effects model are very similar to the pooled OLS 
estimates.  In this model the variation across individuals is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test helps to discriminate between a random effects and OLS regression. 
The null hypothesis in this test is that the variances across individuals are zero. The 
test indicates that we reject the null hypothesis and so we conclude that there is a 
significant difference across individuals so a random effects model is appropriate.  
 
This indicates that the random effects model is the preferred model. This is somewhat 
surprising as we would expect unobserved effects to be correlated with the 
explanatory variables i.e. that a fixed effects model is appropriate. A Hausman test 
can help decide between a fixed effects and random effects model. The null 
hypothesis in this test is that there is no correlation between the individual effects and 
regressors. If this is true then both estimators are consistent but the fixed effects 
estimator is inefficient. If the individual effects and regressors are correlated then the 
random effect estimator is inconsistent. The Hausman test follows a chi-squared 
distribution and is equal to 22.47 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0962. This 
indicates we cannot reject the random effects model at the 5 per cent level of 
significance, but it can be rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance.
101
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 The Hausman test is essentially testing whether the coefficient estimates from the fixed effects 
model are equal to those from the random effects model. As the fixed effects estimator only uses a 
small part of the information in the sample it usually has a large standard error. In practice, the 
Hausman test can very often accept the null hypothesis. Accepting the null hypothesis implies that 
either the two sets of coefficient estimates are reasonably close or it could indicate that the fixed effect 
estimates have very large standard errors and so we fail to reject the null hypothesis or we cannot 
conclude that the two estimators are significantly different (Wooldridge (2002)). 
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Table 7.10: Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Wage Growth Models^ 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
       
 Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Job Change 0.0794*** 0.0182 0.1122*** 0.0237 0.0805*** 0.0183 
       
Age -0.0110** 0.0043 -0.0211 0.0267 -0.0113** 0.0044 
Age Squared 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002*** 0.0001 
Experience -0.0019 0.0022 0.0062 0.0210 -0.0017 0.0022 
Experience Squared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Female 0.0014 0.0065 - - 0.0016 0.0066 
Education: (ref: Low Education)       
Education - Medium -0.0087 0.0073 - - -0.0086 0.0074 
Education - High 0.0078 0.0110 - - 0.0080 0.0111 
Public Sector 0.0070 0.0098 -0.0028 0.0282 0.0073 0.0100 
Number of Employees > 50 -0.0244*** 0.0067 -0.0497*** 0.0147 -0.0251*** 0.0068 
Occupation: (ref: Elementary 
Occupations) 
      
      Manager -0.0016 0.0111 -0.0076 0.0278 -0.0013 0.0113 
      Professional 0.0210** 0.0099 -0.0015 0.0268 0.0212** 0.0101 
      Clerk 0.0186** 0.0092 0.0106 0.0240 0.0190** 0.0093 
      Skilled 0.0125 0.0114 0.0385 0.0329 0.0128 0.0117 
Sector of Origin: (ref: Non-Market 
Services) 
      
      Agric., Mining & Utilities 0.0073 0.0184 0.1026* 0.0606 0.0080 0.0189 
      Manufacturing -0.0108 0.0130 0.0269 0.0383 -0.0107 0.0133 
      Construction 0.0133 0.0181 0.0799** 0.0389 0.0137 0.0184 
      Market Services 0.0037 0.0097 0.0501* 0.0298 0.0039 0.0099 
Year Dummies:       
      1996 -0.0168 0.0167 - - -0.0166 0.0167 
      1997 0.0139 0.0155 - - 0.0140 0.0155 
      1998 -0.0199 0.0146 - - -0.0198 0.0145 
      1999 -0.0069 0.0144 - - -0.0070 0.0144 
      2000 0.0120 0.0140 - - 0.0120 0.0140 
      2001 -0.0072 0.0149 - - -0.0072 0.0149 
Constant 0.2987*** 0.0707 0.3859 0.4649 0.3021*** 0.0716 
       
Number of Observations 5,320   5,320   5,320   
Number of People 1,205  1,205   1,205   
R-squared within   0.0157  0.0144  
R-squared between   0.0281  0.0715  
R-squared overall   0.0156  0.0294  
R-squared 0.0294      
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000    
Prob > chi squared     0.0000  
F test that all 0i     F(1,204,4100)=0.68   
0: 20 iH       chi-squared(1)=162.76 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by person. In the table * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 
1% level of significance. 
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We expect to see different wage impacts associated with job mobility depending on 
the reason for job separation. Table 7.11 reports the random effects estimates of 
different types of mobility on wage growth.
102,103
 The first model in the table does not 
distinguish between different types of mobility. Model 2 distinguishes between 
voluntary, involuntary and other types of job changes.
104
 Voluntary moves have the 
highest effect on wage growth, as expected. The table indicates that voluntary changes 
are associated with a 14 per cent increase in short-term wage growth and this effect is 
significant at the 1 per cent level.  The table also shows that involuntary moves do not 
have a negative impact on wage growth; in fact the estimated effect is positive, 
although it is insignificant and much smaller than for voluntary moves. Although the 
sign of estimate is not as expected it is not significant and, as discussed before, may 
be attributable to the construction of the sample. In addition, it could reflect the 
tightness in the labour market over the period under consideration where workers had 
many alternative employment opportunities and also employers may have been more 
willing to disregard any reputation effects associated with involuntary mobility. The 
estimated effect of „other‟ types of mobility on wage growth is in-between the effects 
of voluntary and involuntary mobility. Model 3 excludes cases from the „other‟ 
category and just separates out voluntary and involuntary mobility. The results are 
practically identical to those of Model 2. 
 
Model 4 distinguishes between whether this is the first move a worker makes or 
whether they are observed changing jobs more than once during the observation 
window. The estimate associated with the job change being the first move observed is 
above that of a second or higher move but there is no evidence of wage penalties 
associated with repeated mobility. However, as mentioned before, it is important to 
note that in many cases we do not observe a workers‟ entire prior mobility history.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
102
 The same tests were conducted to help choose between the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random 
effects specification. The random effects model is the preferred specification although the coefficient 
estimates form all three models are broadly comparable.  
103
 These models only include the relevant job change variable(s) and a constant term. 
104
 Other types of job changes are those where the reason for changing jobs is not reported or the 
respondent chooses the „other‟ category from a list of possible reasons for changing jobs. 
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Table 7.11:  Random Effects Wage Growth Models, Controlling for Type of Job Mobility^ 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
         
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Job Change 0.1068*** 0.0182       
         
Voluntary Job Change   0.1397*** 0.0242 0.1394*** 0.0242   
Involuntary Job Change   0.0335 0.0380 0.0337 0.0381   
Other type of Job Change   0.0791* 0.0479     
         
First Job Change       0.1153*** 0.0264 
Second plus Job Change       0.0973*** 0.0241 
         
Number of Observations 5,346   5,346   5,282   5,346   
Number of People 1,206   1,206   1,203   1,206   
R-squared within 0.0095  0.0115  0.0105  0.0093  
R-squared between 0.0142  0.0154  0.0176  0.0156  
R-squared overall 0.0112  0.0134  0.0129  0.0113  
Prob > chi squared 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
^ Notes: * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. Standard errors are 
clustered by person. Only constant terms and the job change variables reported in the table are included 
in the regressions. Model 1 does not distinguish between different types of mobility. Model 2 
distinguishes between voluntary, involuntary and other types of mobility. Model 3 excludes other types 
of job changes. Model 4 distinguishes between whether a job change is the first one a worker is 
observed making or whether they change jobs more than once. 
 
Next we formally examine the impact that misclassification in job changes has on the 
estimated effect of job change on wage growth. We use the procedure outlined in 
Section 7.2.4 to control for misclassification in a binary regressor. The first step 
involves using the Hausman et al. modified probit estimator to control for 
misclassification in a model of job change.
105
 Table 7.12 shows the estimates of the 
misclassification probabilities. The estimated probability of misclassification for job 
stays, 0 , is very small at a ¼  of one per cent and the estimated probability of 
misclassification for job changes, 
1 , is high at 51 per cent.  Significance tests on 0  
and 
1  can be used as tests of misclassification. Workers who have truly changed jobs 
are more likely to be misclassified, as 
1  exceeds 0 . This means that the measure of 
job change is likely to undercount the true number of job changes. To put this 
estimate 
1  in context, the average mobility rate in the sample used in the wage 
                                                          
105
 The analysis only examines controlling for misclassification in the overall job change dummy 
variable.  
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growth regressions is around 8 per cent and this estimate for 
1  implies that the true 
mobility rate is around 12 per cent.  
 
These first stage estimates are then used to construct the predicted probabilities that an 
observation is truly a job change. In the second step, this generated regressor is 
included instead of the job change dummy variable in the wage growth 
regression.
106,107
  
 
Table 7.12: Effect of Job Mobility on Wage Growth Controlling for Misclassification^ 
 Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
First Stage Estimates   
0ˆ  0.0025 0.0086 
1ˆ  0.5113** 0.2385 
   
Second Stage Estimates   
Job Change 0.1372** 0.0532 
Number of Observations 5,217  
R-squared 0.0238  
Prob > F 0.0000  
^ Notes: * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. Standard errors are 
clustered by person. The standard errors in the second stage are also adjusted to take account of the fact 
that a generated regressor is included in the model. The first stage model also includes controls for 
experience, experience squared, gender, whether the person has children, whether they are married or 
living in a couple, education level, whether the person has undergone recent training, whether they 
report if they are overeducated, working in the public sector, firm size, occupation, sector, year 
dummies and the national unemployment rate. The second stage regression includes the predicted 
probabilities from the first stage and also the other variables in Model 2 in Table 7.9.   
 
The results from the second step indicate that the impact of changing jobs on wage 
growth is closer to 14 per cent when we control for misclassification.
108
 The 
comparable result from the model that ignores misclassification is around 8 per cent 
                                                          
106
 The identification of the model comes from the fact that certain variables, such as whether a person 
reports if they are overeducated, have children, have undergone recent training and the national 
unemployment rate, are included in the model in the first stage of the estimation procedure but not in 
the second stage and also that the predicted probabilities are non-linear functions of the explanatory 
variables. 
107
 In addition, the standard errors are adjusted in the second stage to take account of the additional 
variance due to the inclusion of generated regressor as described by Newey and McFadden (1994) and 
Murphy and Topel (1985).  
108
 The results in Table 7.12 use a pooled OLS model in the second stage. The comparable estimates 
using a random effects model and a fixed effects model in the second stage are 13.77 per cent and 
14.84 per cent respectively. 
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(see Model 2 in Table 7.9). Therefore failing to control for misclassification leads us 
to seriously underestimate the wage effects of job mobility. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Effect of Different Rates of Measurement Error on 
Estimates 
This section illustrates the effect different rates of misclassification have on the 
estimates of job mobility in the wage growth regressions. It applies the formula for 
attenuation bias described in Section 7.2.3 and uses a range of misclassification rates 
to generate corrected OLS estimates. These „corrected‟ estimates can be compared to 
the pooled estimate of 0.0794 from Model 2 in Table 7.9. Table 7.13 reports adjusted 
OLS estimates for different rates of misclassification. Using the first stage estimates 
of 0  (i.e. the probability that a job stay is misclassified) and 1  (the probability that 
a job change is misclassified) from the previous section generates an adjusted OLS 
estimate of around 0.10, around 30 per cent above the estimate from Model 2 in Table 
7.9.  
 
The table also shows comparable corrected OLS estimates when 0  is assumed to be 
equal to zero and 
1  varies between 1 per cent and 80 per cent. The corrected 
estimates indicate that when 
1  is low that the adjusted estimates are quite close to 
the pooled OLS one. However, as 
1  increases the adjusted estimate moves 
increasingly further away from pooled OLS estimate. In addition, the table reports 
corrected OLS estimates when 0  is 1 per cent and 5 per cent and 1  is assumed to 
be equal to zero. Even for these relatively low rates of misclassification, the adjusted 
OLS estimates are quite far away from the pooled OLS estimate. This stronger impact 
from misclassifying job stays arises from the fact that the proportion of observed job 
changes in the sample is around 8 per cent, so the proportion of job stays is 92 per 
cent and therefore the misclassification rate applies to a much higher number of cases. 
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Table 7.13: Adjusted Pooled OLS Estimates for a Range of Misclassification Rates 
 Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Reference:   
Pooled OLS estimate (from Model 2, Table 7.9) 0.0794*** 0.0182 
   
Corrected OLS Estimates:   
Using 
0 =0.0025 and 1 =0.5113 (from Table 7.12) 0.1008  
   
Varying 
1  (assume 0 =0):   
1 =0.01 0.0795  
1 =0.05 0.0802  
1 =0.10 0.0811  
1 =0.20 0.0832  
1 =0.30 0.0860  
1 =0.40 0.0902  
1 =0.50 0.0968  
1 =0.60 0.1086  
1 =0.70 0.1364  
1 =0.80 0.2798  
   
Varying 
0  (assume 1 =0):   
0 =0.01 0.0903  
0 =0.05 0.2131  
 
Besides measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity, an additional difficulty 
with investigating the effect of job mobility on wage growth is the possible 
endogeneity of job mobility. In particular, there is a potential issue with reverse 
causality; wage growth is affected by job changes but also job changes may occur in 
expectation of higher wage growth. This can be addressed using an instrumental 
variable approach. We need instruments that are highly correlated with job mobility 
and that are uncorrelated with wage growth, so they have no independent effect on 
wage growth other than through job mobility. The approach taken is to use non-wage 
aspects of job satisfaction as instruments for job mobility. 
 
Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen (2004) argue that job satisfaction may be a proxy 
for the worker‟s assessment of the quality of the match. Job satisfaction may capture 
unobserved aspects of work, such as the organisation of work, harsh working 
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conditions etc. As such, job satisfaction should be a strong predictor of job mobility. 
However, the difficulty with using a measure of overall job satisfaction as an 
instrument for job mobility is that we expect a worker‟s satisfaction with earnings to 
dominate such as measure. Therefore it is likely that overall job satisfaction is 
correlated with wage growth. However, the LIS asks workers how satisfied they are 
with different aspects of their job, where satisfaction with earnings is only one 
component. Nonetheless, it may still be the case that satisfaction with earnings 
influences a worker‟s assessment of their satisfaction with other aspects of the job and 
this should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
 
Table 7.14 shows the percentage of workers who are satisfied with various aspects of 
their jobs.
109
 From the table, dissatisfaction with earnings is the most common source 
of dissatisfaction with the job.  
 
Table 7.14: Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Job 
 % Satisfied % Not Satisfied 
Satisfied with:   
Earnings 67% 33% 
Job Security 82% 18% 
Type of Work 90% 10% 
Number of Hours 83% 17% 
Distance to Job/Commuting 88% 12% 
Working Times (i.e. daytime, night-time, shifts etc.) 88% 12% 
Working conditions/environment in place of work 88% 12% 
 
To assess whether satisfaction with wages affects satisfaction with other aspects of the 
job, Table 7.15 reports the percentage of workers satisfied with other areas of their 
jobs of those who are not satisfied with their earnings. The table shows that high 
proportions of workers are satisfied with other areas of their jobs even though they are 
unhappy with their earnings. This indicates that (dis)satisfaction with earnings may 
not influence satisfaction with other areas of the job. Therefore, the non-wage aspects 
of job satisfaction may be appropriate instruments for job mobility. 
 
 
                                                          
109
 Workers are asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with each area of their work on a scale of 1 
to 6, where 1 indicates that they are not satisfied at all and 6 indicates that they are fully satisfied. In the 
table, satisfied corresponds to workers who report a level or 4 or above and not satisfied refers to those 
who report a satisfaction level of 3 or below. 
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Table 7.15: Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Job for those not Satisfied with Earnings 
 % Satisfied % Not Satisfied 
Satisfied with other aspects of job, if not satisfied with earnings:   
Job Security 66% 34% 
Type of Work 80% 20% 
Number of Hours 70% 30% 
Distance to Job/Commuting 83% 17% 
Working Times (i.e. daytime, night-time, shifts etc.) 81% 19% 
Working conditions/environment in place of work 78% 22% 
 
The quality of the instruments can be checked by testing their significance in the first 
stage of the two-step approach. The results from the Hausman et al. modified probit 
estimator that includes all the exogenous variables and all the instruments show that 
satisfaction with distance to job and working conditions are not significant and the 
coefficient on satisfaction with working hours has the incorrect sign and is only 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Consequently, these three variables are dropped 
from the analysis. Satisfaction with job security, type of work and working times are 
used as instruments for job mobility in the first stage. Using the Hausman et al. 
estimator in the first step, we can calculate the probability of truly being a job 
changer,   1Pr * itm . In the second step, the wage growth equation is estimated using 
pooled OLS substituting in for *itm  using the fitted probabilities from the first stage. 
This controls for both misclassification and endogeneity. 
 
As discussed in Section 7.2.3, we expect the IV estimates that don‟t control for 
misclassification to be biased upwards. Table 7.16 shows the results from the two-step 
procedure using IV but where misclassification is ignored i.e. the predicted 
probabilities in the first stage come from a standard probit model.  The estimate on the 
job change dummy variable indicates that the increase in wage growth associated with 
changing jobs is around 26 per cent. This compares to the pooled OLS estimate of 8 
per cent (see Model 2, Table 7.9). As expected, the IV estimate is above the OLS one, 
but it is dramatically higher and arguably implausibly large.
110
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110
 This type of estimate is consistent with what Davia (2005) finds when she controls for endogeneity 
in job mobility using ECHP data. For most of the countries in her analysis, the estimates that control 
for endogeneity are multiples of the pooled OLS estimates (see Davia (2005), Table 2, page 24).  
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Table 7.16: Second Stage IV Estimates of Job Mobility on Wage Growth^ 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Job Change 0.2590*** 0.0706 
   
Number of Observations 4,428  
R-squared 0.0275  
Prob > F 0.0000  
^ Notes: * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. Standard errors are 
clustered by person. The standard errors in the second stage are also adjusted to take account of the fact 
that a generated regressor is included in the model. The second stage model includes the same controls 
as Model 2 in Table 7.9. The first stage model includes the same controls as the first stage model in 
Table 7.12 as well as the three instruments 
 
Table 7.17 shows the results from the two-step approach controlling for both 
endogeneity and misclassification. The estimates of the misclassification probabilities 
from the first stage are practically identical to the estimates in Table 7.12. The second 
stage IV estimate implies that the impact of changing jobs on wage growth is around 
13 per cent, when we control for misclassification. This is around half the IV estimate 
that ignores misclassification, implying that ignoring misclassification leads to a 
significant upwards bias in the IV estimate. In addition, the estimate is around 1.6 
times the size of the pooled OLS estimate but quite similar to the estimate that 
controls for misclassification but ignores the possible reverse causality of job 
mobility.   
 
Table 7.17: IV Estimates of Job Mobility on Wage Growth, Controlling for Misclassification^ 
 Estimate Standard Error 
First Stage Estimates   
0ˆ  0.0072** 0.0030 
1ˆ  0.5107*** 0.1337 
   
Second Stage Estimates   
Job Change 0.1242*** 0.0348 
   
Number of Observations 4,428  
R-squared 0.0274  
Prob > F 0.0000  
^ Notes: * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. Standard errors are 
clustered by person. The standard errors in the second stage are also adjusted to take account of the fact 
that a generated regressor is included in the model. The second stage model includes the same controls 
as Model 2 in Table 7.9. The first stage model includes the same controls as the first stage model in 
Table 7.12 as well as the three instruments.  
 
Finally, Table 7.18 provides a summary of the various estimates of job mobility on 
wage growth. 
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Table 7.18: Summary of Estimates of Job Mobility on Wage Growth 
 Estimate Standard Error 
Pooled OLS (See Model 2, Table 7.9) 0.0794*** 0.0182 
Random Effects (See Table 7.10) 0.0805*** 0.0183 
Controlling for Misclassification (see Table 7.12) 0.1372** 0.0532 
IV (see Table 7.16) 0.2590*** 0.0706 
IV & Controlling for Misclassification (see Table 7.17) 0.1242*** 0.0348 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter adds to the literature on the effect of job mobility on wage growth. The 
chapter finds OLS estimates of the effect of job mobility on wage growth of around 8 
per cent. The chapter also finds that wage effects differ depending on the reason for 
job separation, as expected. Voluntary job changes are associated with a 14 per cent 
increase in wage growth. However, there is no evidence of wage penalties associated 
with involuntary mobility. This may be attributable to the fact that the sample 
considered is one where workers have a very high attachment to the labour force or it 
may be due to the very high growth rates and tightness in the labour market over the 
time period under consideration. 
 
The chapter argues that the OLS estimate of the effect of changing jobs on wage 
growth may be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and also 
because of measurement error which is the main concern of the chapter. The chapter 
finds that the effect of job mobility on wage growth persists even after controlling for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. The magnitude of the estimates obtained from 
OLS regressions and regressions that control for unobserved heterogeneity are 
broadly in line with the existing empirical literature (see Chapter 2). For example, 
OECD (2010) finds a wage premium associated with changing jobs of around 9 per 
cent for Ireland which is very similar to what is found in this chapter. However, these 
estimates ignore measurement error in job changes. 
 
This chapter adopts a two-step approach to controlling for misclassification in a 
binary explanatory variable.  It finds that controlling for misclassification has a 
substantial effect on the estimated impact changing jobs has on wage growth. The 
effect of job mobility on wage growth is estimated to be closer to 14 per cent when 
measurement error is controlled for. Finally, controlling for reverse causality using an 
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instrumental variables approach and ignoring misclassification produces an estimate 
that seems questionably high; however a more plausible estimate is obtained when the 
IV strategy is combined with the measurement error approach. 
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Appendix 7A: Misclassification Bias in Multivariate Regression 
Recall from (7.1) the true model is: 
 
  itititit xmw  
*log               (7A.1) 
 
However, we do not observe the binary variable *
itm , only the mismeasured proxy 
itm , such that: 
 
ititit umm 
*
              (7A.2) 
  
Therefore:   ititititit xumw  log  
        itititit uxm               (7A.3) 
 
The measurement error becomes part of the error term in the regression equation and 
creates an endogeneity bias. To assess the size of the bias consider the probability 
limit of OLS estimator for   in the two variable case: 
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(A linear projection of 
itm  on 
*
itm  is:   ititit mm  
*
100 1 , where it  
is uncorrelated with *
itm , so      itititit xmCovxmCov ,1, *10   ) 
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Appendix 7B: Bias in Instrumental Variable Estimates in a Model 
with a Single Binary Regressor 
Suppose a binary variable, 
itz , that is highly correlated with 
*
itm  is available as an 
instrument. As discussed in Section 7.2.3 the measurement error, 
itu ,  is correlated 
with *
itm , so any instrument which is correlated with 
*
itm  will also generally be 
correlated with the measurement error. When there are no other covariates in the 
model the IV estimator is given by the Wald estimator so that: 
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Expanding the individual terms in (7B.2): 
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         (using the law of iterated expectations) 
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       (where  11Pr *  itit mza  and  01Pr *  itit mzb ) 
 
Similarly: 
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Similarly: 
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Substituting (7B.3), (7B.4), (7B.5) and (7B.6) into (7B.2) yields: 
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       (where    1bac ) 
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Simplifying: 
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Substituting for c in (7B.8) yields: 
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Appendix 7C: Consistency of Estimator in Two-Step Approach 
The two-step approach outlined in Section 7.2.4 can be viewed as a two-step GMM 
procedure. Brachet (2008) argues that the estimator in the two-step approach is 
consistent provided the conditional distribution of truly being a job changer in the first 
stage has been correctly specified.  
 
Brachet (2008) demonstrates the consistency of the estimator by using a model with a 
single binary regressor *
itm  which is assumed to be correctly measured but correlated 
with the error term, as follows: 
 
    ititit mw  
*log               (7C.1) 
 
The first step of the two-step approach comes from the Hausman et al. procedure and 
involves estimating a nonlinear model which has    ititit xxmE *  where  .  
denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution. As the chapter assumes that the 
error terms are normally distributed, a modified probit model is estimated in the first 
step. The second step substitutes the estimate of  itxF   for the variable 
*
itm  for in 
(7C.1) above and the resulting regression model uses the following moment 
condition: 
 
          0log  ititit xwxE             (7C.2) 
 
(7C.2) only holds if    ititit xxmE *  i.e. that the standard normal distribution is the 
correct choice in the first stage. This can be shown as follows: 
  
                ititititititit xxwExExwxE   loglog  
                 itititit xxmExE   *   
          (assuming   0itit xE  ) 
           0  if    ititit xxmE *  
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